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Foreword

I

n the global effort against landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) the
international mine action community is constantly striving to improve the safety,
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of clearance methods. It is widely recognised
that machines can contribute to this endeavour and accordingly their use has increased
and expanded dramatically in recent years.
In addition to the ability of machines to clear land faster than manual methods, they
also offer new approaches to humanitarian demining that can reduce the total amount
of land requiring full clearance. This study looks in detail at these new approaches
with a view to increasing the future efficiency of demining operations.
To further this objective, the study has also generated a software model to measure
the cost-effectiveness of machines in demining. Users of this model, which is known
as CEMOD, are encouraged to share results and experiences so that, collectively,
the machine user community can learn more about which mechanical systems,
procedures or deployment methods are working better and why.
At the same time, it must be recognised that the operational methodology of
machinery in demining is still very much evolving. Considerable further research is
needed to enhance our collective understanding. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the
research conducted offers useful perspectives on machine employment and
development. The CEMOD software is available free of charge from the GICHD
upon request.
The GICHD would like to express its appreciation to the Governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom for their financial
support to this study.

Amb. Martin Dahinden
Director
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining
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Executive summary

Introduction
The last 15 years have seen the evolution of machines used in demining. At
the beginning of the 1990s, the few machines on the market tended to be large
and heavy, often based on converted armoured military vehicles. There is
now a much greater array of machines of varying size and armour protection
to suit the different physical environments and threat levels found in mineaffected regions of the world. Certain trends have emerged, such as the
development of multi-tool systems for multiple tasks, the design and
manufacture of machines in mine-affected countries using indigenous materials
and skills, and the adaptation of commercial earth-moving vehicles for mine
clearance purposes.
A glance at the 35 machines detailed in the GICHD’s Mechanical Demining
Equipment Catalogue 2004 reveals that there is no shortage of machines to choose
from. But this impression belies the fact that machines in demining remain
underused and the market for them is relatively small. Of those listed, very
few have been sold; most specialist demining machines cost more than
US$250,000, and a cost-effective return on such an outlay is not always
perceived. However, A Study of Mechanical Application in Demining
demonstrates the vast potential of machines to make demining more efficient
and faster, either independently or when combined with other clearance
methodologies.

Mechanical clearance
Machines are yet to be fully accepted among deminers as a tool of equal
reliability to the two mainstays of clearance methodology: manual deminers
and mine detection dog (MDD) teams. This results from of a lack of knowledge
as to the capabilities of mechanical demining systems and misunderstanding
as to their potential application. In the early days of humanitarian demining,
machines acquired a reputation for adding less value than expected. They were
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also blamed for a range of negative effects, such as throwing mines into safe
areas, failing to detonate mines or burying them deeper, and causing mines to
become more volatile for subsequent manual deminers. Although some of these
allegations have been well-founded, a decade and a half of technological
development has rendered many of these effects negligible or redundant.
However, this statement is difficult to prove: there is not yet an internationally
agreed and recognised testing and accreditation regime for demining machines,
and empirical data to support the application of machines, however good in
quality, is weak in quantity. Two developments would greatly enhance the
understanding of mechanical application in demining: an increase in the testing
of machines using an appropriate number of test targets — at least 800 for
each machine tested — and closer attention to recording mechanical clearance
data in live operations in order to build up empirical information.
Recent research has shown that, given suitable conditions, machines can be
used as the primary clearance system. This is based on a careful examination
of clearance data of machines used for ground preparation. This data showed
that after the passage of machines manual deminers and MDD teams found no
live items of ordnance in areas known to have previously contained them.
Deminers who use mechanical systems have a good idea as to the most
appropriate environments in which their machines might achieve clearance to
humanitarian standards, but national demining authorities are still reluctant
to accept that machines form the primary clearance method. The lack of
precedents creates a lack of confidence.
An exception to the general reticence to apply machines as the primary clearance
method is mechanical excavation with converted commercial earth-movers.
These machines remove potentially contaminated soil down to a depth
suggested by survey information. It is undisputed that areas treated in this
way are free of ordnance down to the depth excavated. This technique
represents the only current example of machines being employed as the primary
clearance tool, but the practice is not widespread.

Risk assessment
According to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 09.10 — Clearance
Requirements), land “shall be accepted as ‘cleared’ when the demining organisation
has ensured the removal and/or destruction of all mine and unexploded ordnance hazards
from the specified area to the specified depth”. Once an area has been selected for
clearance, it must be treated in this way regardless of the clearance method
selected. However, the process for deciding on which area should be cleared
and which clearance method should be used requires a rational framework.
This can be achieved by using a risk assessment methodology to determine
the probability of a post-clearance mine/UXO incident and the impact this
might have on subsequent users of land. Machines can make a major contribution
to this process by gathering information as part of technical survey. Where
information about a suspect area is weak, a machine passed over the area will
reveal not only the presence of ordnance but also the specific threat; this is
invaluable information for any clearance plan.

Executive summary

Area reduction
Area reduction is a component of the technical survey process. In all clearance
tasks, the great majority of efforts are conducted on ground that subsequently
proves not to contain mines or UXO. Clearance data gathered by the GICHD
from 15 countries suggests that of suspect areas cleared, less than three per
cent actually contained mines or other ordnance (individual items of ordnance
were allocated a ground coverage of one square metre). This suggests that
effective area reduction is the phase of demining where the greatest increases
in efficiency can be made. Thanks to their speed of operation, machines are
best placed to achieve such increases. Manual survey cannot possibly cover
the same area in as little time and should be used only where extremes of
topography rule out the use of machines. Dogs are good at area reduction, but
are far more affected by such vagaries as weather, soil conditions and
vegetation. The importance of improving the speed and reliability of area
reduction operations is recognised by deminers and is reflected in the research
findings of the GICHD publication, Mine Action Equipment: Study of Global
Operational Needs.

Ground preparation
Currently, most mechanical mine clearance operations are in support of manual
deminers and/or MDD teams as ground preparation systems. All case studies
conducted by the GICHD show a significant increase in productivity where
machines are applied to assist manual or MDD methods. Tests and research
have shown that increased productivity is achieved by the removal of vegetation
and tripwires, the turning-over of soil and the reduction of scrap metal
contamination using magnets. Machines can perform all of these functions,
and much faster than any other known method. The optimal machine would
be one that can perform all of these functions in one or two passes of a suspect
area. Such a machine does not exist at present, but it is hoped that future
research will reveal to manufacturers what is most needed.

Protection of vehicles
Many machines employed in demining are commercially available earth-movers,
civilian engineering plant, or agricultural vehicles. To operate in suspected
hazardous areas, operators must be protected against the expected explosive
threat. Usually, the armouring of such machines is left to the respective
demining body. The calculation of appropriate thicknesses, placement, welding,
angles, materials and spacing of armoured plate is often military specification,
information which is not available publicly. This study explains the background
to the principles of armouring vehicles intended to work in suspect areas and
how to assess the probable effectiveness of armour based on the threat. The
information on the protection of vehicles and plant equipment against mines
and UXO is designed to provide demining organisations with a check-list of
practical principles, and is a starting point for those seeking information on
the subject.
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Cost-effectiveness
Case studies of the use of machines in demining revealed a positive effect on
productivity for demining operations. However, cost-effectiveness is not
automatically guaranteed in all cases and, where it is achieved, it might be
improved. The Cost-Effectiveness Model (CEMOD) developed for this study
provides managers with a software tool to input all costs related to the running
of a machine in a mine clearance programme. A cost in US dollars per square
metre can be calculated. The software can also compare machine costeffectiveness with manual and MDD operations within the same programme.
With this information, managers should be better able to use available resources
to maximise cost-efficiency, allowing savings to be made that could be plied
back into operations.

Summary
In sum, the GICHD believes that machines are underused in demining, in
large part due to a lack of understanding by the mine clearance community of
their most suitable roles and applications, and particularly of recent
improvements in design. The GICHD seeks to improve comprehension of
mechanical application in demining, because machines are critical to efforts to
speed up the painfully slow process of clearing the world’s mined areas.
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T

his study is divided into six chapters: mechanical clearance; risk assessment
and mechanical application; mechanical application to area reduction; the
application of machines to ground preparation; the protection of vehicles and
plant equipment against mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); and mechanical
cost-effectiveness.
The chapters have been selected with a view to identifying how machines can improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of clearance operations. Each chapter has its own
aim and methodology, but the overall objective remains the same: to highlight the
advantages and improve the understanding of the use of machines in minefields.
The study was managed by the GICHD’s Operational Methods Section, headed by
Håvard Bach. Input was provided by Mark Buswell, Dr John Gibson, Alexander
Griffiths, Leonard Kaminski, Dan Marsh, Dr Ian McLean, Dave McCracken, Rebecca
Sargisson and Johan Van Zyl. A User Focus Group was established to oversee and
facilitate the study. This group was made up of representatives of prominent
companies and organisations in the mechanical manufacturing, operational, research
and testing sectors.
As Chapter 1 explains, a choice of stand-alone mechanical systems exists — flails,
tillers, rollers, sifters, combined and multi-tool systems, and adapted commercial
engineering machines. The chapter reviews the characteristics of the different systems
and their impact on the ground and mines within it, and considers their potential
for application as the primary clearance method to remove and/or destroy mines
and UXO to humanitarian standards.
Chapter 2 looks at risk assessment and mechanical application. The sub-study that
forms the basis of the chapter uses risk assessment to determine the most appropriate
roles for mechanical systems in reducing the dangers to the civilian population.
Chapter 3 addresses mechanical application to area reduction as part of the technical
survey process. The case studies that form the basis of the chapter assessed techniques
used in area reduction operations by machine and sought to establish a framework
for appropriate mechanical application so as to minimise the clearance requirement.
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Chapter 4 considers the application of machines to ground preparation. This reflects
the potential for machines to be used to prepare the ground for other “follow-up”
clearance methods. Clearance after the use of machines is currently conducted by
manual deminers and/or MDDs.
Chapter 5 looks at the mine and UXO threat to vehicles and plant equipment operating
in the field. The authors discuss the effect of each type of threat on unprotected
vehicles and put forward suggestions on how to enhance the protection of vehicles
and their occupants.
Chapter 6 aims to establish standards for calculations of the cost and productivity of
a machine operating in a minefield. A software package, CEMOD (Cost-Effectiveness
Model), was specially developed to support this objective.
The study’s main conclusions and recommendations complete the body of this report.
Following the bibliography and a list of acronyms, Appendix 1 provides the list of
members of the study’s User Focus Group. Appendix 2 provides a glossary of
technical terms used in the study report.
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Chapter 1

Mechanical clearance

Summary
Manufacturers, research and development agencies and field operators
have largely ceased to regard mechanical clearance — the use of standalone mechanical systems to fully clear minefields — as achievable. Yet,
this sub-study has found evidence from the field to suggest that full
clearance may sometimes be the result of ground preparation by certain
machine systems, notably flails, mechanical excavators and tillers.
Based on the record of demining machines gained since the late 1980s,
machines perform best where soil is not saturated with water or as dry as
dust, and where terrain is not too steep or too rough. Steep gradients pose
one of the most significant limiting factors on the ability of a flail to
operate. Rocky ground is also an important obstacle. However, the precise
circumstances under which humanitarian mine clearance by machine
may occur remain to be determined.

Introduction
Background
Since the start of humanitarian demining at the end of the 1980s, the use of standalone mechanical systems to fully clear minefields — mechanical clearance — has
been hailed as the ultimate goal to which all mechanical development efforts should
be directed. A decade and a half later, expectations have greatly diminished.
Manufacturers, research and development (R&D) agencies and field operators have
largely ceased to regard mechanical clearance by machine as achievable. As a
consequence, mechanical systems have typically been deployed in clearance operations
in conjunction with manual demining and MDDs, for ground preparation, area
reduction and, as part of the quality control process, cleared area confirmation.

Terms of reference
A choice of stand-alone mechanical systems exists — flails, tillers, rollers, sifters,
combined and multi-tool systems, and adapted commercial engineering machines.
This chapter reviews the characteristics of these systems, their impact on the ground
and mines within it, and considers their potential for mechanical clearance.
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The term “mechanical clearance” is here defined as the application of machines
as the primary clearance method to remove and/or destroy mines and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) from a given area to the quality of clearance laid down for
clearance by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Manual or MDD
teams may, of course, be subsequently used as independent quality assurance
(QA) of the area.
Insufficient information is available on the physical consequences for the ground
and any mines under or on its surface from the beating of a flail, the grinding of a
tiller, or other forces exerted by various systems. Testing of machinery using live,
surrogate or dummy mines has been limited. Some manufacturers, national
testing agencies and mine action centres have conducted testing and accreditation
of vehicles in order to gauge their level of effectiveness, but these could be further
developed.
Missed mines and any possible relationship to mechanical systems are not extensively
recorded. Often, they are only noted when they are the cause of an accident or
incident. Independent QA is still not widely carried out, particularly outside Europe,
and records that are kept may be jealously guarded, incomplete or inaccurate.

Chapter layout
Following this introduction, the remainder of the chapter has five sections.
Section 1 addresses flail systems. It describes how flails function and explains some
of the physical limitations on their capability for ground processing.
Section 2 reviews tiller systems, describing how they function and the physical
limitations that may affect their capability for ground processing.
Section 3 discusses mechanical excavation, giving an overview of the technique of
soil excavation and subsequent treatment/cleansing of potentially mine-affected,
excavated soil.
Section 4 gives a brief overview of mine rollers and steel-wheeled vehicles, describing
their successful role in area reduction and the reasons for their unsuitability for
mechanical clearance.
Section 5 contains the conclusions, findings and recommendations of the sub-study
research and assesses the implications for the possible use of machines as the primary
clearance tool in the future.
Additional empirical evidence of machines clearing to humanitarian standards is
provided in Annex 1 to this chapter.

Flail systems
Introduction
The most common type of mechanical system currently on the market is the flail.
Flails have a long pedigree: prototypes saw service in the 1914-1918 war and were
used extensively during the 1939-1945 war. From then until the early 1990s, however,
flail systems developed slowly. It was the emergence of humanitarian demining
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that provided the impetus for advances in flail technology. More R&D funding has
been invested in improving flails than in any other system.
Flails have largely developed as a result of market forces — improvements carried
out by private mechanical engineering firms in the business for profit — but also
through the work of national militaries. All operate according to the same principle:
a rotating axle, shaft or drum with attached lengths of chain-link along its surface
that impart violent impact to the ground when rotated at speed. Some flail designs
have an advantage when encountering anti-tank mines. The stand-off provided by
the distance of the chains to the flail unit axle allows the blast to dissipate somewhat
before contact with the vehicle hull is made.1 Mostly, however, flails are regarded
as a tool against anti-personnel mines and small items of UXO.2

Flail strike characteristics
There is a lack of information on the sub-surface physical effects of mechanical
clearance systems on mines. A length of chain hitting the ground at speed forms the
core working methodology of all flail systems. The target is the ground and/or
mines and UXO contained within it. The impact of the flail with its target is referred
to as a flail strike. Three characteristics of flail strike are identified: a disruptive strike,
a detonation strike and an ejection strike (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Flail strike characteristics

Adapted from an original in Lower (2001).

Disruptive strike
A disruptive strike refers to a strike of the flail resulting in a mine or UXO
becoming physically damaged. In the worst-case scenario, ordnance is damaged
but is still functional, potentially becoming more dangerous than before it was
struck. Preferably, and more usually, a disruptive strike will result in the ordnance
being broken up to a point where it no longer functions. Fully functioning mines
can be disrupted rather than detonated when struck by a flail so that the fuse
mechanism fails to function correctly. In addition, mines that are disrupted may
have become inoperative at some stage of their history since being laid and would
not have functioned in the conventional manner. There is no known method to
predict the ratio of mine break-ups between functional and non-functional antipersonnel mines.
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It may be acceptable that when a flail is deployed to prepare ground for later clearance
by other methods, mines are broken up to the extent that they are inoperable. The
mine is no longer a threat to subsequent clearance personnel. The broken pieces are
frequently found in a radius not significantly greater than the radius previously
covered by the intact mine. Sometimes, however, random fragments can be strewn
over a wide area. The spread of mine fragments may depend on the type of mine
struck and the soil type and depth in which the mine was laid. The greater the
depth, the less the spread of mine fragments but the less the corresponding likelihood
of destroying the mine.
According to a number of operators, certain flails are capable of breaking up specific
mine types into fragments no bigger than a thumb nail. If such systems are deployed
across a suspect area for more than one sweep, results can be so effective that further
clearance methods bear more resemblance to quality control (QC) than actual
clearance. Small fragments of explosive material do, though, remain and would be
signalled by MDDs, were they to be subsequently used. Metal fragments/small mine
components would also be located by metal detectors. This approach has limitations,
possibly dictated by mine type, soil type and topography; the parameters of these
limitations are yet to be determined. The implications, though, are that given suitable
conditions against suitable mine types, it may be possible to predict situations where
flails could operate as a stand-alone clearance system.
Detonation strike
A detonation strike refers to a flail strike upon a mine or the soil above it causing
it to detonate as a result of the impact of the chain initiating the fuse sequence.
Detonation greatly helps area reduction as the presence of mines is immediately
indicated. Detonations are not always complete. On occasions the fuse will
function but the main body of the mine fails to explode (for example, because of
moisture ingress). These are known as partials. Experience shows that mine type,
soil conditions, engine power, ground penetration ability and the forward speed
of the machine may influence whether a mine will detonate or break up when
flailed.
Depending on the type of mine, a detonation may result in particles of mine casing
fragments being distributed over a wide radius. Although the threat from the mine
has been removed, detonation during mechanical ground preparation — where the
task of the machine is to prepare the ground for primary clearance by other means
— causes complications for subsequent operations over the same area for manual or
MDD teams. If the mines were of a large metal content, thousands of metal splinters
are indicated by metal detectors. For MDDs, explosive molecules create extensive
contamination over the area to be cleared. 3 Thus, manual and MDD clearance
operations over ground previously prepared by machines where the majority of
mines were detonated is safer but may sometimes be more time consuming than if
they had only been broken up.
Ejection strike
An ejection strike is a flail strike resulting in a mine being picked up and thrown
clear of the flail unit. This effect is commonly known as a throw-out. In general, flail
operators have found throw-outs to be a relatively rare occurrence, although the
exact frequency is not known. It is likely, but difficult to prove, that throw-outs are
caused by an incomplete strike of a chain link upon a mine. Instead of being broken
up or detonated, the mine is raised from the ground to become briefly entangled in
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the mêlée of the rotating chains before being disgorged forwards in the path of the
vehicle or to the side.
If the mine is thrown in front of the continuing path of the machine, it is unlikely to
escape detonation or break-up a second time. Mines thrown into a previously cleared
or non-suspect area pose more of a problem by creating suspect ground out of minefree land.
Throw-outs are the principal contention among detractors of flail systems as a primary
clearance tool. According to a number of field operators, mechanical engineers have
made improvements to flail systems such that certain machines have almost
completely eliminated the problem of throw-outs.4

Physical forces of flailing
A length of hammer-tipped chain link slammed onto the ground will be attended by
a variety of violent physical forces, each affecting the result against a mine/UXO
target in different ways. What these forces consist of, and their exact contribution
towards a flail system destroying mines and UXO, is not entirely understood. In
order to smooth out the problems of flail technology, it is important that the effect
of these physical forces is as fully understood as possible. The impediments to flail
efficiency can perhaps be negated, at least partially, by adjustments to flail power,
the forward speed of the machine, hammer shape, ground depth penetration, flail
shaft height in relation to the ground and flail shaft helix configuration (see below), to
name only a few.
The features of a particular flail design may overcome some physical limitations
while simultaneously accentuating the negative effects of others. It is a fine balance.
A system effective in one soil may be less effective in another. The individual
components that make up a flail need to be rationalised. The nature of soil mechanics
may play a crucial role.
It is sensible to attempt to unravel what is happening to the chains as they hit the
ground, drag through it, and continue their rotation through the next 360º cycle.
Understanding of what actions occur in the ground when struck by a flail also
requires investigation. To date, only limited scientific research has been
conducted, notably the study by DRES (now Defence Research and Development
Canada — Suffield) on behalf of the Canadian Centre of Mine Action Technologies
(CCMAT).
The following is a simplified extrapolation of the findings of the study published in
1999 by DRES.5 Some of the terminology has been altered for ease of understanding.
The DRES study is largely theoretical, based on tests carried out at their test facility
and never in live minefields. The findings require further verification, and it is
possible that results would be different if the principles stated in the study were put
to use in real field conditions. However, the Canadian study increases our
understanding of the limitations of flailing as well as its potential.
The main forces
Two main forces have been identified in attempting to rationalise the physical
phenomena endured by the chain links of a flail in operation, and in the ground it
strikes (see Fig. 2 overleaf).
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Fig. 2. Force 1 and Force 2 characteristics

Adapted from an original in Shankla
(2000).

Force 1
Force 1 (F1)6 is the physical force which describes the sequence of actions that occur
the moment an individual chain impacts with the ground. These actions would change
slightly, depending on the hammer shape and whether a hammer is fitted to the end
of a chain. The chain has extended itself straight due to the centrifugal force imparted
on it by the high-speed rotation of the shaft to which it is attached.
From the moment the ground interrupts the trajectory of the end of the chain in its
circular path, F1 plays its part. F1 takes place in the ground struck by the chain, but
not along the chain itself. The ‘F’ in F1 is impact force. It can be expressed as a
function of hammer mass (or in the case of a chain without hammer, the end link or
links), angular velocity, flail radius and stopping time. Stopping time is represented
by the ground, which provides resistance to the path of the chain. The power of the
stopping time is reliant upon the characteristics and composition of the soil, a subject
dealt with below.
F1 is responsible for the positive function of a flail: the initial impact of the end of
the chain causes the mine to detonate or shatter. It therefore stands that F1 should
be maximised so that detonation or shattering is the result.
Force 2
Force 2 (F2)7 refers to various forces unleashed the instant F1 is played out. The
chain is still being propelled at approximately the same speed as at F1, but is no
longer straight as it fights against the ground into which it has been driven, and is
dragged along until continuing upwards and away from the ground in its next cycle.
F2 is the horizontal drag through and across the ground that has been penetrated as
a result of F1. F2 accounts for three possible consequences when flailing. All of them
negatively affect flail performance.
1. Bulking
Sometimes referred to as overburden, bulking is the loosened soil created by the
action of the flail dragged through and across the impacted ground. Bulking is an
effect well understood by the construction engineering and agricultural industries.
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The measure of the bulking factor of soil is its volume after excavation divided by
volume before excavation. As the flail moves along its path, a trail of loosened soil is
left in its wake. In the event of a mine being missed by the flail, overburden may
serve to conceal missed mines under a depth of loosened soil, exacerbating the
difficulty of locating missed ordnance after a machine has completed its sweep. The
amount of overburden created varies between mechanical systems and soil types.
It has been discovered that overburden can
be significant enough so that some current
models of metal detector are unable to detect
mines and UXO buried as a result of it. The
amount of overburden created increases the
deeper a machine is required to flail. A ground
penetration depth of 20 centimetres will
produce roughly twice the amount of
overburden created by flailing to a depth of
10 centimetres.
2. Throw-outs
Throw-outs have been explained above in
the section describing an ejection strike.
Throw-outs occur as a result of the F2 phase
of flail action. A length of chain having not
achieved a hit on a mine during phase F1
may contact it during its subsequent
horizontal path (F2) through and across the
ground, picking it up and propelling it out
of the flail rotunda.

Fig. 3. SWEDEC test area demonstrating
overburden/soil bulking.

3. Ridges/skipped zones
The pattern created by the points at which Fig. 4. Beaten zone of a flail system. Small
of the ground show where
chains are attached to the flail shaft is referred sections
chains may not have achieved a
to as helix configuration. A flail helix complete strike.
configuration is usually designed so that when
chains have hammers connected which are of greater circumference than chain links,
all strikes upon the ground should be overlapped by adjacent hammers. The intended
result is that no section of ground is missed by the flail. At reoccurring intervals, F2
defeats this aim. Once the impact at F1 has played out, the chain length buckles as
the horizontal plane does not permit it to remain straight, as during its unimpeded
flight prior to ground strike. The chain kinks and buckles in a snake-like motion.
During phase F2, the overlap of impacting chains achieved at F1 is disrupted, allowing
points of ground along the path of the machine to be skipped over.
It is conceivable that a mine/UXO could be situated within such skipped zones,
which appear as ridges with an unbroken surface, islands within the trail of the
machine, unless these are covered by overburden. Some flail manufacturers have
minimised this effect by a combination of improvements to flail helix designs and,
through increased rotation speed, achieving more strikes to the ground per metre.
For certain flails, ridges/skipped zones remain a problem. On some flails, such likely
shortcomings are immediately predictable due to the sparse positioning of the chains
attached to a shaft.
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Fig. 5. Skipped zones (illustration exaggerates effect)

Adapted from an original in Shankla (2000).

The manner in which a machine is operated will also have implications on the degree
that ridges/skipped zones present a problem. Better results are recorded by machine
operators when ground penetration depth selected is 10 centimetres or less. The
lesser depth of penetration appears to minimise the ‘’snaking’’ effect of chain lengths
as they are dragged through and across the ground. Certain clearance contracts
may dictate that systems must penetrate beyond 10 centimetres. The result may be
an increase in ridges/skipped zones.
Forward speed of the machine also plays a part. In general, the slower the vehicle is
driven while flailing the ground, the lesser the likelihood of ridges/skipped zones.
Unfortunately, a slower-moving vehicle reduces productivity.
The DRES study argues that the increase of one of the force components leads to a
corresponding decrease in the other and vice versa. Therefore, if the positive F1 is
increased, the negative F2 will decrease to a corresponding degree. If this is the
case, overburden, throw-outs and ridges/skipped zones can be reduced although
not eliminated. Elimination of F2 would require a flail to use rigid arms instead of
chains which give way when striking the
ground. A stiff limbed flail (‘’fixed link’’)
would cause tremendous shock to a
machine that could not possibly be
absorbed by all but the heaviest chassis.
DRES constructed a fixed link flywheel
at their test facility. The violence imparted
to the flywheel was so great that the fixed
link was adapted to incorporate a ‘’kneejoint’’ in the middle of each fixed link in
order to absorb some of the shock.
Currently, this design is showing high
potential, achieving good results in tests
against surrogate mines.

Fig. 6. Aardvark MK IV, Balkans.

There are other means of increasing F1 at the expense of F2 for conventional chain
flails. An increase of power to the flail shaft results in greater revolutions per minute,
causing a much enhanced initial strike onto the ground (F1). The horizontal drag
through and across the ground (F2) is curtailed. Where practicable, selection of a
lesser ground-penetration depth may create advantages. Slower forward speed of
the machine reduces productivity but is a preventive measure against ridges/skipped
zones as it concentrates more strikes upon the soil per metre.
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Impact stress distribution and soil movement
When the end of a chain impacts with the ground, a reaction is set off in the soil.
Shock waves travel in roughly isotropic circles (i.e. equal in all directions) from the
point of impact, travelling out in ever-widening but ever-weakening arcs in the
manner of the ripple pattern caused by an object thrown into a pool of still water.
The area beneath the surface of the ground affected by shock waves as a result of
being struck by the end of a flailing chain is referred to as the influence zone. The
DRES study indicates that if the blow is delivered hard enough, ordnance within
the influence zone may detonate or break up:
“The hammer impact forces the soil located under the hammer to give way and
move. The pattern of soil particle movement depends on soil conditions. The impact
of the hammer causes the soil particles located directly in front of it to move in the
direction of travel with the same speed as the hammer. Hammer movement also
affects the other soil particles located to the right and left side of the hammer. The
cohesion and adhesion properties of the soil particles influence the relative movement
of soil particles. Some of this movement is in the direction of the hammer and some
towards the sides of the direction of hammer travel. Soil particles go forward and at
the same time they may move to the sides until they are outside of the influence of
the hammer, and finally, the hammer passes them and they come to rest.”
Fig. 7. Sub-surface influence zones

Adapted from an original in
Shankla (2000).

The pattern of movement of soil particles underneath the hammer suggests the
existence of an influence zone underneath the hammer. To simplify understanding,
it can be assumed that the influence zone has a circular shape and moves with the
hammer. The iso-intensity circles that are attached to each other at the hammer
impact point create the influence zone. As the radius of the zone increases, the soil
movement decreases. The smallest circle of the zone has the highest intensity as the
soil particles close to the hammer have the highest tendency for movement. The
largest circle that is representative of the soil particles some distance away from the
hammer have the least tendency for movement.
The path of the movement of soil particles are lines drawn perpendicular to each
circle’s perimeter. Arrows show the path of movement of the soil particles. The
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magnitude and direction of the movement of each soil particle depend on its location
within the influence zone. Soil particles located directly under the hammer will have
the same velocity as the hammer. The velocity of soil particles would decrease towards
the perimeter away from the centre of the influence zone. The points located outside
of the influence zone would have no velocity and hence will not move.
Soil underneath the hammer is considered to have a semi-infinite dimension. At the
start of the hammer impact, soil particles located beneath the hammer are displaced
downward. After rearrangement of soil particles, when there is no margin for further
soil compaction underneath the hammer, soil particles start to move to the sides.
The influence zone is thought to move with the hammer. The movement of the
hammer will affect soil particles located in a width equal to the largest diameter of
the influence zone.
Depending on the location of the soil particles, the influence zone will be affected by
one of the iso-intensity circles. The movement of the soil particles will be proportional
to the intensity of the corresponding circle. Direction of movement of the soil particle
will be perpendicular to the perimeter of the circle where the particles would be
located. After this movement, the soil particles will attain a new position. A flail
moving over a buried mine will, depending on its forward speed, initiate a series of
impact points, each giving rise to a series of iso-intensity circles with their respective
zones of influence.
Fig. 8. Soil stress distribution on a target

Adapted from an original in Shankla (2000).

An anti-personnel mine buried within the reach of these influence zones will
experience increased pressure depending on the mine’s location with respect to the
point of hammer impact and the intensity of the impact. It is suggested that designers
working on improving flails for mine neutralisation should focus on flails that create
influence zones of the required duration and intensity, and of a diameter that is
greater than the depth of ground required to be clear of anti-personnel mines.
It is the influence zone comprised of iso-intensity circles as a result of F1 that may
account for the destruction of mines/UXO when a direct hit from a flail hammer (or
chain link) is not achieved. A possibility exists that this indirect violence may be an
effective way of destroying mines/UXO, largely because it presents an opportunity
to minimise flail ground-penetration and the consequent negative effects of this as
earlier identified.
Stress distribution in soil is not a new science, but not much of the knowledge in this
field has been used by flail designers. Figure 9 overleaf shows soil stress distribution
with contiguous and uniform iso-intensity circles. For ease of explanation, it was
assumed by the DRES study that soil is elastic, homogeneous and isotropic. Actual
soil is never all of these things at any given time but varies greatly in type and
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consistency, and can be afflicted with roots, stones and foreign objects. It can be
assumed that the size and velocity of an influence zone imparted by a flail strike
depends to a large extent on particular soil conditions.
Fig. 9. Effects of soil on impact zones

Adapted from an original in Shankla (2000).

Limitations imposed by soil, terrain and vegetation: extreme situations
Difficult ground and terrain are among the most limiting factors in the deployment
of mechanical assets. Severe gradients, heavy vegetation, boggy ground, rocks and
boulders can all determine whether a machine can be set to work in a particular
suspect area. Different machines will be defeated by different levels of difficulty.
Some ground and terrain limitations are related to problems suffered by the prime
mover to which a flail may be attached, e.g. difficult traction or lack of power to
operate uphill, and as such do not fall within the scope of this study. Other constraints
may be due to the inability of a flail tool to contend with extremes of soil and terrain,
factors of relevance to understanding flail action or appropriate identification of
mechanical tasks.
Based on the records of demining machines since the late 1980s, machines perform
best where soil is not saturated with water or as dry as dust, and where terrain is
not too steep or too rough. Steep gradients pose one of the most significant limiting
factors on the ability of a flail to operate. Manufacturers claim that current models
of flail can move up inclines of 25º-45º (though only one machine was said to be
capable of 45°). Most machines operate within the 30º-35º range, and even these
figures refer more to ‘’hill-climbing ability’’, the ability of the prime mover to drive
up a hill.8 It is doubtful that a flail tool can actually operate at gradients in excess of
30º. This restricts the use of flails over many types of terrain.
Rocky terrain is an obstacle to the effective deployment of flails. In broad terms,
rocks begin to cause serious problems for flails when they are of five centimetres in
diameter or more. The degree to which rocks create difficulty depends on the
particular consistency of local stone, the power of the flail and the mass of the chains
and hammers. Rocks and stones provide a shield to mines that lie beneath or near to
them, greatly increasing the probability of a missed mine or an ineffectual, glancing
blow.9 Individual chains of the flail cannot connect with nooks and crannies protected
by rocks. This problem has proved particularly acute in Lebanon, where the United
Nations-coordinated operation in the south of the country has barred flails from
attempting mechanical clearance.
The work-limiting parameters of soil and terrain are particular to individual machines.
MDD and manual teams have similar restrictions of soil and terrain, except that
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their parameters are somewhat wider. When a machine is operated in a physical
environment which suits its capabilities, full clearance is often achieved.
Ground penetration depth
The degree of ground penetration depth when operating a flail has significant
implications on the forces at play during flailing. Currently, one of the main uses for
machines in mine action is ground preparation. The ground preparation role for
mechanical application is explained in Chapter 4. The sub-study on which the chapter
is based concluded that machines are of more assistance to manual and MDD teams
as well as more economically viable if they both cut vegetation and break up the
ground. Currently, the IMAS state that clearance on a suspect area must be conducted
to a depth indicated by a technical survey or at least down to the default depth of 13
centimetres. Many national mine action centres and commercial contracts stipulate
that clearance should be conducted down to 20 centimetres.
Yet, according to a number of machine operators, maintaining a ground-penetration
depth of the flail of 10 centimetres or slightly less appears to achieve better results.10
Moreover, according to the DRES study, beating the ground with a flail with limited
indentation to the ground may have a destructive effect on mines/UXO while at the
same time reducing the negative effects caused by F2. It is asserted that this is a
result of stress distribution and soil movement upon impact of a flail. Although not
yet known, it is likely that there is an optimum ground-penetration depth at which
flails are most effective. This would probably vary depending on the model of flail.
Effects of hammer geometry
The ability of a flail to produce energy in soil sufficient to detonate or break up antipersonnel mines may be affected by hammer mass and geometry. The DRES study
was based on the assumption that flail chains are fitted with a hammer. Flail chains
without a hammer were not considered. Many flail operators interviewed during
the research of this sub-study do not re-attach hammers onto chains, even when
using systems for which hammers were part of design specifications. It appears that
this omission is related to cost and wear-and-tear problems. Also, if a machine is
employed purely in the ground preparation role rather than for clearance, hammerless
flails appear to be effective.
The shape of a hammer may have a crucial role in flailing that is only partially
understood by the demining community. It was earlier argued that the force
component F2 may be the culprit behind soil bulking, throw-outs and ridges/skipped
zones. This in turn was connected to the ground penetrating action of the flail. The
ability of an individual flail to penetrate the ground is influenced by the shape of the
hammer attached to it. Sharp-edged, chisel-shaped hammers will tend to cut deeper
than rounded hammers. A blunt-edged or rounded hammer will reduce the ploughing
action and surface disruption thereby minimising the effects of F2. Chisel-shaped
hammers may increase the likelihood of a mine being shifted from its position without
being rendered inoperable.
The DRES study argues that reduced surface indentation and penetration afforded
by rounded hammers minimise the negative aspects of flails and accentuate their
potential role in clearance. This has yet to be proven, and after initial field tests
appears unlikely.
If, however, this concept does prove to be correct, something resembling the shape
of a ball may be the optimal hammer geometry. It is not currently known if the
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fitting of rounded hammer shapes would have implications on a flail’s ability to deal
with vegetation. Hammers do play a role in vegetation cutting, but it is mainly the
chain links themselves that fulfil the cutting action. The answer to this must await
future test results and/or empirical evidence.
Fig. 10. Selection of hammer types

Adapted from an original in Shankla (2000).

Engine power and shaft height above the ground
The effect of engine power on a flail’s ability to defeat mines has been briefly touched
on. As suggested by the DRES study, in order to improve flail performance, force
component F1 must be increased at the expense of F2. Theoretically, one way to
achieve this is to increase the power from a prime mover to the flail attachment. The
hammer or chain-link hits the ground with greater force. The influence zone is
increased and thereby the potential to break up or detonate mines. A lowering of
the flail shaft to the ground will also accentuate the force of a chain strike.
At the same time, though, the stand-off distance, which may be an advantage to flail
systems in general, is compromised. This is due to the flatter angle between the
shaft and the centre of the hammer mass at impact. However, both increase of power
and decrease of flail shaft height above the ground also increase the potential for
flail link to penetrate soil. This would in turn increase the negative effects associated
with force component F2. To counteract this, a possible solution is a rounded hammer,
which would increase the impact on the ground and reduce the ill-effects of ground
penetration.
Some flail machines rely on the same power source for forward drive of the vehicle
and flail shaft rotation. When a machine begins to struggle in difficult ground, power
is taken away from the flail unit and given to the prime mover so that it may continue
along its route. As a consequence, the flail slows down and chain impact weakens,
as does its influence zone. Chains take longer in their dragging, horizontal path
along the ground before the next cycle of rotation. The chances of throw-outs,
overburden and skipped zones are potentially increased.
Machines with a guaranteed uniform flow of power to the flail head gain a distinct
advantage. Despite difficult terrain, they can maintain rapid and powerful strikes
against the ground, delivering a near-constant influence zone beneath the ground.
Possibly, with an optimal hammer design, force component F2 would be reduced.
High power also maintains a higher number of chain strikes per metre. A number of
authorities have asserted that at least 70-80hp per metre of flail shaft must be
maintained to achieve rotation speed sufficient for effective mine destruction (and
reduced effects of F2). This is an approximate figure, which requires further testing.
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Fig. 11. Armtrac 100.

Forward speed
Much of how a flail affects mines/UXO relies on a combination of the gearbox of the
prime mover and the way it is driven by the operator. A balance must be found and
maintained whereby a machine is driven slow enough to allow the flail to achieve a
high number of strikes on ground within its path, but fast enough so as to maintain
productivity. Too great a forward speed risks small segments of ground not receiving
strikes from the flail (i.e. skipped zones). This can be partially alleviated by greater
power to the shaft as the flail will turn faster and strike more often.
During research in Lebanon, two operators of the Armtrac 100 flail, one from the
mine clearance company, BACTEC, the other from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
found that forward speed of flail machines had a significant effect on what happens
to mines. Operators from both organisations report that as the vehicle is driven
faster, more anti-personnel mines (mostly the Israeli No 4 and sometimes the Italian
VS 50) tend to detonate than break up. At slower speed, more break-ups occur than
detonations. It is not known if this is caused by the soil, which is very rocky with
large boulders, or the types of mine found in Lebanon, or a combination of the two.
(The speeds here referred to are not exact and were simply described as “faster”
and “slower”.) This phenomenon is not recorded in any other theatre of operations
using this machine. It is therefore unlikely that the vehicle itself is the cause.
Dog handlers working for the U.S. company, RONCO, indicated that when deploying
dogs on clearance subsequent to a flail, mine break-ups are the preferred result as
contamination covered less ground than detonations. LAF flail operators reduce
forward speed in accordance with this. It is not fully understood why changes in
forward speed affect the result against some anti-personnel mines. The GICHD
intends to investigate this, as well as the suggestion by the Mine Action Coordination
Centre for Southern Lebanon that anti-personnel mines struck by a flail but not
detonated can sometimes be rendered more dangerous than had they not been flailed
at all.
Mine type
Mines may be anti-personnel or anti-tank and come in different shapes, sizes and
designs. The types of mine encountered, as well as their condition, affect whether
or not a flail will successfully destroy them. Fuse sensitivity, for instance, can be a
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result of design, or the result of its conditions of storage, handling or emplacement.
The amount of time a mine spends in the ground and the climatic conditions it has
endured will also influence whether or not it is still functioning. Water ingress, for
example, is a suspected reason why mines might fail to operate as intended. Certain
mines tend to degrade faster than others. For instance, the Soviet PMD 6 has a
wooden body that disintegrates particularly quickly underground. In Eritrea, a region
with a fairly dry climate, local people state that it is rare to find a PMD 6 still intact
10 years after it has been laid. Often, this mine will be broken up by flail action
instead of detonated.
It is generally recognised that flails do not consistently destroy thick-cased, abovesurface fragmentation mines. They are usually taken up by the action of the flail, but
will frequently survive intact with the increased inconvenience of being removed to
a new and sometimes unknown location. On the positive side, tripwires are ripped
out and fuses are usually broken off. If a flail is put to work in a suspect area where
fragmentation mines are mixed with sub-surface blast mines, it must be assumed by
the relevant clearance agency that back-up by alternative clearance techniques must
be subsequently employed on the understanding that anti-personnel fragmentation
mines are the likely residue.
A subject that has aroused much concern is the possibility that, with certain types of
mine, a strike that achieves neither detonation nor complete break-up may render
the mine in a more sensitive state than before the intervention. There is little evidence
to support this case, but it cannot be discounted. In sum, far more research is required
regarding the factors posed by mine type when flailing.

Tiller systems
Introduction
The second largest family of purpose-built demining machines is the tiller. Most
tillers are based on tank or forestry machine chassis. Accordingly, tillers are often
characterised by their heavy weight and large size, although lighter designs are
beginning to enter the market. In general, the tiller working tool consists of a rotating
drum fitted with overlapping rows of steel alloy teeth or bits. The teeth grind and
chew up the ground as the tiller drum is lowered to a selected depth. Anti-personnel
mines, smaller items of UXO and, for certain models, anti-tank mines, are either
detonated or broken up as the steel bits impale them.
Due to the large size of most tillers, difficulties are often experienced when operating
in countries where infrastructure is poor. Once working, however, clearance results
appear to be good. Suspect ground is “brutalised” by these powerful machines and,
if operated correctly in a suitable environment, few items of ordnance are likely to
escape destruction by the bits of a tiller drum.
The majority of tiller systems are manufactured in Austria, Germany and Sweden.
Currently, there are five manufacturers of tiller machines in the weight range of 1453 tonnes. In addition, there are two combined systems: the STS MineWolf tiller/
flail, which has a light tiller attachment and weighs 24.7 tonnes with the tiller fitted,
and the Redbus Mineworm (part of the combined Land Mine Disposal System —
LMDS) weighing 15 tonnes.
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Fig. 12. Bofors Mine-Guzzler.

Limited research has been invested in understanding the physical effects unleashed
in the ground and against mines by the action of a tiller. Compared to flails, there is
a dearth of empirical data. In some cases, specific tillers that gave lacklustre
performance in controlled tests went on to refute test results with successful
application in the field.11

Tiller bite characteristics
Tillers work by the action of sharp blades, tines, teeth or bits fixed to a rotating
drum pushed by the heavy bulk of the prime mover. The tiller unit interjects with
the soil directly, taking a bite out of the ground to a depth selected by an operator
from 0 to 40 centimetres. The impact with ground and ordnance within it is referred
to as a bite. Three characteristics of tiller bite with regard to its effect on a mine/
UXO are identified. These are similar to those of
flail strikes and are therefore dealt with briefly:
Disruptive bite
A disruptive bite on a mine/UXO from a tiller
unit refers to where ordnance becomes physically
damaged by involvement with the tiller bits.
Items of ordnance can be broken up to the point
where they are rendered harmless or only
partially damaged, whereupon the item may Fig. 13. Opposite-revolving tiller
drums, Rhino.
become more volatile than before the action of
the tiller. It is probable that mines/UXO are
disrupted when the fuse of the item has failed to function (i.e. the mine was a dud),
or the angle of attack from a tiller bit was such that direct contact with the fuse was
avoided and the casing was ruptured before the ordnance was able to function
correctly. Where ordnance is broken up sufficiently so that it no longer presents a
threat, disruptive bites have a positive outcome.
Detonation bite
A detonation bite refers to the destruction of ordnance where the item is detonated.
The interruption of a tiller bit upon a mine/UXO or the pressure exerted when
caught between a bit and the ground (especially hard ground) may cause the fuse
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mechanism to actuate. Partials, where the fuse functions but the main charge does
not, are considered a detonation bite.
Ejection bite
An ejection bite describes a mine that is picked up from its position in the ground
and thrown to a new location. As with flails, an ejection bite leads to a throw-out.
Throw-outs with tillers are not common. Those that occur generally result in an
item of ordnance being thrown in a line ahead of the machine and not to the side.
The opinion from the field is that throw-outs from tillers are less of a problem than
with flails.
Fig. 14. Tiller bite characteristics

A. Griffiths

Physical forces of tilling
The action of tilling is fundamentally different to that of flailing. Whereas flails not
only affect a target directly, but also, potentially, indirectly through sub-soil waves
of energy, the action of a tiller is direct. Beyond the physical reach of the tiller bite,
the potential to destroy ordnance disappears.
Certain tiller operators have remarked on a number of negative effects of tiller
action upon soil and ordnance within it. These are slipstreaming, burying, soil
bulking, throw-outs and bow wave. In the main, these observed phenomena are
not written down and have not been verified by scientific examination. Some of
these phenomena have been noticed during machine tests conducted by the
Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining Centre (SWEDEC), but they
did not form the subject of those tests. In future, these effects may be subjected
to greater technical scrutiny but, in any event, they appear to be rare. Based on
available evidence from the field, they represent possible rather than probable
outcomes and do not appear to seriously threaten the clearance abilities of most
tiller systems.
Slipstreaming
Slipstreaming refers to the theoretical phenomenon whereby the rotating action of
the tiller drum creates a thin layer of free space between the end surface of the tiller
bits and the surface of the ground beneath. Although as yet unproven, this space
may contain aerated, loosely-packed debris such as broken-up soil, small stones and
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mulched vegetation. On occasions, depending on the design of the teeth fixed to the
drum, the soil type being engaged and the mine type concerned, ordnance may
become situated within the slipstream and escape destruction. It appears that the
occurrence of slipstream beneath a tiller drum is aided by increasing rotation speed.
It can resemble the effect of a vehicle tyre spinning on icy ground while remaining
static.
The slipstream effect is also increased by dry, light soil conditions. Reportedly, where
light to medium vegetation is present in an area worked by a tiller, slipstreaming is
significantly reduced. This appears to be due to the additional “grip” on the soil
provided by mulched vegetation matter. When vegetation of above-medium thickness
is encountered, the performance of a tiller begins to be degraded as with any other
mechanical system.
Once an item of ordnance becomes caught up in a slipstream, it may remain within
the slipstream layer until the tiller drum has passed over it. Should it prove a factor
at all, it should be stressed that slipstreaming does not occur in all conditions all the
time. It is not known what percentage of ordnance that fails to be destroyed by
tillers is due to this effect.
The factors that contribute to slipstreaming are not exactly understood. Where it
occurs, its negative effects can range from severe to non-existent, depending on the
size of the mine type involved. Smaller
mines or fuses may escape destruction by
Fig. 15. Slipstreaming and burying
“hiding” in the slipstream. Of the existing
tiller machines, drum rotation speed
varies from approximately 100 to 700rpm.
As mentioned, reducing rotation speed is
believed to be one method of preventing
slipstreaming. It remains to be seen if
drum rotation speed reduction might lead
to other performance limitations.
Burying
The possible deeper burying of ordnance
under the influence of a tiller drum may A. Griffiths
be a cause for concern. As a tiller
penetrates the ground, mines located below the ground penetration depth selected
by the operator may, in theory, be pushed down further by the downward force of
the drum.
The design principle behind tiller systems suggests that bulk and weight are required
for the performance of their intended function. The majority of tiller systems weigh
between 32 and 46 tonnes. It may prove that the great mass required for tiller systems
to do their job inexorably leads to some ordnance escaping destruction by becoming
buried deeper into the ground. Given that a pressure-activated mine subjected to
pressure from above should detonate, it is probable that such mines are inoperative.
It may also be the case that mines located deeper than the tiller action were already
at that depth. The question, however, remains open.
Bulking (overburden)
As with flails, the grinding and churning action of tilling creates a layer of loosened,
aerated soil referred to as bulking (overburden). Some of the overburden is swept
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under and behind the vehicle, some pushed ahead of the tiller unit in the form of
bow wave and some deposited to the side from the bow wave into windrows. As
with flails, non-destroyed ordnance may be buried within the bulked soil invisible
to the naked eye. Due to aeration, the depth of soil is increased, further concealing
ordnance that may have remained within the original soil bed beyond the groundpenetrating ability of the machine.
Throw-outs
Like flails, tillers may potentially pick up items of ordnance within their path and
throw them to a new location. Unlike flails, tiller throw-outs tend to be in a line in
front of the path of the vehicle and seldom to the side. The rotating bits cannot
move in random directions as occurs to the chains on a flail. This is an advantage as
it can be reasonably expected that such ordnance will be neutralised at the second
opportunity. With most tiller systems, drum rotation is often of a clockwise direction.
This means that the teeth of the drum bite into the ground from above. Anti-clockwise
rotation is understood to be where the teeth come up from underneath, in opposition
to the direction of travel of the vehicle. (Clockwise rotation is taken as the direction
of flail/tiller rotation when observing the right-hand side of the vehicle.)
Most tillers rotate in a clockwise direction although some tillers that combine a double
roller configuration rotate the drums in opposing directions. It is logical that where
tiller throw-outs occur, they are most frequently as a result of anti-clockwise tiller
drum rotation, although this is unsubstantiated. If correct, the already-infrequent
occurrence of tiller throw-outs could be further reduced by a preference for clockwise
tiller drum rotation. However, some operators believe that clockwise drum rotation
increases the possibility of mine burying. The Minebreaker 2000/2, for example,
was designed with an anti-clockwise rotating drum in order to avoid compaction of
mines into soil. As with the problem of slipstreaming, throw-outs may also be lessened
by the reduction of tiller drum rotation speed. Conceivably, the greater the rotation
speed, the greater the propensity for ordnance to be flung out from the ground.
Bow wave
Bow wave refers to the loosened earth moving slightly forward of the rotating tiller
drum as the machine moves forward. The soil in a bow wave is produced by the
bulking effect. The assertion that bow wave may be a tiller problem is not universally
accepted. Within the demining industry, some contend that it is marginal and is not
a factor affecting safety. However, bow wave has been identified as a concern by
tiller operators in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
Bow wave has the appearance of water pushed in front of a ship at sea. Ordnance
may be situated within the bow wave at the front of a tiller drum. On occasion,
ordnance caught in this position may roll continually within the bow wave and never
end up between the jaws of the tiller teeth and the ground surface, thus escaping
destruction even though the soil particles that comprise the bow wave are ever
changing; the ordnance acts like a surfer, always keeping slightly ahead of the
breakpoint. As a machine finishes a sweep in a suspect area, ordnance within the
bow wave may be pushed to the edge of the area to be deposited and left there as
the machine changes direction to begin a fresh path.12
The amount of bow wave may increase the greater the ground penetration depth
selected by an operator. However, some operators claim that mines and other
ordnance located at 10 centimetres or more below the surface are less likely to escape
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destruction due to bow wave than
items closer to the surface. This
seems to be supported by tests of
the Mine-Guzzler conducted by
SWEDEC, which was found to be
more effective against mines at 10
centimetres and 20 centimetres than
those
nearer
the
surface.
Potentially, items placed at greater
depths are less afforded the
opportunity to rise up and become
caught within the bow wave.

Fig. 16. Bow wave in front of a tiller

As the soil builds up ahead of the
tiller drum, the excess tends to spill
out to the sides of the path of the
A. Griffiths
vehicle, leaving small windrows
either side of the machine wake.
Mines that have been displaced by the tiller but that have avoided destruction by
moving with the bow wave may be deposited to the sides within these windrows.
Where this occurs into the path of the next sweep, it can generally be assumed that
the item will not escape destruction with the next line of clearance followed by the
machine. If the mine is contained within the windrow deposited on the cleared side
of the vehicle path, a problem is presented.

Limits of soil, terrain and vegetation
Like flails, tillers are at the mercy of particular conditions of topography and
soil. As with flails, in steep or close terrain tiller machines are restricted more by
their heavy prime mover than by the efficacy of the tiller tool. Of the five tillers
on the market at the time of writing, hill-climbing ability claimed by manufacturers
ranges between 24° and 30º. Tillers tend to be bulky and difficult to manoeuvre
over extreme topography. When it comes to soil type, it is the tool itself which is
subject to limitations.
Tillers do not perform well in sodden conditions, possibly as the backstop provided
by harder soils does not come into play. Nor do they function impressively in rockstrewn soil. Large stones and rocks tend to protect mines/UXO from the intrusions
of an oncoming tiller bit. Where the rock type is hard, damage to tiller bits can be
expected. As claimed earlier, the presence of light to medium vegetation possibly
enhances tiller performance, allowing the bits to grip the soil reducing slipstreaming.
Most tillers operate less effectively in vegetation of 10 centimetres in diameter or
more. The restrictions on tiller performance presented by soil, terrain and vegetation
are similar to those experienced by flails.

Ground penetration depth
As tillers cannot be expected to affect buried ordnance through indirect energy (F1)
and beyond the actual reach of the bits attached to the rotating drum, the maximum
effective ground penetration depth achieved by three of the five tiller systems
available on the market is 50 centimetres (in soft soil). Of the remainder, none achieves
less than 20 centimetres.
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Where survey has not indicated the likely depth of ordnance, all tillers on the market
can achieve the required IMAS default clearance depth of 13 centimetres. All tillers
also achieve sub-surface ground preparation (see Chapter 4), which both cuts vegetation
and breaks up the ground. As noted above, tillers appear to perform better when
ordnance is found at depths of 10-20 centimetres. Other tests and statements from
users suggest that the optimum performance of most tillers is achieved when mines/
UXO are cleared at between 10-30 centimetres, with the tiller drum set at penetration
depth of 30 centimetres. However, where mines are found at deeper than 20
centimetres, performance begins to deteriorate. It is not known whether this
deterioration is uniform to all ground conditions and against all mine/UXO types.
There may be exceptions.

Engine power
As a generic type, tillers are heavyweight tools assisted by mass to bite into
ground at greater depths than most other mechanical mine clearance solutions.
Intrinsically, such weight requires considerable engine power to drive both the
prime mover and the tiller drum. Large mass helps a tiller to absorb the shock
wave of detonations.
A massive prime mover is also needed to counteract the forward (or backward)
drag imparted by the rotating tiller drum. Without great size, the machine would be
propelled or retarded by the tiller attachment as well as its own engine and gearbox.
This need for resistance to the propulsion effect of a churning tiller drum is in part
the reason all tillers employ caterpillar tracks, giving them greater contact with the
ground.
Unlike the chains of a flail, tiller drums are forced into direct contact with ordnance
and cannot rely on the stand-off and force-absorbing flexibility enjoyed by flails.
Without greater mass, a tiller might suffer unacceptable damage.
Tiller machines currently on the market are able to drive tiller drums at 190-700rpm
in light to medium soil — an achievement requiring considerable power when
penetrating ground at 20 centimetres or more. If such power is the goal of tiller
manufacturers, large size is an inescapable feature.
As experience with tiller systems increases, it is becoming more apparent that a high
speed of tiller drum rotation may not be as crucial as had been thought. Higher tiller
drum revolutions per minute may even be a significant contributing factor to
occasional throw-outs and the potential for slipstreaming. The destructive action of
a tiller bit upon a mine/UXO may not actually require great speed, as the mass
behind each bit should ensure penetration of a mine/UXO casing or the pressure
activation of a serviceable fuse.
Optimal engine power is specific to each machine. Whether there may be scope for
the reduction in engine power and therefore rotation speed remains to be seen.
Reduction of revolutions per minute may reduce slipstreaming and throw-outs, but
may also introduce other, as yet unknown drawbacks.

Forward speed
Forward speed is largely dependent on the speed of tiller drum rotation. If tiller
drum revolutions per minute are low, so too must be the forward speed. This would
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reduce cost-effectiveness. Despite other possible negative effects mentioned above,
faster revolutions per minute of the tiller drum allow greater forward speed and
therefore increased productivity. Like flails, the helix configuration of the tiller bits
attached to the drum is positioned in such a way that the optimal forward speed
must be found and maintained in order that each centimetre of ground is affected
by a tiller bit and that skipped zones do not occur. According to tiller operators in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, limited fluctuations in forward speed do not
appear to affect the ratio of break-ups to detonations, as occurs with flails.

Mine type
With the exception of one machine, existing tillers are designed to destroy antipersonnel mines but are able to survive anti-tank mine blasts. The Rheinmetall
Landsysteme Rhino and STS MineWolf both employ a tiller attachment for suspect
areas where anti-personnel mines alone are expected, but use a flail attachment for
areas where anti-tank mines may be present. The ability to engage with anti-tank
mines using a tiller drum is largely due to the significant mass of most tiller systems,
enabling them to absorb greater explosive blast pressure.
As with flails, mines/UXO encountered by tillers will be destroyed by actuating
fuse mechanisms, or by breaking up ordnance that fails to detonate. With regard
to anti-personnel fragmentation mines (e.g. the POM-Z), no evidence has been
obtained to suggest that tillers are more effective than flails. Since tillers destroy
mines and UXO by the direct contact of the tiller bits with ordnance, the efficacy
of tiller systems is less connected to the factor of mine type than is the case with
flails. When a mine is situated beneath the physical ground penetration ability of
a flail chain, indirect energy in the form of influence zone may destroy only
some types of ordnance. A tiller relies on the physical contact and pulverising
power of its hardened steel bits, discriminating less between the varying
fallibilities of mine/UXO types.

Mechanical excavation
Introduction
Of all the mechanical ground processing options, excavation of soil from suspect
land is arguably the most tried-and-tested method of ensuring that suspect ground
is rendered clear to a stated depth. The method involves moving suspect soil for
subsequent inspection for mines/UXO, leaving the optional return of cleared spoil
to its original location.
The HALO Trust employed the technique using adapted front-end loaders and
tractors throughout the 1990s in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Georgia (Abkhazia),
the Russian Federation (Chechnya), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo).
A similar technique was adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA), using a front-end loader, and by European Landmine Solutions (ELS),
using an excavator. Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) has also been at the forefront of
the excavation method, particularly in regard to soil sifting. Other systems using the
excavation technique are the Mineworm (as part of the Redbus LMDS), Armtrac
Sifter, MgM Rotar Mk-2, and the Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate
(NVESD) Floating Mine Blade.
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Fig. 17. Converted (armoured) Russian RABA front-end
loader conducting rubble clearance, The HALO Trust,
Kabul, 1998.

The HALO Trust programme in Afghanistan is evidence of the tangible benefits of
mechanical over manual clearance. HALO estimates that from the moment a manual
deminer encounters a buried mine until the moment the mine has been destroyed by
a charge placed in situ, an average of 25 minutes will have elapsed. The HALO
programme operates in cycles of 21.5 days.
HALO calculates that the number of mines destroyed by mechanical means per
cycle would take manual deminers 6.8 cycles to match.

Often, the inspection of potentially contaminated soil is carried out in an area prepared
for the purpose. Some machines process soil on the move, with cleared soil released
along the path of the vehicle. Most machines employed in the excavation role are
specially adapted commercial engineering vehicles, upgraded with add-on armour
plate and transparent armour (reinforced glass). These typically include front-end
loaders, tractors, excavators and bulldozers. They represent an effective alternative
to the purpose-built mechanical systems sold on the market as specific mine clearance
vehicles. In demining tasks among rubble and destroyed infrastructure in built-up
areas, excavation is the only mechanical clearance process that has met with success.

The excavation and processing technique
Mechanical excavation involves the removal of suspect soil to a depth indicated by
survey that mines are expected to be found. The general method for mechanical
excavation has four main stages:
1. The parameters of a minefield are established using minefield maps, general
survey, technical survey, area reduction by MDD/manual/mechanical system
or by any other method that will reveal the border between a safe and a
mined area (see Fig. 18).
2. Potentially mined soil is excavated. If the excavation method is by tractor or
front-end loader bucket, the bucket should only be three-quarters full in order
to avoid possible spillage of suspect soil when the machine is moving (load
capacity for a typical loader bucket is around 2.5 cubic metres). Some specialised
mined soil excavation systems process and clear soil picked up in situ while
moving along a clearance path within the suspect area.
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Fig. 18. Locating the true mined area
Starting from a safe base line, the true area
affected by mines should be delineated
prior to mechanical excavation in order to
save significant time.

Fig. 19. Suggested positioning of
inspection area in relation to
suspect area

3. Suspect soil is processed to separate
mines/UXO from soil. Once this is
achieved, ordnance is destroyed by
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) staff.
The method of soil excavation and
processing depends upon the machine
used:
¾ Sifting in situ: soil is sifted through the
machine separating earth from solid
objects as the machine moves along a path
of excavation.
¾ Manual inspection area: a flat, open area
with a hard surface is prepared where
suspect soil is spread out for visual
examination and check by metal detector.
The inspection area needs to be outside
the danger template of the adjacent suspect area where soil is being excavated
(see Figs. 19 and 20).
¾ Sift inspection area: an area separate to the excavated area where soil is put
through a sifting mechanism, separating loose soil from ordnance.
¾ Crushing: suspect soil can be fed through an industrial rock crusher of the
type used in rock quarrying. The crushing chamber is robust enough to absorb
the detonation of anti-personnel blast mines. Larger UXO or anti-tank mines
are located by an on-board metal detector, warning the operator of a possible
mine/UXO. Ordnance is removed from the conveyor belt for subsequent
disposal before entering the crushing chamber. Mine-free, loose soil emerging
from the chamber is fed into a pile for later redistribution in the original suspect
area.
4. Soil free of ordnance can be left at the point of processing (if in a separate
inspection area) or preferably redistributed to the original suspect area
(automatic in the case of on-board, in situ soil processors).

The machines
Mechanical excavation and sifting operations are carried out by a variety of machine
types. Many are commercial engineering vehicles, adapted for work in mined areas.
Some adapted commercial vehicles are fitted with special-to-task demining
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Fig. 20. Inspection area
As contaminated soil is being raked by
loader bucket, deminers should remain
under protection or situate themselves out
at an appropriate safety distance. They
return to inspect soil once the machine
has raked one row of one-bucket width.

Fig. 21. Deminer inspecting excavated soil in inspection
area, Cambodia.

attachments. Mechanical excavation is also conducted by machines exclusively
designed for the role, as described below.
Commercial engineering vehicles
The workhorse of excavation ground processors is the front-end loader. Excavators
are also extensively used, particularly in rubble clearance. With its hydraulic,
extendable arm, an excavator can reach over obstacles such as walls, ditches and
earthworks in order to excavate in suspect spot locations where it would be physically
impossible or damaging to infrastructure to deploy a full-size bucket. Commercial
excavators can be employed where
conditions are too tight for front-end
loaders and tractors such as in built-up
areas.
Front-end loader buckets have been
adapted by HALO with the addition of a
steel grill, which it calls “the gill”, so that
machines can operate in suspect areas
where anti-tank mines may be present.
As seen in Fig. 22, soil is sifted through
the gill, allowing soil and objects up to
the size of common anti-personnel blast

Fig. 22. A “gill” in operation.
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mines through but retaining any anti-tank mines or large UXO encountered at the
surface of the gill where it can be easily seen by the operator and subsequently dealt
with. It is not the aim to deploy gill-fitted front-end loaders into anti-tank minefields,
but where the mine situation is unclear, machines so-equipped can be deployed with
greater confidence.
Clearance method
Once an area is confirmed as mined, the vehicle moves into the suspect area from an
established safe line. The driver contacts the ground with the bottom front blade of
the bucket and drives forward. Using manual controls, the bucket is angled to skim
off soil to a desired depth. With a half- to three-quarters-full bucket-load of suspect
soil (in order to avoid spillage), the vehicle reverses down its own track to a safe
route previously established between the suspect area and the pre-prepared soil
inspection area.
To avoid wasting time, the soil inspection area should be as close to the suspect area
as possible while observing a calculated safety distance. The machine dumps its load
of potentially contaminated soil at one end of the inspection area. Various local,
cheaply-made devices have been developed to assist the spread of contaminated
soil in an inspection area. The spreading of soil into thin layers for ease of visual
inspection can also be achieved by skimming, using the bottom blade of a loader
bucket (see Fig. 20).
Sifting and crushing
Once suspect soil is excavated, one option of processing it so that it is rendered free
of ordnance is to sift it and then feed it through a crushing mechanism. Two systems
have been used: the Redbus Land Mine Disposal System (LMDS) Mineworm which
sifts and crushed debris in situ, and industrial rock crushers which are static, fed
with suspect soil from a separate location.

Fig. 23. Redbus LMDS, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Mineworm is the follow-up vehicle of the two-machine Redbus LMDS. Mineworm
follows in the wake of the ground-beating Bigfoot machine. The remote-controlled
Mineworm excavates soil to a pre-selected depth (to a maximum of 55 centimetres)
using a front-mounted soil-breaker and root-cropper. This feeds loosened soil into
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a rotating blade excavator which lifts soil up and onto an on-board conveyer leading
to an industrial fragmenter.
Before the fragmenter, a magnet removes larger metal objects for later inspection.
UXO tend to be captured by this, whereas smaller metal items such as detonators,
or objects of limited metal content such as anti-personnel blast mines, should be
fragmented. Cleared spoil is then deposited at the back of the machine. The entire
process is conducted in the suspect area as the machine moves along its path.
Mineworm has undergone trials and development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
system began full-scale operations there in 2003 (along with Bigfoot).
Industrial crushers have been used for the processing of excavated suspect soil. The
HALO Trust operates crushers adapated from the quarrying industry. Soil is fed
into a hopper/sifter where small particles are dropped before larger particles and
fed into a crushing chamber. The size of crushed debris released from the chamber
is adjustable. This is usually set to enable destruction of the smallest known antipersonnel mine types. Crushers have been fitted with metal detectors producing
audible alarms so that when larger metal particles such as UXO or metal-cased mines
are encountered, the crusher conveyor belt stops and reverses in order to prevent
the item from entering the crushing chamber. Such items are dealt with by EOD
staff. The crushed, hazard-free soil is eventually returned to the site from where it
was originally excavated.
Sifting
Various earth sifting mechanisms are
deployed to process suspect soil. Most are
adapted agricultural sifters such as that used
by the Pearson Survivable Demining Tractor
and Tools (SDTT) or the Armtrac Sifter.
Some sifter attachments are purpose-built
for mine clearance operations, notably the
MgM Rotar Mk I and II and the Mine
Collector.
Initial excavation of suspect soil can be Fig. 24. MgM Rotar Mk 1 sifting
executed in a variety of ways before being
deposited into and processed by a sifter unit. Excavation and sifting to extract mines
and UXO from soil is done in situ as a vehicle moves along a path within a suspect
area, or suspect soil is excavated by tractor/front-end loader and brought to a sifter
system for processing at a location outside the area. There are numerous ways to
achieve the same aim, which is to remove suspect soil, process it through a sifting
system to separate soil from mines and UXO, and dispose of the ordnance.

Mine rolling
Introduction
Although not exclusively aimed at defeating mines, the first rollers were mounted
to British Mk IV tanks in the 1914-1918 war. Current designs of anti-mine rollers
have retained the simplicity of their predecessors. Anti-mine rollers were most widely
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employed by the Red Army of the
Soviet Union. The design of rollers
used in present-day humanitarian
demining owe much to these.
“Rolling” could also be said to
include the use of mine-protected
vehicles fitted with steel wheels (no
tyres) which have been used in a
similar manner to conventional
rollers.

Operational methodology
Anti-mine rollers

Fig. 25. Armoured Terex front-end loader with
Pearson roller. Eritrea - Ethiopia border, 2001.

Rollers used in humanitarian demining have generally been mounted to adapted
front-end loaders and tractors. Rollers are usually used in the area reduction role.
The aim is to speed up the process by which manual clearance teams reach the real
perimeter of a suspect area. Locating mines/UXO constitutes the greatest amount
of time spent in any clearance operation when conducted by manual or MDD teams.
Anti-mine rollers are intended to activate sub-surface mines that are in a live,
serviceable condition. They cannot influence mines which have, for whatever reason,
become non-operational. As a result, anti-mine rollers do not have the same potential
to destroy mines as do flail or tiller systems. Anti-mine rollers capable of withstanding
blast from an anti-tank mine exist in military service, but have not yet been fully
employed in humanitarian demining. Pearson Engineering and NVESD are in the
process of developing anti-tank mine rollers for humanitarian demining.
Rollers are not suited for mine clearance as they can destroy functioning mines only,
and these only where conditions allow. Even fully-operational mines cannot be
guaranteed to activate under the weight of a roller disc. The depth of ground in
which a roller is likely to detonate a mine is determined by the weight of the roller,
soil types and conditions. It cannot be conclusively determined.
As well as for area reduction, rollers are useful for post-clearance verification, and
establishing confidence in a community by demonstrating the absence of live mines.
Rollers typically used in mine clearance consist of segmented, heavyweight discs,
each turning on a central axle. As the prime mover goes forward, the individual
discs of the roller contact the ground. To a degree, the discs conform to undulations,
bumps and rises in the ground.
For best results, a roller should be used in a set pattern over a suspect area. Patterns
that have been used include rolling four times in four different directions. Rolling
an area repeatedly is likely to be more effective than rolling just once. This is likely
due to the soil compacting after each pass. At least this is supported by Pearson
Roller trials conducted by the CCMAT and the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)
in March and April 2003.
In situations where information as to the location of mines is accurate, a roller need
not be used for locating mines by detonation. A roller can cover the ground close to
the expected safe clearance start line in order to help corroborate that the land is
truly clear of live mines before deploying manual or MDD teams. Once the presence
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of mines has been verified, direct clearance assets can be deployed into the reduced
area where mines are actually located.
Fig. 26

Phase 2 of HALO Trust rolling operation. Grey
lines are pattern from first roll. Concentric
box pattern ensures that the middle of the
area is rolled four times from four directions.

Fig. 27

Rolling area using concentric box pattern
where mines were not expected but were
subsequently encountered. In this example,
an approximate mine pattern is revealed.
Rolling should stop and clearance assets
take over.

Rollers have been “home-made” using
available local components in various
programmes worldwide, particularly in
Afghanistan. The only commercially
produced anti-mine roller in common use in
humanitarian demining is the Pearson
Engineering segmented Area Reduction
Roller (ARR). The ARR weighs one tonne per
metre of width, available up to a width of
3.5 metres. Each individual disc exerts a
ground pressure of 50 kilograms. It has been
used by TMAC and The HALO Trust, which
has area-reduced more than four million
square metres using it.

Fig. 28. Pearson Engineering antipersonnel mine roller.

The U.S.-produced Armadillo anti-mine roller has not yet been widely used in
mine clearance programmes. Its ability to conform to bumps and undulations in
terrain is good. Each weighted disk is mounted to an individually mounted
suspension system.
Steel wheels
The attachment of steel wheels to mine protected vehicles evolved in the 1970s and
1980s, mainly in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia).
Specifically, steel wheels have been fitted to the South African Casspir MPV,
developed by Mechem.
Steel-wheeled Casspirs have been used in a similar manner to anti-mine rollers; the
vehicle drives in a pattern within a suspect area with the aim of detonating live
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mines to indicate mine patterns or
sporadic presence. Covering ground in
overlapping patterns without missing
areas is more of a challenge than with
anti-mine rollers. The wheels do not
form a contiguous width beneath the
vehicle but are spaced as with any
standard wheeled machine.
The steel wheels are an optional extra
and can be fitted to Casspirs employed
for mine clearance. When used to Fig. 29. Casspir MPV.
pressure-activate
mines,
the
effectiveness of the steel-wheeled Casspir depends on the type of mine
encountered. In recorded clearance tasks in Mozambique, the South African
clearance organisation Mechem tended to detonate 89-96 per cent of PMN-1s
and PMN 2s, 70-76 per cent of OZM-72s, 7-8 per cent of PMD-6s (they tend to
become non-operational very quickly and were often merely crushed) and
approximately 2 per cent of POM-Zs.

Fig. 30. Pearson Engineering SDTT. The Pearson Roller is
attached to the tractor. Used in Thailand.

Conclusions, findings and recommendations
Conclusion 1.

There is scope for stand-alone mechanical systems to be used for clearance to
humanitarian standards.

Findings
Although there is limited data to back up the assertion that machines achieve primary
clearance of land contaminated by anti-personnel mines to humanitarian standards
(as set out in Annex 1 to this chapter) it is supported by growing empirical evidence
from implementing agencies as well as testing regimes. Evidence from the field
suggests that few anti-personnel blast mines are left behind in a functional condition
after treatment by certain machines in suitable terrain. Manual and dog teams are
thereby relegated to picking up fragments.
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Flails and tiller systems have set precedents for use as stand-alone, primary clearance
assets: but this is by coincidence. These were set by machines employed in the ground
preparation role where follow-up clearance assets did not encounter functional mines
after a machine. There exists no official international proscription of using machines
in the primary clearance role. It is simply that a culture of “not doing it ” has developed
within the demining community. Machines are often allocated to working where
mines are not expected. This approach should be carefully reconsidered. The demining
community is not trying hard enough to extract the clearance potential of machines
in order to use their speed and potential cost-efficiency.
With regard to flails and tillers, it is difficult to exactly understand from existing
research the interrelationship between a ground penetrating tool, its force, soil types
and mine/UXO types. If further research is not conducted, a time may come when
enough real-time, empirical data comes to the fore to accredit some machines as a
choice for primary clearance. A development that must precede such an outcome is
that more stringent and comprehensive data collection for recording clearance
performed by machines be made. To date, most clearance data lacks detail, making
the extraction of comparative analysis difficult at best.13 Without improvements in
this field, empirical support for greater use of mechanical systems cannot be
marshalled.
With the few examples provided in this paper, it can be seen that — provided a
machine is up to the task and that conditions of soil, terrain and mine type are
favourable — mechanical demining systems exist that are able to clear areas where
no hazardous ordnance remain to threaten follow-up MDD or manual teams. ‘’Full’’
clearance is being achieved, certainly by mechanical excavation, but also with flail
and tiller systems in some cases where mine type and conditions are suitable. One
outstanding aspect of these examples is that primary clearance was not the expected
result. Full clearance has sometimes been achieved where the sole aim was to prepare
ground for subsequent clearance methods. “Full” clearance of land occurred as a
fortuitous by-product. A significant problem lies in recognising what conditions are
most favourable for machines to succeed as primary clearance systems.
It is known that topography, soil mechanics and mine type together with the choice
of mechanical system play a critical role in the success or failure of a system to
achieve full clearance. What is not known is specifically what the most favourable
conditions are. Until these factors are better understood, it will be impossible to
gain full control of whether or not a machine consistently succeeds as a primary
clearance asset: success or failure will be more a result of random circumstances
rather than controlled certainty.
Demining operations conducted by mechanical excavation and sifting currently
serve as proven examples of successful primary clearance. To the depth penetrated
by a front-end loader bucket, clearance is as good as guaranteed. If the quality
of this method of clearance were ever to come under scrutiny, it is more the
subsequent treatment options of contaminated soil that might benefit from fine
tuning.
Despite the apparent success and ease of the mechanical excavation and/or sifting
process, it remains an underemployed clearance technique. The reasons for this are
not exactly known; it could be that this methodology has somehow escaped wide
notice within the demining community. A more likely cause is the comparatively
low productivity that this technique affords. A tractor could not hope to excavate
contaminated soil at the rate a tiller or flail can process land, despite the proven
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efficacy of the former over the remaining doubts about the latter. Assumedly the
operational advantages of mechanical excavation and sifting will be continuously
reduced as tiller and flail designs improve and their optimal conditions are better
understood. It is likely, however, that excavation will remain a good option in more
extreme conditions, particularly in built-up areas.
Recommendation 1.
If a particular machine or mechanical system can demonstrate that, given suitable conditions
against an appropriate target (ordnance type), it can be used as the primary clearance
tool, it should be so used. Manual or MDD team follow-up can be streamlined in order to
compensate for the likely residual threat left by that machine.

Conclusion 2.

Machines are rarely, if ever, deliberately employed in the primary clearance
role.

Findings
Examples are scarce where machines have been used as a primary clearance system
and followed by a dog team or a small team of manual deminers intended to
compensate only for a known residual threat left by the machine. Residual threat
refers to specific ordnance that a specific system has a tendency to be unable to
destroy. The residual threat particular to a machine should be stated by the operator.
Remains of these mine types should be cleared by subsequent demining methods —
manual or MDD teams.
The aim of using machines is typically not to clear land, but to prepare ground for
post-machine full clearance by manual and MDD teams. However, clearance
sometimes appears to be the inadvertent result.
Yet, at the same time, there are numerous cases where machines repeatedly fail to
adequately destroy even the easier target of sub-surface anti-personnel blast mines.
This may be because a particular machine is simply not up to the job, or that it is not
being operated correctly. The comparative efficacy of different machines varies
widely. Another cause may be extremes of soil or terrain. For example, the soil can
be very hard and on occasion mines are apparently protected from the blow of a
flail hammer by large rocks. There is much to be gained from a better understanding
of the physical limits imposed upon a demining machine by its operational
environment.
Recommendation 2.
Further efforts should be made to understand the optimum physical conditions in which
particular machines can be expected to act as the main, primary clearance asset. This
would include factors of topography, soil, ordnance type and machine.

Conclusion 3.

In general, throughout the industry, machine clearance data is poor.

Findings
Detailed data gathering on the effectiveness of mechanical clearance is the exception
rather than the rule. Records of clearance statistics, post-clearance accidents and

Mechanical clearance

missed mines are difficult to secure. Tests using an adequate number of live or
surrogate mines to establish a machine’s true clearance potential are few, and those
that do exist do not explore a wide range of scenarios where terrain, soil and mine
type may be a critical issue. This has been a major handicap for the research carried
out for this study. Even where they are collected, statistics and clearance data from
different organisations can be of widely ranging reliability. Furthermore, care must
be taken that statistics are not manipulated to support a particular line of argument.
Recommendation 3.
The mechanical demining community would benefit from a coordinated, standardised
method of recording mechanical clearance data. This data could enable machine operators
to argue for the expanded employment of mechanical assets.
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Endnotes
1. For example, the STS Minewolf and RLS Rhino employ interchangeable flail and tiller attachments
but both use the flail attachment when operating in areas where anti-tank mines are expected.
2. Typically for ordnance up to an 82mm mortar shell.
3. Phelan and Webb (2003).
4. For example, the Armtrac 100 has addressed the problem by introducing extended cowling over
the flail unit. Engine power, flail rotation speed and suggested adjustments to vehicle forward
speed are also intended to decrease the possibility of throw-outs.
5. Shankla (2000).
6. Referred to as FN in the DRES study.
7. Referred to as FH in the DRES study.
8. SWEDEC (2002).
9. According to an Armtrac 100 operator for the organisation BACTEC, working in southern
Lebanon in 2002: “Rocky soil tends to quickly degrade chain links and hammers, requiring them to be
replaced more often”.
10. Based on interviews with machine operators in Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2002 and in
southern Lebanon in August 2002.
11. SWEDEC 7/2001, Eksjö, Sweden.
12. This occurrence was observed by Håvard Bach, GICHD, during operation of the MgM Rotar in
Namibia in 2001.
13. CROMAC, for instance, serves as an example to the industry for full and comprehensive
clearance data. Worldwide, there is significant disparity of quality of operational statistics.
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Annex 1.

Examples of machines achieving clearance
in demining operations

The following are a few examples of where machines have cleared land leaving little
or nothing to be found by subsequent clearance methods.

ELS supporting NPA in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), European Landmine Solutions (ELS), a commercial
mine clearance company, provides mechanical mine clearance support for other
organisations that deploy MDD and manual teams. ELS has mainly used the Armtrac
325 and 100 in the ground preparation role.
From April 2000 to the end of 2002, NPA contracted ELS to conduct ground
preparation on many of its clearance sites. In general, the terrain in BiH is a mixture
of rolling and steep hills, interspersed with agricultural plains and forest. The climate
is temperate European and the soil is of medium consistency, seemingly well-suited
to flails. Patterned, intensive minefields are not common in BiH.
During the NPA/ELS contract
period, one apparently functional
mine was found after the
preparation of ground by flail.
This was a Yugoslav PMA-2 antipersonnel blast mine, believed to
be in working condition. It was
discovered by an NPA deminer
during the follow-up clearance of
an area following ELS machine
preparation. NPA believes it
probable that the mine was never
contacted by a chain from the
Armtrac as the machine passed
too far to one side of the mine, Fig. 1. Armtrac 325.
located near the base of a large
tree. This is the only known missed mine incident as a result of ELS preparing 781,634
square metres of ground for NPA. All other mines were detonated or broken up
before manual deminers or MDD teams conducted final clearance.
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NPA in Angola
Beginning in 1998, the NPA programme in
Angola has carried out mechanical ground
preparation using Aardvark and Hydrema
flails. These machines were used on suspect
ground where survey produced unreliable
information. The suspect areas dealt with
were believed to be of low mine content.
Since 1998, approximately 2.5 million square
metres of suspect land have been
mechanically prepared by the NPA
machines in Angola. Of this area, one Fig. 2. Hydrema MCV 910 (series 2).
throw-out is recorded. No incidents of
missed mines as a result of deminer clearance or civilian accidents have been
recorded.

Aardvark Project Afghanistan 1990-1995
The United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (UNMAPA) employed
Aardvark flails in an attempt to speed up the rate of clearance and improve costeffectiveness. Neither of these aims was met due to problems of management, logistics
and operating procedures. Large areas were, however, mechanically prepared.
UNMAPA stated that: ‘’Flails are most effective against anti-personnel blast mines, achieving
virtually 100 per cent detonation’’.1 This is probably an exaggeration as there must
have been incidents of anti-personnel blast mines being broken up, however the
technique of flailing minefields obviously impressed those involved in the
programme. Unsurprisingly, the Aardvark flails were not consistently successful
against thick-skinned anti-personnel fragmentation mines such as POM-Zs, a common
problem among tiller and flail systems.

Minebreaker 2000 in Afghanistan
The German military (Bundeswehr) engineer
contingent in Afghanistan employed a Minebreaker
2000 to clear ground in the area of Bagram Airbase
in support of U.S. military operations (not as part
of the International Security Assistance Force).
From 17 November 2002 to 23 April 2003, the
Bundeswehr Minebreaker mechanically prepared
roughly 38,000 square metres of ground. Soil was
of clay quality and vegetation consisted of mainly
thick, high grass.
Fig. 3. Tiller drum configuration –

The area was later manually cleared by Polish Army FFG Minebreaker 2000/2.
engineers who confirmed that the Minebreaker had
detonated or broken up approximately 80 sub-surface anti-personnel blast mines.
All items of UXO were detonated or broken up. Two Iranian YM-1 anti-personnel
mines were located that had escaped destruction. This mine type requires sustained
1. Handicap International, 2000.
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pressure of at least one second in order to activate. The tiller rotation speed of
Minebreaker was unable to apply this.

The HALO Trust mechanical excavation
HALO mechanical operations began in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1996. Since then, HALO
has operated machines in mine clearance programmes in Abkhazia, Afghanistan,
Angola, Cambodia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Kosovo, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Somaliland, Sri Lanka and Sudan. As of March 2003, HALO has used mechanical
application in a total of 11,804,416 square metres of land. No accidents occurred to
demining personnel. No missed mines have been recorded by subsequent users of
the land.

Croation Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) clearance
projects for the year 2002
The GICHD commissioned CROMAC to provide clearance data for all demining
activity within Croatia from January to December 2002. Clearance operations were
conducted in a total of 232 suspect areas, and machines were employed to prepare
areas by breaking the surface of the ground in 167 tasks (concurrently clearing
vegetation). Of these, 104 were to prove free of mines and were cancelled out. In 63
tasks, machines encountered anti-personnel mines. Of these 63 sites, no mines were
found intact by follow-up clearance methods (manual or MDD). The 63 sites covered
5,530,192 square metres. All mines had been detonated or broken up. Remaining
fragments were cleared by manual or MDD teams.

Lebanese National Demining Office (LNDO)
Demining operations in Lebanon are carried out by engineers of the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF), coordinated by LNDO. Confidence in the clearance capacity of flails
(in this case an Armtrac 100) is sufficiently high that LAF demining standards allow
for full clearance in order to reduce casualties. They use the flail for full clearance
only in scattered minefields where the threat is higher than that in uniformly
distributed minefields, as experience has shown that, in general, in Lebanon, it is
quicker to clear patterned minefields manually.
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Chapter 2.

Risk assessment and
mechanical application
Summary
IMAS state that land shall be accepted as “cleared” when the demining
organisation has ensured the removal and/or destruction of all mine and
unexploded ordnance hazards from the specified area to the specified
depth. However, the complete removal of risk cannot be assured in mine
clearance (even though it is probably achieved in many cases) owing to
the inaccuracy of much available information combined with the inherent
limitations of clearance methods. A detailed set of tolerable risk criteria
should therefore be established prior to clearance. For example, leaving
components of broken-up mines in situ should be an option unless
stipulated otherwise by the relevant mine action authority.
The way to more effective and efficient demining is through acquiring
more information about the hazards occupying an area, rather than
assuming a worst-case scenario. Machine development should therefore
focus on technology that is able to acquire as much information as possible
about the minefield prior to clearance. Numerous possibilities are already
available on the open market for this to happen now. Furthermore,
demining organisations should recognise that in areas where a machine
has not indicated the presence of mines it is possible that no subsequent
clearance method is required.
Insufficient research has so far been conducted into the reliability and
capability of all clearance methods. Records need to be far more thorough
and should include details about the conditions in which mines were
undamaged by machine use, judgements of whether mines are still
operational following machine use and any trends or links between the
machine type and its effect on various mine types and variables such as
terrain and soil conditions.

Introduction
Background
In Chapter 1, we looked at the potential for mechanical systems to be employed for
clearance. We also learnt that, throughout the industry, machine clearance data is
poor. Yet, information is central to the effective management of mine action. This
chapter looks at how information should be collected — and decisions taken —
based on a notion of what constitutes acceptable risk.
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Given the threat from mines and UXO to the local population, risk assessment is a
key component of mine action, especially in humanitarian emergencies. Although
the human impact of explosive contamination is generally well documented,
investigation of the effectiveness of the application of machines to risk reduction has
tended to be limited and fragmented.

Terms of reference
The sub-study that forms the basis of this chapter looked at how machines can be
applied to a minefield, using a risk assessment process to determine the most
appropriate roles for mechanical systems in reducing the risks to the civilian
population. Risk assessments are an integral part of mine clearance and EOD
operations. However, the methodologies are very much underdeveloped and examples
of specific procedures are rare. This chapter considers the risk to those who use
affected land both before and after clearance operations, as well as the risks to
deminers carrying out their work. In some cases, a sensible prioritisation of tasks
can be achieved through a risk assessment, which inevitably has consequences for
both land users and demining personnel
This sub-study is based on both field and library research. Field visits were conducted
in Croatia, Lebanon, Thailand and Viet Nam and an analysis made of secondary
sources from Kosovo. The chapter has been researched and written by Mark Buswell,
Leonard Kaminski and Rebecca Sargisson, who are employed by the GICHD.

Chapter layout
The chapter first establishes a basic understanding of the concept of risk. Second, it
proposes a risk assessment model, which takes into account the application of machines
to minefields. Third, examples of the roles of machines in a mine clearance operation
are analysed to demonstrate how risk management can maximise the benefits of
mechanical application. Finally, the chapter presents the conclusions and
recommendations of the sub-study.

Theory of risk
Everyday life involves risk. There is a chance, for example, that we will be the victim
of an accident or crime. Most of the risk associated with everyday life, though, is
deemed tolerable, because the likelihood of a harmful event occurring is low or the
impact of the occurrence may be low.
Let us consider the simple act of crossing a road. The level of risk is assessed by the
person crossing the road based on information available at the time and on the person’s
experience with crossing roads. Thus, “having looked in both directions (side to side), we
decide it is safe to cross the road. This does not mean there is no traffic on the road but rather we
have determined on the basis of experience that the risk of being struck by the vehicles we can see
in the distance is, to us, acceptably low. It can also involve value judgements on the risk. For
example, if late for a vital meeting we might be prepared to accept a much higher risk than
normal”.1
This example highlights the two basic issues that affect the process of risk assessment:
available information and tolerance.

Risk assessment and mechanical application

Available information
The decision to cross the road is based on information, such as the speed of the
traffic, the distance to be crossed, weather conditions and visibility, combined with
our experience of crossing roads in the given conditions. Thus, we can adjust our
walking speed to suit the traffic conditions because we have learned to judge how
fast we need to walk to avoid danger.

Tolerance
After gathering information we then need to decide if the risk is worth taking,
based on the likelihood of being hit and the damage that may occur. We may accept
higher levels of risk in certain situations, such as in situations of economic necessity
(the urgent appointment may mean the difference between keeping a job and losing
it).
On occasions, we may decide that the level of risk is unacceptable. While it may be
difficult to remove all risk from crossing the road, we may be able to reduce the risk
by waiting or finding a more suitable crossing point. Risk could be avoided entirely if
the road is not crossed.
Responses to risk, therefore, should be flexible and reflect the level of threat present at
a specific time and place. For example, lengthening your journey to find a safer crossing
point is uneconomic if the likelihood of being struck by a car is low at the current
crossing point.

Risk management
There has been a tremendous improvement in many aspects of the quality of our
lives. We now live longer than at any time in history. Although accidents at work still
occur, the trend averaged over the years has been downwards. This progress in the
quality of our lives is readily acknowledged but, paradoxically, it has been
accompanied by an increasing expectation of a society free of involuntary risks. The
rapid technological developments of recent years have introduced new hazards but
also enhanced the scope for controlling existing hazards.
The trend for managing risks has been to merge and centralise industrial authorities
through the establishment of regulatory regimes whereby broad general duties are
explicitly put to those who are best placed to do something about preventing or
controlling the risks. However, providing a clear explanation of the risk decisionmaking process is not an easy task. The process is inherently complex, with a variety
of inputs. It has to be workable while allowing the use of judgement by the regulator
(i.e. typically the mine action centre and/or national mine action authority) and
flexibility for implementing companies or organisations. At the same time, it must
reflect the values of society at large as to what risks are unacceptable, tolerable or
broadly acceptable.
Any informed discussion quickly raises ethical, social, economic and scientific
considerations. These include how to achieve the necessary trade-offs between benefits
to society and ensuring that individuals are adequately protected.
The way we treat risks depends on our perception of how they relate to ourselves
and the things we value. Particularly important for man-made hazards are “how well
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the process (giving rise to the hazard) is understood, how equitably the danger is distributed
and how well individuals can control their exposure and whether risk is assumed
voluntarily”. 2
It is claimed that it may not be possible to derive a quantifiable physical reality
that most people will agree represents the “true risk“ from a hazard. Instead,
the concept of risk is strongly shaped by human minds and culture, which is why
a number of high quality risk assessments by leaders in the field have failed to
reassure people.3
Other theories have been offered to explain why risks that are minor in
quantitative terms produce massive reactions while major risks are often ignored.
The “social amplification” model, for instance, suggests that the impact of a
particular risk begins with the initial victims and diffuses outward to society at
large. In this process, the public response to the risk can be amplified depending
on how the reporting of the risk interacts with psychological, social, cultural and
institutional processes.4

Measuring risk
Measuring risk is inherently complex. In the context of mine clearance for
humanitarian purposes a major problem is already the lack of reliability, accuracy
and quantity of data. The importance of operational record-keeping has only been
considered since the development of mine action centres. Before this, records were
only kept at the discretion of individual agencies and for their own purposes.
But, even if all available data and the best science and technology are used,
measurement cannot be undertaken without making a number of assumptions such
as relative values of risks and benefits or even the scope of study.
Depending on the issues, risks are measured either qualitatively or quantitatively or
in combination.
Quantitative methods
The use of quantitative methods is reliant on the accuracy and appropriateness of the
data that is available. Quite often, large amounts of data are required to provide
any credible results. Quantitative data can be gathered from such sources as testing,
accident reports, operational records, fault analysis and so on, and are particularly
useful when the foreseeable severity and extent of harm are high.5
Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods are open to degrees of subjectivity and bias based on the
experience, knowledge and interest of the individual. However, the process of risk
assessment does provide a degree of accountability in information collection and
analysis.
In mine clearance, methods of measuring reliability tend to be qualitative. For
example, it is rare to know the exact number of mines that are in a minefield prior
to clearance.
When measuring risk, care needs to be taken to avoid numerous pitfalls that can trap
the unwary. These include accident or incident samples which are too small or have
too narrow a scope, and which may therefore be misleading. Also, the time period
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may be too short, which may lead to the omission of representative accidents or
incidents, and statistical data may not include the cause. Selective use of data can
result in figures that do not accurately reflect history.

Achieving tolerable risk
A product, process or service is deemed to be “safe” when its users believe the risk
associated with its usage is tolerable, even though some small risk may exist. As it
may be unfeasible to provide absolute safety, tolerable risk takes into account factors
such as the limitations of the product, process or service, the cost-effectiveness of
reducing risk further and the conventions of the society concerned.
For example, in mine clearance a higher level of risk may have to be accepted if a
demining tool is used that has low reliability, or if there is a requirement to reduce
the cost of demining in an area. The tolerance of the local community may vary from
place to place and people in one area may be prepared to accept a higher level of risk
than people in another.
The level of tolerable risk needs to be continually reassessed, because, for example, an
economically feasible improvement in technology or knowledge may be achievable,
meaning that a higher level of safety can be achieved.6 The tolerance levels of the
affected community may also change. If, for instance, someone is injured due to a
missed mine in a supposedly cleared area, the people in the area may call for a lower
level of risk.

Risk assessment
Risk assessment is a tool used to facilitate decisions about how to optimise the use of
scarce resources. Risk assessment provides the basis for determining the risk involved
in certain processes and justification for the actions that have been undertaken.
Properly used, a risk assessment often provides an essential ingredient in reaching
decisions on the management of hazards. The results of a risk assessment are often
used to inform rather than dictate decisions and are only one of many factors taken
into account in reaching a decision.
However, the use of risk assessment practices is not without controversy. For example,
an approach based on the assessment of risk could be seen to underestimate the true
impact of a problem and could therefore undermine the adoption of precautionary
approaches based on anticipating and averting harm.
In the context of mine clearance, tolerable risk is achieved by a process of risk
assessment (risk analysis and risk evaluation) and risk reduction as illustrated in
Figure 1 overleaf. The model presented describes several steps that, once completed,
provide a basis for establishing and judging tolerable risk. These steps are discussed
in greater detail in the remainder of this section. However, it is worth emphasising
two points. First, the boundaries between stages are not clear cut. Information and
perspectives are gathered while progressing from one stage to another, often
requiring early stages of the process to be revisited. In short, the process is iterative.
Second, stakeholders should be involved at all stages, although final decisions may
not always be taken by consensus since the various stakeholders may hold different
or even opposing views.

51

52

A Study of Mechanical Application in Demining

Fig. 1. Process of achieving tolerable risk
A fundamental principle underpinning
Health and Safety Acts worldwide,
covering almost all industries, is that those
companies or organisations creating risks by
nature of their work activity are responsible
for protecting workers and the public from
the consequences.
Where hazards entailing severe
consequences are involved, the trend in
recent years has been to amplify the duties
for generic risk assessments to require the
production of specific safety cases.
This requires implementing companies or
organisations to write down and submit to
regulatory bodies measures to ensure safe
and healthy systems of work and proper
management of heath and safety. This
enables the companies or organisations to
demonstrate that they understand the
hazards associated with work activities
and how to control them.

Adapted from ISO (1999a).

The responsibility to develop safety
measures is with the company or
organisation implementing the work
activity. The regulation body clarifies the
duties requiring, for example, employers to
assess risks and base their control measures
on the results of the assessment.

The model works by first identifying the user group for the product, process or
service. The intended use for the product should be ascertained along with any
foreseeable misuse. Once the user group and land use post-clearance have been
defined, a tolerable risk level can be set. This tolerable risk level is a standard of
“safety” that needs to be met before the people in the community use the land for its
intended purpose.
The hazards in all stages of the process should be identified and the risk associated
with each hazard estimated and evaluated. This involves gathering information about
the area which enables a judgement of risk to be made. The risk can then be judged to
be tolerable or intolerable to the user group. If the risk associated with the land prior
to any clearance effort is tolerable, then no clearance is necessary. If the risk is not
tolerable, options for reducing the risk should be outlined. Each option will come
with its own limitations and estimates of reliability. The option which is likely to
reduce the risk to the defined tolerable level should be implemented.
Step 1. Identify the likely user group(s)
The model is designed to identify the product or service that is provided to mineaffected communities. In the context of humanitarian demining the service is “mine
and UXO clearance“ with the product being “safe land”. The main aim of the product
and service is to remove all mines and UXO.
Thus, consideration should be given to the level of risk that the local community is
prepared to accept. What may be an acceptable level of risk for one group of people
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may be unacceptable to another. To help determine what level of risk is appropriate
for the user group, the survey team can analyse factors such as whether the affected
land is currently being used, what level of risk may have been accepted in past
clearance sites, and the views of the local government or residents. The process,
however, is complex. Some of the main issues and constraints are set out in Table 1.
Table 1.
Issues

Constraints

Cleared land cannot be guaranteed as free
from risk of mines and UXO.

Every clearance method used has limitations.
Additionally, information regarding the exact
number of mines in an area is vague. A
demining organisation can not be sure all
items have been removed based on the
number located and cleared.

Mines and UXO may exist outside areas
identified as requiring clearance.

The survey process is limited in its ability to
locate all mines and UXO. It identifies areas
of contamination and not individual items,
which often exist randomly.

Step 2. Identify the intended use of the land
This stage of the model is designed to investigate what the local community intends
to use the land for. If people intend to build houses and move onto the land with their
families, the level of risk they will accept from injury by mines or UXO is likely to be
lower than if the land is to be used for a more low-density purpose, such as grazing
cattle. Moreover, building on cleared land, as opposed to farming it, means the risk of
landmine or unexploded ordnance needs to be reduced to a greater depth so that
building foundations can be safely established. Therefore the intended land use should
be factored into the analysis of tolerable risk.
It is also possible that although a community may not originally have intended to live
on the land, after passage of time they may still move onto it even though it has not
been deemed tolerably safe to do so due to some pressing necessity. The potential
for habitation is reduced if the land is mountainous, swampy or difficult to access,
so these factors can be taken into account when considering possible future alternative
use of the land, and thus the importance of conducting clearance in the right areas.
Determining the intended land use may also help in the division of land according
to community priorities. For example, if the location of the suspected minefield
impedes living conditions for the local people, then reducing the risk from mines
and UXO in that area may be a higher priority than reducing the risk in an area the
people do not need to put to immediate use. Some of the main issues and constraints
are set out below.
Table 2.
Issues

Constraints

Clearance method is matched to intended
use of the land.

Land use may change over time.

Land is not necessarily used after clearance.

Limited accountability or incentive for land
to be used as intended.

An area may need urgent clearance but also
be politically unstable. Future conflict may recontaminate the area.

Difficult to predict future conflict.
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Step 3. Establish the tolerable risk level
This is the most subjective phase of risk assessment because it is based on the
perception of risk held by local people as well as the responsibility of the demining
industry to ensure the relative safety of its product or service. So, even after a
demining organisation has deemed an area to be tolerably free of landmines and
UXO, if the people in the area refuse to use the land because of the perception of risk
is still too high and the demining organisation may need to increase the perception
of safety by implementing a further demining technique. Alternatively, the local
people may be using an area that the demining industry cannot yet confirm to be
tolerably free from mines and UXO.
In practice, risk tolerance criteria are being implemented poorly in a range of
industries worldwide. This is due to risk measures being misunderstood. The major
issues and roadblocks that need to be addressed before risk tolerance levels can be
developed include:
¾ presentation of risk must be uniform and consistent;
¾ ethical assumptions must be consistent;
¾ terminology must be consistent;
¾ guidelines should be regularly reviewed; and
¾ organisations need to view risk reduction as an opportunity for improving
their business instead of an imposed requirement.7
The general approach is to set out the objectives and to give considerable choice to
duty holders as to the measures they should put in place to meet these objectives. The
tolerable risk level may be affected by other factors, such as time constraints and
cost-effectiveness. It may be suitable to accept a higher level of risk to release land
for urgent activity, such as aid or road development, and an analysis may be required
as to whether the land value is representative of the cost of clearance.
Establishing the tolerable risk level early is necessary because managing mine/UXO
contamination is based on the optimum allocation of scarce resources. A programme
must have a method of determining which areas will be cleared first and which
areas will be cleared later. Again, some of the main issues and constraints are set out
in Table 3.
Table 3.
Issues

Constraints

Time spent clearing in one area means people
living in other areas are exposed to risk.

The more reliable the method of clearance,
the more time is needed in each minefield.

Clearance conducted in large areas with
few mines.

A lack of detailed and accurate minefield
information.

The demining community is undecided on
the most effective way to reduce mine/UXO
casualty figures .

Different methods or approaches are often
not comparable. These include mine risk
education, full clearance or identification
and marking.

It has been argued that rapid risk reduction with a high tolerance may result in a
greater reduction in the number of victims than one with a low tolerance requiring an
increased timeframe to achieve a higher level of risk reduction.8
One of the benefits of using machines to reduce risk is their potential daily output,
which is superior to manual or dog techniques. If mine clearance machines were
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used in as many minefields as possible, prior to the deployment of any subsequent
clearance activity, two things would happen. First, a larger percentage of mines
would be cleared faster than if only manual teams were deployed. Second, the machine
could act to allow any subsequent clearance teams to be deployed in a more focused
manner, through an effective process of area reduction.
The hypothetical situation would be that all the minefields were first cleared by
machines, where almost all mines would be detonated or broken up. Some items of
UXO would also remain. As machines both clear mines and augment information
about an area, this information would assist in prioritising clearance tasks as well as
in identifying the real perimeters of mined areas.
The by-product of this approach is that many areas would not receive any follow-up
clearance for a considerable period. The broken-up mines can be considered a tolerable
risk, if only for a certain period, because the alternative is to do no clearance
whatsoever for a relatively longer period.
The importance of establishing the tolerance level at this stage cannot be
underestimated. This step is quite often overlooked but it did occur in Kosovo. The
Kosovo example (see Annex 4 at the end of this chapter) discusses the implications of
establishing a level of tolerance at the early stage of mine/UXO clearance action.
The same approach is also conducted by the TMAC through its “area and risk
reduction” operations as opposed to mine clearance operations. Their tolerance levels
were established after consulting local inhabitants and beneficiaries. This approach
is detailed in Chapter 3.
Step 4. Estimate the risk level
Estimating and evaluating the identified risks is a process of determining the
probability and impact of the identified hazards, i.e. the likelihood that an incident
with a mine or UXO will occur and the consequences of the incident. The impact of a
mine and UXO detonation is difficult to predict as it depends on the type of device,
how it was initiated and how many people were involved at the time.
Knowledge uncertainty
Estimating accurately the probability and impact depends on the reliability of the
information. The process of uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Process of uncertainty when estimating risks

HSE (2001).

The vertical axis represents increasing uncertainty about the probability of an incident
occurring in a particular area. As less is known about the probability of an incident
occurring, the more likely it is that decision-makers will focus on the possible impact.
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The horizontal axis represents increasing uncertainty as to the nature of the impact.
The less that is known about the possible impact of an incident, the greater the focus
on hypothetical consequences.
When both the probability of an incident occurring and the impact of the incident
are known (upper left hand corner), assessments of risk can be undertaken. However,
the less that is known about the probability of events occurring and the impact of
those events, the more decisions are likely to be based on generic hazards or past
experiences. These decisions made in the face of uncertainty are likely to be
precautionary in nature and incapable of being tested.
As more information is gathered, uncertainty is decreased. The example of Southern
Lebanon (see Annex 1 at the end of this chapter) shows how machines can be used to gather
information so that the impact and probability can be more accurately defined and the
most effective clearance method applied. The scope of the task may be reduced in terms
of area (area reduction) and methods used (less meticulous). Thus, machines may prove
valuable not only in the sense that mines are detonated during their use, but also as a
source of information about mine density and mine type in an area.
General probability levels
Table 1 overleaf shows that the probability of mine presence, when considered as a
proportion of items per area suspected and cleared, is incredibly low. This reality is
related to the inability of the technical survey (in its current form) to define the
exact location of mines within a given area without conducting a physical search
(high information uncertainty). Table 1 illustrates that most work is concerned with
searching for mines (97.91 per cent) and very little work is concerned with actually
clearing them (2.09 per cent).9
Additionally, Table 1 highlights the difference between perceived risk and actual
risk. The total area perceived to be at risk is 292,080,515 square metres, however,
the total area representing actual risk averaged out as 6,092,268 square metres.
Step 5. Decide whether the risk is tolerable
At this stage, it is important to determine whether the risks in an area are tolerable.
Assuming that the risk is not tolerable regardless of the probability of mines or UXO
existing in a suspected area will often result in a long and expensive risk reduction
procedure. In the context of mine clearance, the mine/UXO hazard is generally regarded
as significant unless past experience, or the probability of an occurrence, is low compared
to the background level of risk to which people are exposed.
Table 4
Issues

Constraints

Confidence in the decision made.

Quality of the information cannot be
accurately tested.

Freedom of organisations to make decisions.

Some regulations and laws dictate that the
risk of mines/UXO is not tolerable regardless of
probability or impact.

Organisations cannot immediately attend to
mine/UXO problems although expectation to
do so is high.

A lack of resources to satisfy needs; prioritising
necessary.

Tolerance varies according to organisations’
objectives and aims.

All mine/UXO risks tend to be categorised
equally.
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In Kosovo, the Mine Action Coordination Centre applied different clearance methods
according to different explosive item risks. High-risk items included mines and cluster
bombs. Clearance methods were used in areas known to contain these items. Other
general munitions (mortars and artillery rounds, etc.) were believed to represent a
lower risk and the primary means of dealing with them was through education and
avoidance methods, implying that areas containing only general UXO could be deemed
tolerable to clearance organisations, but intolerable to mine risk education
organisations or programmes.
The use of machines is generally restricted to ground preparation work, after which
other clearance techniques are employed, regardless of information obtainable from
the mechanical process. The Southern Lebanon example (see Annex 1) highlights how
tolerable risk levels were decided once a machine was applied. The information
gained from applying machines often resulted in minimal follow-up clearance being
required or, in some cases, no follow-up whatsoever.
Step 6. Identify the existing hazard
The next step in the risk assessment analysis is to identify the existing explosive
hazards to the local people. Hazards can be categorised into mine and UXO types
illustrated in Figure 3. The mine action survey team can gather information about
the mine type and density of mines likely to be present in an area. Site maps of the
minefield can be used, where available. Additionally, the history of the area should
be studied to ascertain what the land was used for in the context of the conflict.
Important information includes who was fighting, the length of the conflict, who
was financing the conflict and where the weapons were coming from. The local
residents can be asked about their knowledge of the land, whether any accidents
have occurred in the region and what type of mines they have seen.
Fig. 3. Mine and unexploded ordnance classification

There are two aspects of landmine and UXO types to understand when identifying
the different hazards:
¾ detectability of the mine/UXO, and
¾ design function of the mine/UXO.
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Mine detection technology in manual demining is based on the detection of the
metal content within the explosive item. Anti-personnel blast mines are generally
plastic-cased mines with a small amount of metal in the internal workings of the
mine. This means they can be relatively difficult to locate by a metal detector.
Moreover, every piece of metal of similar size needs to be investigated in case it is a
mine. This is a major inhibitor to clearance effectiveness, particularly in areas with
high levels of extraneous metal.
By nature, anti-personnel fragmentation mines have much higher levels of metal
content and are therefore much easier for metal detection technology to locate
(smaller sized metal readings can be ignored). Additionally, UXO tend to have a
similarly high metal content. Anti-tank mines can have either high or low levels of
metal content but areas containing these mines can generally be differentiated from
areas containing other mine types.
When using MDD techniques, explosive molecules are more efficiently released in
mines with plastic casing than in mines with metal casing, although molecules in
metal-cased mines may be released through built-in apertures.10
Additionally, the design function of an item influences the clearance options available.
Different machine tools are capable of different effects on mines. A roller, for example,
applies pressure to the ground, therefore only mines that are designed to function
from direct downward pressure are affected. Tripwire-activated fragmentation mines
become a less hazardous item to approach and destroy once the tripwire threat has
been mechanically removed.
Machines will need to identify the types of mines and UXO that exist both before and
after machine use in an area so that clearance can be tailored to the threat in the most
efficient manner possible. The Thai Mine Action Centre example (see the example in
Chapter 3 on area reduction of non-patterned minefields) shows how different mechanical
tools can be applied to identify whether different hazard types exist in an area. Any
areas that have been processed and where no evidence was found of the presence of
any type of mine/UXO are cancelled out, and receive no clearance subsequent to
mechanical action.
Step 7. Outline options for reducing risks
Although all the above six steps of the risk assessment process are important, getting
Step 5 right — deciding whether the risk is tolerable — is crucial. Achieving this will
not only help to reach decisions that are likely to be supported and implemented but,
because of the iterative process inherent in risk assessment, it will help to get the
other stages right as well. However, getting Step 5 right depends on the criteria adopted
for deciding whether a risk is unacceptable or tolerable.
Research analysing the criteria used by regulators in the health, safety and
environmental field has shown that, in general, the criteria can be classified according
to three categories:11
¾ An equity-based criterion, which starts with the premise that all individuals
have unconditional rights to certain levels of protection. If the risk estimate is
above the limit and further control measures cannot be introduced then the risk
is held as unacceptable whatever the benefits.
¾ A utility-based criterion, which applies to the comparison between the
incremental benefits of the measures used to prevent the risk of injury and the
cost of the measures (cost-benefit analysis). There is a requirement for a balance
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to be struck between the cost of removing a risk and the benefit of removing
it.
¾ A technology-based criterion, which reflects the idea that a satisfactory level
of risk prevention or removal is attained when state-of-the-art control measures
are employed to control risks whatever the circumstances.
Demining organisations and authorities tend to take a technology-based approach to
determining tolerable risk with regard to how a hazard should be removed. Often
equity-based and utility-based criteria are ignored.
Mine clearance operations are generally conducted using three different methods:
manual demining, mine dog detection and machines. The technology-based criteria
mean manual techniques are the preferred method of clearance as there is more
confidence in the reliability of manual methods to clear all of the hazards, regardless
of the overall effectiveness of the technique or the probability of mines being present
in certain areas. But manual techniques are not infallible: according to Version 1 of
the Database of Demining Accidents, around 18 per cent of manual demining accidents
were due to missed mines. This information demonstrates that limitations exist with
even the supposedly reliable methods.
The general limitations of the three main methods of clearance are summarised in
Table 6 below.
Table 6. Limitations of the three main humanitarian clearance techniques
presently in use
Technique

Limitations

Manual clearance Reliant on the use of detectors to locate mines. Detectors have depth
limitations and may miss what are known as minimum metal mines beyond
a depth of 13 centimetres.a) Also, it is known that the sensitivity of detectors
fluctuates throughout a working day. Human error is also involved, either
with detectors or with manual excavation.
Dog detection

Dogs’ ability to detect mines is influenced by environmental conditions, the
migration of explosive molecules to the surface of the ground, training
of the dog and the interaction between the dog and its handler. However,
the parameters for these influences are not clearly understood.

Machines

Machines such as flails and tillers both detonate and break up mines. When
mines are broken up they are not always completely neutralised and
hazardous components can remain in their wake. Machine effectiveness is
also influenced by ground conditions and environmental factors – machines
are of limited use in rocky, damp soil or extreme terrain.

a) Minimum metal mines have been found deeper than 13 centimetres using manual excavation
techniques. E.g. The HALO Trust, Cambodia 1996, Samaki minefield: in this incident an area was
cleared by detectors first. The Location Manager then noticed a small area where it appeared earth
had built up over time and ordered it to be manually excavated. Twelve MD82b anti-personnel
mines were located.

Step 8. Reduce the risk using the option(s) likely to achieve tolerable risk
Selection and subsequent implementation of a demining technique (or combination
of techniques) should be based in part on a consideration of the reliability of each
method separately and in combination with other methods.
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Method reliability
Obtaining information about the reliability of demining methods is difficult, because
it is only possible to know the percentage of mines that have been removed from an
area when the number present prior to clearance is known. The most accurate
information on the reliability of clearance methods is gained in test situations where
the number of mines and their location in an area is known. Alternatively, empirical
evidence can be gained about the probable machine effectiveness if it is followed up
by full clearance.
SWEDEC has conducted comprehensive testing on three different machine types, a
summary of which follows. CROMAC has summarised the results of all mechanical
actions in Croatia for 2002.

SWEDEC test results
SWEDEC did comparative testing on three machines in late 2002: the Scanjack twin
flail (SJ), the Hydrema 910MCV (HD), and the Mine-Guzzler tiller (MG).12As part
of the overall testing regime a probability test was conducted. Test objects similar
to a PMA 2 anti-personnel blast mine and a TMM 1 anti-tank mine were used and
fitted with live igniters only.
The test was carried out in the following soil types:
¾ arable ground
degree of compaction: approx. 85 per cent of maximum;
¾ sand
degree of compaction: approx. 90 per cent of maximum;
¾ gravel
degree of compaction: approx. 94 per cent of maximum.
The test objects were laid with a metal plate so as to verify the status of the mine
after clearing at one metre distances from each other at varying depths: 0, 10 and 20
centimetres. In each test bed and at each depth, 100 mines were used. The complete
test schedule for each machine totalled 900 mines. The manufacturer selected both
the speed and clearance depth of each machine.
Evaluation of the results was in accordance with:
¾ mines destroyed (only the plate was found or mine was broken up with less
than 50 per cent of the explosive charge remaining);
¾ mines separated (more than 50 per cent of the explosive charge remaining, igniter
detached);
¾ mines damaged (reduced functioning of mine or igniter); and
¾ mines unaffected (the mine still in working condition).
Figure 4 overleaf suggests that the choice of machine affects clearance performance.
Each of the machines tested is quite different in its make-up and use (tool design
and procedure). The Scanjack, a double flail machine, recorded the highest clearance
performance results with one run. The other two machines had single system tools
and also had one run at the test bed.
It could be that machine performance is also dependent on how many times it processes
the ground. Further, when all three machines were tested on vegetated areas
containing ten mines, the Mine-Guzzler out-performed the other two with a 100 per
cent detonation rate, suggesting terrain conditions with vegetation can also have a
significant influence.
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Fig. 4. Percentage of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines destroyed, damaged
and unaffected by each machine type across three soil types

Figure 5 shows a significant effect of each machine type on detonation rates
(F (2, 17) = 20.78, p < .001), with the Mine-Guzzler detonating fewer mines overall than
the other two machines. There was no effect of mine depth on detonation rate
(F (2, 17) = 1.83, p > .05) and no significant interaction between machine type and mine
depth (F (4, 17) = 1.45, p > .05). This means that while all three machines detonated
mines with equal success at depths of 0, 10 and 20centimetres, the Hydrema and the
Scanjack performed better overall than the Mine-Guzzler.
Fig. 5. Detonation percentages for each machine at mine depths
of 0, 10 and 20 centimetres

Figure 6 shows the results of operating the machines at different speeds. The MineGuzzler was operated at a much larger range of speeds than the other two machines
and appeared to detonate a lower percentage of mines the faster it was used, although
the negative trend was not significant (rs = -.17, p > .05).
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Fig. 6. Detonation percentages as a function of machine speed

Figure 7 shows no significant effect of mine depth (F (2, 17) = 1.31, p > .05) or soil type
(F (2, 17) = 0.47, p > .05) on the detonation rate. This means that the machines achieved
similar detonation rates regardless of soil type and mine depth.
Fig. 7. Detonation percentages as a function of mine depth with three soil types

Using machines to reduce risk to a tolerable level requires that the performance of
the machine is predictable. The results from the SWEDEC tests show little difference
in detonation rate as a function of mine depth and soil type but some difference in
detonation rate across machine type. However, many questions remain unanswered.
There is very little knowledge about how a machine affects a mine. The use of a
machine, therefore, should be based on its known capabilities and various features
of the task site, such as terrain and parameters, which are reconciled with the
ordnance and terrain threat at each task site.
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CROMAC empirical data
The CROMAC data is a summary of all post-clearance project reports submitted to
CROMAC in 2002.13 When mine clearance machines are applied there are three
different outcomes: mines are detonated, broken up or undamaged. Undamaged
mines occurred only in areas where vegetation cutting machines were used. Figure
8 shows the effect of mechanical action on a range of mine types in Croatia. Table7
shows the number of mines found, detonated, damaged and unaffected by machines.
Fig. 8. Machine effect on mines encountered

Table 7. Number of mines encountered, detonated, damaged and unaffected
as a percentage of the total processed by machines
Mine condition

Total

Percentages

Number of mines encountered

2,004

100.00

Number of mines detonated

1,262

62.97

669

33.38

73

3.65

Number of mines damaged (condition unspecified)
Number of mines unaffected (vegetation cutter only)

As Croatia legally requires an additional clearance method (a form of follow-up)
when using a machine, information regarding each machine’s effectiveness was
obtained in the follow-up process. Sixty-three per cent of the mines were detonated
by the machine. The 3.65 per cent which were undamaged are a result of the vegetation
cutters not penetrating the ground. The condition of the mine may explain why
some were not detonated. This information is not generally available to a demining
organisation prior to conducting clearance operations. What the data does suggest
is that the approximate number of remaining mines could be calculated, based on
the number of mines detonated by the machine, as illustrated overleaf.
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Table 8.
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Additionally, an analysis of effects on UXO shows that machines are fairly ineffectual
at detonating or breaking up all UXO (see Figure 9).
Fig. 9. Machine effect on UXO by machine type

The type and condition of the particular UXO would have an obvious influence on
these results. As accurate knowledge regarding type and condition would also not
be generally available to a demining organisation, UXO will remain a hazard after
the use of a machine.
Machine follow-up
There are opportunities to tailor follow-up behind a machine. Full clearance applied
behind a machine may not be justified in some scenarios. For example, if machines
are deployed against a particular minefield and there are no detonations as a result,
full clearance behind the machine may not be necessary. Based on the Croatian results,
a very low number of mines may remain but be in a damaged state. An unknown
number of UXO will also remain, but less intensive and more focused procedures can
be applied to remove this threat, e.g. applying a battle area clearance (BAC) technique.
Broken-up mines — tolerable?
The CROMAC data also shows that mechanical violence results in either a detonation
or a break-up (excluding vegetation cutters).14 When a mine is broken up by a machine
such as a flail or tiller, it is possible that a reasonably intact fuse remains with a portion
of explosive attached to it (the explosive chain is still functional and therefore the
item remains a threat). It is not known, however, whether a machine can further
influence a change in mine condition if applied several times. Moreover, there is no
clear definition between what constitutes a broken-up mine, which can be regarded
as still operational (still a threat), from a mine which is broken up but considered
non-operational (arguably no real threat).
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Fig. 10. PROM 1 anti-personnel fragmentation
mine after a flail had passed over it in
Croatia. Note that the fuse is missing. What
is required to initiate this mine now? Can it
be left behind so that more dangerous items
are dealt with in other areas first?

Fig. 11. M14 anti-personnel blast mine after a
flail had passed over it in Lebanon. The firing
pin is missing. What is required to initiate
this mine now? What form of follow-up is now
required to the area it was in; mechanical,
manual or dogs?

Machine causing hazards to clearance teams?
In Southern Lebanon there is some concern that machines are leaving mines in a
sensitive condition. The concern is that the fuse pin of the Israeli No 4 anti-personnel
mine is being nudged further from its position, potentially making manual clearance
of the mine after machine use more hazardous. Accidents have occurred in areas
preceded by a flail and the machine has been identified as a possible contributor to
the accident. However, accidents of a similar nature have also happened in areas not
preceded by the machine. Nevertheless, the Mine Action Coordination Centre from
Southern Lebanon is convinced that flails are contributing to the increased sensitivity
of the mine.
The concern that flails are contributing to accidents has not been expressed in any
other part of the world visited in this study. The effect of the machine could be
particular to this mine, the terrain conditions, or both. This issue needs further
investigation.
The HALO Trust Rock Crusher example (see Annex 3) highlights how the risk from
mines broken up by machines is deemed tolerable. The mechanical process used has
created high confidence that mine pieces exiting the machine do not pose a hazard.
The ability to predict whether a mechanical process will leave broken-up mines in a
state that is generally accepted as non-operational could help tailor follow-up aimed
at locating the type of explosive ordnance which remains operational. In some cases,
no follow-up clearance may be required. In other cases, follow-up may involve the
application of a machine several times or the application of different and mutually
exclusive mechanical processes. There is little knowledge about, or investigation into,
available options.
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Conclusions, findings and recommendations
Conclusion 1.

How risk is measured and managed will be determined by tolerance to individual
risk.

Findings
Risk-based approaches enable the development of appropriate procedures, protection
and quality requirements and influence the clearance method to achieve the standard.
In doing so, it is critical that both the probability and the impact of the risk are
considered.
There needs to be a clear definition of what constitutes a mine that is still operational
after machine violence from one that is not. Applying this definition of mine condition
could have a dramatic effect on the levels of tolerable risk accepted in various countries,
communities and circumstances. For example, pressure to release land may be so
intense that non-operational mines could be left in an area until the clearance priority
switches to clearing up this relatively limited residual risk.
Recommendation 1.
It should be accepted that the complete removal of risk cannot be assured in mine
clearance (even though it is probably achieved in many cases) owing to the inaccuracy
of information combined with the inherent limitations of clearance methods. This
philosophy is standard among service-based industries worldwide and is reflected in
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) protocol. Furthermore, risk
assessment methodologies, specific for mine clearance operations, need to be further
developed and used at the field level.
Conclusion 2.

A detailed set of tolerable risk criteria established prior to clearance is a prerequisite
for efficient humanitarian demining.

Findings
If every area of suspected land is treated similarly in terms of the level of risk that is
tolerated, there is less room for tailor-made clearance operations to be selected. If the
needs of the local people are understood prior to undertaking clearance, it may be
possible to release land more efficiently using less intensive techniques, such as area
reduction. Risk assessment is the tool used to make qualified decisions about how to
optimise the use of scarce resources. It provides the basis for determining the risk
involved in certain processes and justification for actions that have been undertaken.
Without a tolerable-risk criterion, the safest and the most easily defensible options
for action are taken regardless of the circumstance and in many cases the cost.
Establishing what is or is not tolerable before remedial action unleashes a range of
possible actions that could prove more efficient and rational.
An international proscription against leaving components of broken-up mines in situ
should not exist (currently one is recognised de facto). The IMAS stipulate that undetonated mines must be removed in order to conform to international clearance
standards. This reference does not appear to cover small mine fragments.15 It is
unlikely that mines/UXO broken-up sufficiently in the manner described above
constitute a significant hazard. Saving time and therefore saving lives should not be
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limited by a hide-bound assertion that all fragments of explosive material must be
removed.
Recommendation 2.
Leaving components of broken-up mines in situ should be considered as an option for
clearance organisations, unless stipulated otherwise by the relevant mine action
authority.

Conclusion 3.

The way to more effective and efficient demining is through acquiring more
information about the hazards occupying an area rather than assuming a worstcase scenario.

Findings
Clearance techniques are applied once hazard information is obtained. However, a
high degree of information uncertainty still exists on completion of a verbal-based
assessment and as a result the worst-case scenario is assumed. This can result in
unnecessarily time-consuming and expensive techniques being employed.
Machines are used as part of a risk-assessment process to acquire an additional layer
of information of the actual risks in an area. This additional information can often
result in the application of different and less intensive clearance techniques (as seen
in Southern Lebanon example) or the elimination of areas requiring clearance
(Thailand example — area reduction). In both these programmes, in specific
circumstances an area does not receive subsequent follow-up clearance if the
mechanical process has not indicated the presence of mines. Available information
suggests that there is enormous scope for this approach.
It is well known that a reasonable proportion of the suspected mine/UXO
contaminated areas have, through clearance, proven to contain no hazard whatsoever.
It is important that these areas be identified through the use of a mechanical process
so that expensive and time-consuming follow-up assets are set to work in areas
“known” to contain mines.
Recommendation 3.
Machine development should focus on technology that is able to acquire as much
information as possible about the minefield prior to clearance. These machines will probably
need a variety of information-gathering tools to investigate a range of explosive-risk
categories. There are numerous technological possibilities on the open market for this to
happen in the field now. Furthermore, it should be recognised as an option for individual
implementing agencies that, in areas where a machine has not indicated the presence of
mines, no subsequent clearance method is required.

Conclusion 4.

Insufficient research has so far been conducted into the reliability and capability
of mechanical clearance methods.

Findings
Studies by CROMAC and SWEDEC represent the first genuine attempt to quantify
the capabilities and reliability of machines involved in the demining industry. The
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results of these studies, however, raise further questions.
Whenever machines are used in information-gathering or clearance-related activities,
detailed records should be kept. The current standard of operational record-keeping
is suppressing the growth of understanding in the use of machines.
Recommendation 4.
Records need to be far more thorough and should include:

a) details about the conditions in which mines were undamaged by machine use;
b) judgements of whether mines are still operational following machine use; and,
c) any trends or links between the machine type and its effect on various mine types,
including variables like terrain and soil conditions.
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Annex 1.

Southern Lebanon
(Operation Emirates Solidarity)

This example shows how the probabilities of mines existing in an area affect follow-up
clearance options.
Fig. 1. In Southern Lebanon, minefields are
predominantly regular patterned
minefields laid tactically or defensively by
the Israeli Defence Force. There are a
limited number of irregular minefields but
some of these areas are suspected not to
contain mines at all.
Both the Israeli Defence Force and local
militia kept records of their mine-laying
and this information was made available
to the Mine Action Coordination Centre.

The approach adopted in Southern Lebanon replicates the Kosovo experience and
approach in many ways. Manual teams are targeted in areas known to contain mines
and not in areas where evidence of mines is not convincing. Machines are used in
these areas.
In addition to ground preparation and area reduction, machines (usually small and
medium-sized flails) are used to eliminate low probability areas and increase
confidence that no hazardous items are present. Generally, where there is a reasonable
degree of confidence that mines are not present in a given area, machines are deployed
to confirm this or otherwise inform the MACC’s Planning Officer. The machine may
or may not be followed up by a clearance method, but this decision relies on discussions
between the operator and the Planning Officer.
When a machine indicates the presence of a mine in areas of low probability (i.e. a
mine detonates), an area of 100 square metres is then cleared from the seat of the
detonation. The fact that follow-up is restricted to a specific area within the suspected
area and not the entire area is significant. Information gained by the machine combined
with existing information regarding the minefield affects the way the hazard is
approached.
The general probability table strongly shows that the number of areas where area
reduction following machine use can be applied is very high. Currently, this and
similar approaches are rare.
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Annex 2.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Viet Nam

This example shows that there is doubt about a machine’s vulnerability to a perceived risk.
Information can be obtained to provide high confidence of the actual risks. The machines
can then be used to expedite clearance.

In Viet Nam, MAG cleared a 120-hectare site in Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province. This
site was an abandoned U.S. firebase in the former Demilitarised Zone. The site was
known to be protected by a five-panel mine belt (25 rows) which surrounded the
base.
After the war the Vietnamese Army undertook some limited clearance which was
later abandoned. This complicated clearance because UXO, scrap and barbed wire
were bulldozed into holes and buried. The initial approach was to clear this land
using manual teams and standard detection methods (only 12 lanes were initially
available). This method soon proved unproductive.
The initial concerns regarding the use of machines centred on the belief that the UXO
to be cleared would be too sensitive to mechanical action.
Increased information was crucial to the implementation of a range of options and to
investigate whether machines could be used. Information was gained by using the
manual lanes around the site in a Technical Survey role (breaching lanes). After three
months, sufficient information was gathered to build a picture of what risk types
were evident on the ground. The site was then divided. Different clearance methods
were designed according to the survey information, with each category of threat treated
differently.

Mine clearance
Once identified, the mine panels were cleared using traditional manual clearance
methods. Additionally, the safety distances were reduced from 25 to 15 metres
between each man due to the low explosive content of the mines (M14 blast antipersonnel mines).
The entire area was searched using large loop detectors, often after the ground was
initially cleared with conventional manual techniques and with machines (a Mk II
screening unit).

Risk assessment and mechanical application

Fig. 1. Deep search
Information from the technical survey confirmed the location
of the mines and that no mines were expected inside the
firebase. Additionally, the condition and nature of the UXO
meant mechanical excavation would be possible
(abandoned UXO only, which had not been fired). Locallyhired excavators were used to dig trenches within the
firebase. The spoil was searched with detectors before being
replaced. The machines excavating for buried UXO were not
armoured. The company the plant was hired from had many
previous experiences of unearthing UXO on construction
tasks and the risk was thus deemed normal and tolerable.

Fig. 2. Mk II screening unit.

On more static sites a large MkII screening unit was deployed to process the soil.
The initial idea was to use the Screener as part of the trenching method. However,
in this role it had to be moved an impractical number of times. It was then used on
fixed locations in the minefield, clearance of pits and in areas of high metal
contamination. This machine system is susceptible to UXO with centrifugal fusing.
The technical survey established that this risk did not exist and the machine was
used without incident. The figure below shows how the different areas were cleared.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the different methods used by MAG in Viet Nam

a)

a) Ebinger EBEX® 420 pbd.

Some of the area only received a visual inspection as it was within the
area requiring clearance but the probability of contamination was
considered very low. A typical response to this type of task in
humanitarian demining would be manual clearance over the entire site
and an excavation process in selected areas where buried ordnance was
known to be. This is often the case despite the time frame and costs
involved. In fact, this was the initial response by MAG Viet Nam until the
Senior Technical Adviser decided that clearance could be expedited if
more information was gathered about the site and actually used.
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Annex 3.

The rock crusher

This example shows how the risk from broken-up mines after machine use is deemed
tolerable.

The HALO Trust operates rock crusher machines as full clearance tools in Afghanistan,
Georgia (Abkhazia) and Sri Lanka. Mine-contaminated soil is fed into a hopper that
transports the soil to a chamber containing hammers which break up all crushable
objects to a uniform size (as used in quarries). The size of particles exiting the machine
is adjustable.
When conducting mine clearance operations, the gap between the impact hammer
and exit shaft is set so that the smallest mine cannot escape without being broken up.
Once the soil has left the machine it is considered contamination free, as the machine
both detonates and breaks up mines. The soil is then either left in a pile or it is replaced.
No process is required to confirm that the mines that have been broken up still represent
a hazard, because the machine has proven its ability to consistently break up mines to
the degree that they do not represent an additional hazard.
Another interesting aspect of the rock crusher is that it distinguishes between hard
metal-cased mines/UXO and plastic or blast mines. The latter are the only items that
make it to the crushing chamber, the former are separated by a metal detector situated
between the hopper and crushing chamber. When a large metal object passes over the
detector the machine stops, and the conveyor belt is reversed so that the item spills
out the other end of the machine to be destroyed in situ. The precedence here is that
broken-up blast mines (usually plastic) can be considered a tolerable risk if the machine
or process has proven to be capable of breaking them up to the degree that they pose
no real hazard. The parameters for this, however, have not been established.
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Annex 4.

Kosovo: establishing tolerable risk

This example highlights the implications of establishing tolerable risk early.

When the Mine Action Coordination Centre in Kosovo conducted the initial mission
analysis, it was aware that the problem of dealing with mine/UXO contamination
after a conflict in Europe was nothing new. The MACC therefore began to enquire
about the current scale of the problem in other parts of Europe (e.g. the United
Kingdom). This led to the Mine Action Coordination Centre’s aim to “replicate the
situation in the rest of Europe”1 which still suffers from explosive contamination in
various forms.
This approach is now commonly referred to as an “impact free” strategy as opposed
to a “mine free“ strategy. To manually clear the 360 square kilometres of suspected
land in Kosovo would prolong the task by 30 to 50 years.2
The Kosovo approach resulted in manual assets being deployed only in areas known
to contain mines. Machines were used in areas where more information about the
existence of mines was needed: if there were no indications that mines were present,
the area was considered clear without any further follow-up clearance methods (other
programmes insist on follow-up in any scenario).

1. J. Flanagan, July 2003, personal communication.
2. J. Flanagan, 2000.
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Mechanical application
to area reduction
Summary
In patterned minefields (ones in which mines are laid in rows or clusters),
machines are used to identify the presence of mines (i.e. the start of a row).
In non-patterned mined areas, machines are used to identify areas
containing mines. The potential for machines to reduce the amount of
land considered contaminated with mines and UXO is enormous.
Indeed, productivity results in the two case studies in this chapter show
that investment in an area reduction machine results in a high return
when compared to the other clearance methods used (MDD and manual).
Eliminating non-hazardous areas where no evidence of a threat is found
through systematic mechanical area reduction has clear advantages. It
allows mine clearance resources to be deployed to where real threats are
located, eliminating huge suspect areas that do not contain mines.
A more efficient approach to humanitarian demining would therefore be,
where topography allows, to confirm the presence of mines through
appropriate application of mechanical technology and then to reassess
which areas actually need clearance.

Introduction
Background
In Chapter 2, we looked at the potential for mechanical systems to be employed for
risk reduction. In this chapter, we look at the allied topic of area reduction as part of
the technical survey process.1 Area reduction is defined by the IMAS as “the process
through which the initial area indicated as contaminated is reduced to a smaller area”.
Generally, the reduction is conducted on the basis of collecting more reliable
information on the extent of the hazardous area.
Area reduction using machines is a relatively new concept with no formal or fully
understood techniques or procedures yet established. Demining organisations find
that the majority of land cleared does not actually contain mines. There is a strong
need to identify actual contaminated areas quickly and accurately.
Minefields in general can be placed in two distinctive categories: patterned and
non-patterned minefields. A patterned minefield is one in which mines are laid in
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rows or clusters: such minefields are also known as “defensive” minefields and are
used to protect valuable resources and military positions. When one mine is detonated
or otherwise located, it can indicate the location of the remaining mines. Thus,
information gained about the presence of one or more mines can be used to determine
the presence of other mines in the area. Usually, a high number of mines are laid in
a patterned minefield.
A non-patterned minefield, however, can be offensive or defensive. Often these
types of minefields (or mined areas) are a result of a low intensity conflict over a
long period of time, where mines have been used as individual weapons. When one
mine has been located in a non-patterned minefield its location cannot be used to
determine the location of other mines in the area, although it is not unusual to find
high concentrations of mines that are non-patterned.

Terms of reference
The sub-studies that form the basis of this chapter aimed to assess techniques used
in area reduction operations by machine and to establish a framework for appropriate
mechanical application to a minefield.
The chapter bases its conclusions on the use of machines in two minefield scenarios.
The first case study is based on area reduction in Abkhazia by The HALO Trust in a
patterned minefield scenario.
The second case study is based on area reduction techniques used in Thailand by the
Thai Mine Action Centre (TMAC) in a non-patterned minefield scenario. The
procedures used in the TMAC case study are defined as both risk reduction and
area reduction, although the case study only focuses on area reduction.

Case study 1: Area reduction of patterned minefields
in Abkhazia
Introduction
This case study is based on area reduction of patterned minefields in Abkhazia
between 1999 and 2000 (area reduction has been undertaken there since 1998). It
covers clearance operations along the banks of the Gumista river, which lies within
the city limits of Sukhumi City.

Mine contamination in Abkhazia
There are basically three different minefield scenarios in Abkhazia. First, Georgian
forces laid belts of mines at intervals along a seven-kilometre stretch of the southern
banks of the Gumista river, when they occupied Sukhumi. The Georgians carefully
mapped their minefields, laying dense mine belts of both PMN and PMN2 antipersonnel mines, no more than one metre apart, as well as the TM series of anti-tank
mines (TM46, TM57) in specific places.
Second, Ochamchire province in central Abkhazia was the scene of the surprise attacks
by the Abkhazians and as such no real frontline was established. The minefields in
this area therefore were not mapped, are not well known and contain a non-patterned
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mix of Soviet-era anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and locally produced improvised
mines and explosive devices.
Third, the Abkhazians laid minefields along its then newly established border with
Georgia, notably along the northern banks of the Inguri river. The mines were
generally laid in rows or patterns but the accuracy of these minefields is not as good
as those laid along the Gumista river.
Fig. 1. Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia

Minefield conditions
Initially, mine clearance in Abkhazia was conducted along both the Gumista and
Inguri rivers. The metal contamination in these areas was extremely high, particularly
along the Gumista, as it was both a light industrial area and a frontline where frequent
exchanges of small arms ammunition, light mortars and rocket-propelled grenades
took place. Both rivers, however, are equally affected by the granite-like boulders
(many ferrous) which dominate the sub-soil, so much so that the ground is best
described as granite boulder with a thin layer of topsoil.
These two dominating factors — high metal contamination and rocky ground —
make manual mine clearance techniques extremely slow. In fact, daily manual
clearance rates along the Gumista river rarely exceeded five metres per lane and
many lanes were manually excavated. In addition, mine
clearance generally takes place during only ten months
of the year as snow and frozen ground during the
height of the winter season make many clearance
options impractical.
Terrain that was being demined along the Gumista
river is generally flat, even including an old football
field that was mined. There are areas of overgrown
grass, shrubs and blackberry bushes.

Area reduction in Abkhazia
The rationale
IMAS defines two types of surveys: the general mine
action assessment and the technical survey. The

Fig. 2. Ground conditions
along the Gumista river.
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purpose of the first is to assess the scale and
impact of the landmine problem on a country
and individual communities and is generally
based on verbal and documented
information. The technical survey is also
based, among other things, on verbal and
documented information but with the aim of
collecting sufficient information to enable the
clearance requirement to be more accurately
defined by doing something physically to the
area.

Fig. 3. A typical, obstacle-strewn manual

lane on the southern bank of
The process through which the land identified demining
the Gumista river. Note the animal
in the general mine action assessment — often bones in foreground.
referred to as a Suspected Hazardous Area
(SHA) — is subsequently reduced to a smaller area is known as area reduction. Area
reduction is an integral part of the technical survey process.

The use of machines to initiate some of the mines provides an organisation with a
greater degree of information about where the mines exactly are and what areas
need to be cancelled out.
At the time of initiating their operations, HALO was given the maps of the Georgian
minefields along the Gumista river, which provided details of the location of mine
belts in relation to each other and other key reference points, as well as the type and
number of mines laid. But HALO did not know how accurate the information was,
so it had to test it.
The clearance options
HALO conducted a risk assessment focusing on how they could use the information
they had. Three options were apparent. The first was to deploy manual survey lanes
to locate the mine belts and then subsequently clear the belts. This would mean the
mine belt environs would receive limited verification. The risk of randomly laid
mines was unknown and therefore needed investigation. The second option was to
deploy a machine that would both identify the dense mine belts and provide a method
of proving the ground in and around the mine belts (testing the information). The
third was to simply manually clear the entire area initially identified (also thereby
testing the information).
The decision
HALO chose the second option. The risk assessment recognised that the belts of
mines represented the true minefield, but the environs needed a degree of
verification. Manual clearance rates were extremely slow and a demining lane would
not provide the coverage needed to make contact with the front row of mines in the
belts. Mines were laid one to two metres apart and as the typical demining lane is
only one metre across, it may clear land between mines and not locate the rows.
HALO chose to conduct area reduction operations (to indicate mine belts and verify
areas) with a Pearson Engineering Area Reduction Roller2 mounted on the front of
an armoured Belarus 1507 Tractor or Volvo 4400 front-end loader. The roller is
made up of heavy-segmented discs, each five centimetres wide. The discs float on a
central axle and thus are able to contour the ground surface extending an even downforce of about 50 kilograms.
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Area reduction procedure
The following four factors contributed to the decision to use the Pearson:
1. Even though the Pearson segmented roller is best used on reasonably flat ground
or over features easily negotiated by the prime mover, it has a limited ability to
overcome surface undulations.
2. In areas that have become overgrown a vegetation cutting attachment is used to
reduce the vegetation back to ground level. If the vegetation were merely pushed
over, there would be a buffering effect that could lead to some mines not detonating.
3. Area reduction does not take place in areas suspected of containing anti-tank
mines. The primary threat in this case was limited to PMN and PMN-2 anti-personnel
mines. HALO has found that the roller is at least 90 per cent effective against both
these types of anti-personnel mine. The mines must, however, be in working order
and have been laid properly (correct depth and position so as to be initiated).3
4. Moisture in the soil appears to influence the effectiveness of the roller. If the
ground is too soft, a concern is that mines could be pushed further in the ground
and, as a result, will not detonate. Although the legitimacy of this concern has not
been confirmed in trials, the perception influences the areas in which the roller has been
used.

Fig. 5. Roller detonation

Fig 4. Pearson

Method
The HALO Trust method of reducing areas is divided into three parts. First, the
dimensions of the mine belts and the start-line for the manual clearance need to be
established. Second, areas between the start-line (boundary of suspect area) and the
newly established manual clearance start-line need to be verified to be confident
that no mines are present. Third, after clearance of the mine rows are completed by
manual teams, to a point 10 metres beyond the final row, rolling recommences to
verify the remaining ground between the end of the manual clearance and the far
end of the minefield.
The tractor/roller drives forward from the established start-line towards the
suspected belt of mines. On detonating a mine, the roller reverses for 10 metres and
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the operator then lays a marker. It then moves further back to the start-line, then
across about 25 metres (less if belts are not linear) and drives again until a mine is
detonated. The operator then lays another marker and this continues until the roller
has identified the entire mine belt front, plus indicating side dimensions.
The markers then form the starting point for the subsequent manual demining lanes
that clear through and 10 metres past the mine belt. The area between the markers
and initial start-line is then rolled four times in four different and opposing directions
(Fig. 1). Provided there are no mine detonations, this area is cancelled out and
receives no further clearance. If, however, a detonation has occurred the area
concerned is then deemed to be part of the minefield and subsequently cleared.
Fig. 6. Phase one and two of the area reduction operation

Fig. 7. Use of the roller on the banks of the Gumista river

Method effectiveness
How effective was the mechanical area reduction option?
Gumista river
Figure 7 illustrates the use of the roller on one task on the banks of the Gumista
river. The threat was from PMN-2 and PMN anti-personnel mines only and no random
mines were actually found in the areas reduced by the roller. On this particular task,
49,000 square metres were cleared manually and 95,000 square metres of land were
cancelled out.
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The project results were as follows:4
Table 1.
Project cost increase
(12 month period)

Project productivity increase
(12 month period)

39 per cent

323 per cent

These good results are a combination of low costs and high productivity. The
mechanical area reduction costs were minimised by armouring a heavy tractor which
could be purchased and maintained in the region. High productivity was achieved
by the machine as the ground was open and flat, especially along the banks of the
Gumista river.

Case study 2: Area reduction of non-patterned
minefields in Thailand
Mine and UXO contamination in Thailand
Landmines have been used in Thailand over the past 40 years by conventional and
guerrilla armies on all four of Thailand’s borders. Understanding the need to quantify
the mine problem, TMAC commissioned a landmine impact survey to determine the
scope and impact of the mine problem in Thailand. The survey, which was completed
in April 2001, identified a total of 933 contaminated areas covering an estimated
landmass of 2,560 square kilometres. This was an area more than three times greater
than that previously estimated by the Thai army.
Twenty-seven provinces on Thailand’s borders are affected by landmines and UXO,
impacting on some 530 communities. These are mostly poor rural villages surviving
on agriculture and foraging amid contaminated border areas. More than 500,000
Thai people’s daily lives are directly affected by landmines and UXO.
The challenges to demining
Unfortunately, it is not known how many mines were laid or where they were laid.
Only information on general locations or approximate boundaries of contaminated
areas is available. Further, since survey data was obtained from stand-off field
observation without circumnavigation of suspected areas, spatial dimensions and
densities of mine contamination are also not recorded. Therefore, given that large
areas of suspected hazardous land endanger Thai citizens and deny productive use
of land, area reduction is the primary focus of risk reduction efforts.
The difficulties inherent in manual area reduction, already relatively slow by its
nature, are compounded by Thailand’s terrain and environment along the border
areas. Typically, all four border areas are primarily rough tropical terrain with seasonal
weather extremes that complicate clearance efforts. Thick tree-canopy jungle,
mountainous areas, laterite soils and tropical monsoons with their associated diseases,
all contribute to the difficult challenges facing both deminers in the field and TMAC
planners.
All categories of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and booby-traps are
present in Thailand. Particularly noteworthy are the low-metal-content mines
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Figure 8.

Figure 9. Nong Ya Khao village

Mechanical application to area reduction

which are difficult to detect with currently available metal detectors. In addition,
as is typical of former battlefields, many items of UXO are regularly found during
mine clearance operations — the UXO-to-mine ratio averages ten to one in
Thailand.
Significantly, large portions of the border areas were under repeated artillery
and mortar fire for some 20 years, contributing millions of pieces of metal
fragmentation (shrapnel) in dense concentrations, further complicating clearance
efforts. The lethal cocktail of low-metal-content landmines mixed with UXO is
concealed in jungle conditions and buried in high ferrous content soil (laterite).
Laterite masks or limits current metal detection technology’s capability to locate
these hazards.
Each report of a “hit” by either mine detection dog or mine detector must of course
be investigated; in some areas, deminers have been getting up to 4-5 “hits” per
square metre and each hit requires a slow, painstaking effort to determine the nature
and lethality of the item that has caused it (almost all hits are false).
All of these conditions are, individually, difficult for demining; in combination, they
make the job even more difficult and resource intensive. Thai deminers work to
destroy mines and UXO all year round, in spite of monsoon conditions during nearly
half the year and high temperatures almost the whole year. The aim of this effort is
to provide land that meets the user requirements, primarily farmers.
In the face of these difficult conditions, TMAC took steps to introduce fully integrated
mechanical, MDD and manual demining methods into its operations. The development
of “Mined Area and Risk Reduction of Non-Patterned Mined Areas” operations
using available technology is TMAC’s operational strategy to address the huge mined
areas on its borders. It is important to note that these integrated methods are still
under development and there is a need to further improve area reduction
methodologies and determine residual risks.
We will now look at the case of one village, Nong Ya Khao, along the border with
Cambodia, to see how TMAC’s operational methodology works in practice.
A long history of contamination
The village is on the site of a former refugee camp which housed Khmers from
Cambodia escaping both the Vietnamese invasion and Khmer Rouge.
Resistance groups and the Thai Army used landmines to protect the area, adding to
the lethal mixture of the nearby K-5 border mine belt. Frequent incursions by
Vietnamese and Cambodian troops laying mines and clashing with the resistance
forces have made the location of landmines extremely difficult at best. The net result
is a very contaminated mined area without identifiable boundaries, generating fear
and causing mine accidents among the returning Thai population.
Prior to the Landmine Impact Survey, information on the mined areas around the
village was sketchy at best. Six villagers fell victim to mines attempting to clear land
for agriculture inside the former refugee camp area. The village is bounded on the
east side by “Siphen Road” an asphalt road built in 1996 without mine clearance. The
east side of this road is considered mined by the villagers. Engineers who constructed
the road claimed that mines were encountered but believe that most of the mines
were pushed into the verges by bulldozers.
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Vegetation includes both hard and soft wood up to 50 centimetres in diameter with
the majority of trees less than 10 centimetres in diameter and up to 10 metres in
height. Impenetrable bamboo thickets of all types dot the terrain. The area contains
old termite mounds — steep, hard soil, honeycombed with tunnels, averaging three
to five metres in base diameter with heights of up to three metres and covered in
thick vegetation. These formidable obstacles are found in densities of up to 10 per
hectare. The significance of these hills is their inherent tactical value. Mines are placed
to deny cover to combatants. Mines were laid amidst termite hills which subsequently
grew over them.
This site was used for 16 years by approximately 40,000 refugees who left a significant
amount of metal contamination, making the area virtually one big rubbish dump.
Heavy shelling in the area added metal fragments impregnated with explosive traces,
introducing additional difficulties for using MDDs.
The explosive threat
A broad range of known anti-personnel mines contaminate the border areas. Local
mine victims are primarily lower-limb amputees, suggesting a preponderance of
pressure-activated anti-personnel blast mines. Villagers have identified Type 72 blast
mines and Type 69 bounding fragmentation mines from identification charts they
were shown. Mines laid and cleared by the Royal Thai Army included M14 and M16
anti-personnel mines and, to the west of the refugee camp along a former anti-tank
ditch, M15 anti-tank mines. These mines were all expected to be encountered.
In addition, since Vietnamese and Cambodian forces in the area employed a full
arsenal of conventional weapons during combat, small arms munitions, grenades,
rockets, mortars and artillery munitions of all calibres were also expected.
Available information suggested a significant anti-tank mine threat on the periphery
of the suspect area, with anti-personnel mines and large UXO within the affected
mined areas.
Operational methodology
TMAC determined a need to address area and risk reduction actions through an
integrated approach using manual deminers, MDDs and mechanical assistance in
combined team efforts. Incremental introduction of trained teams and resources
took several months to complete, allowing valuable experience for the teams in both
the terrain and threat environments.
Manual teams were trained for clearance operations in dense jungle conditions
using standard manual clearance equipment and methods. The teams were
withdrawn from operations and integrated with MDD teams to operate under
similar conditions.
Hampered by the thick vegetation and the severe nature of the metal contamination,
operations were grindingly slow. MDD teams required continuous retraining to
operate in the highly contaminated areas which confused both the dogs and handlers.
Eventually, mechanical assistance was introduced, enhancing performance
dramatically by removing vegetation, metal fragments and preparing the ground
for MDD teams and manual deminers.
Demining by “rai” blocks
Land measurement in Thailand is based on an ancient system. The “rai” is a standard
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measurement for land, measuring 40 by 40 metres, a total of 1,600 square metres.
The rai represents the amount of land needed for a family to build a house and
garden to sustain a living; additional land is needed to produce surplus or cash
crops.
Each farmer living in Nong Ya Khao village is allotted a 14-rai plot to cultivate crops
supporting their families. This block of land measures 80 by 280 metres (or 22,400
square metres) a convenient size dividing the suspect area into manageable parcels.
Unfortunately, these blocks of land were allocated in a mined area where a number
of villagers lost their legs. Based on the village system of 14-rai blocks an operational
plan was developed to clear priority blocks in an orderly process.
Manual effort
Initially, manual deminers were deployed to develop basic skills and create team
cohesion. Using the asphalt road as a safe baseline, clearance lanes were laid out 25
metres apart along the road penetrating into the heavily vegetated mined area. With
thick vegetation pressing on to the road verges and heavy concentrations of metal
scrap mixed with mines, progress was slow.
Employing one-man drills using standard hand vegetation cutting tools, probing
and excavation tools and a metal detector, proved adequate for basic operations.
Heavy vegetation and high metal contamination in the suspected mined area reduced
manual demining progress considerably.
Manual vegetation clearance per square metre averaged between five and 10 minutes
of effort. Sweeping and surface identification using metal detectors took a similar
amount of time. Metal detectors were locating metal fragments up to 15 centimetres
in depth owing to the high ferrous content of the soil. Individual metal hits ranged
from four to 10 hits per square metre. Averaging five hits per square metre made
manual clearance and excavation work very laborious and time consuming.
Probing and excavation of targets down to a maximum depth of approximately 15
centimetres in dry season conditions with hard-baked soil is back-breaking work.
Excavations as a response to signals from the metal detector take up to and beyond
30 minutes for each target to be located and removed. Locating mines or UXO under
these conditions negatively affected progress.
For example, a single 30-man platoon5 employing 12 working lanes for eight hours a
day was able to produce a maximum of 120 cleared square metres a day, although
average progress was normally only 80 square metres. Over a 20-working-day period
(one month’s operations) 1,600 square metres were cleared.
Manual demining with MDD teams in support
Following the training and integration of MDD teams to support the manual deminers
the production of cleared areas increased. The full use of MDD teams is not possible
in heavy vegetation. Manually cleared lanes were therefore used as a baseline to
remove vegetation in the adjacent lanes allowing the deployment of MDD teams.
MDDs indications were followed up by manual deminers operating from the flank
of the cleared lanes.
The use of MDD teams negated the requirement to investigate every metal
indication in the lanes. This dramatically reduced the areas to be swept and
excavated manually.
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MDD teams increased productivity by reducing the number of metal fragments to
investigate. However, MDD teams are not productive while waiting for manual
deminers to clear vegetation with hand-held cutting tools.
MDD teams still indicated a high number of shell and mortar fragments in the suspect
area. Additional training was required to condition animal behaviour where heavy
concentrations of metal fragments were mixed with mines. MDD teams can be
conditioned to react to mines while passing over metal fragments, although dog
interest in metal fragments could not be totally eradicated. Locating metal fragments
that indicate high concentrations of explosive residue is a positive MDD team reaction
but is not ideal for productivity.
During this operation, three MDD teams (each with two dogs, two handlers and
one superviser) were deployed to support half a platoon (18 people, including 12
deminers) or 12 working lanes.6
Productivity after MDD team corrective training cleared 300 square metres a day.
Over a 20-day cycle, clearance of 3,000 square metres was typically achieved.
Clearance results are best when MDD teams identify explosive-trace metal
fragmentation no more than once every three to five metres.
This operation therefore doubled production using half the number of deminers.
Mechanical area reduction
The mechanical system employed in these operations was again based on the Pearson
Survivable Demining Tractor and Tools (SDTT). 7 Introduction of mechanical
assistance to area reduction changed the deployment capabilities of both manual
and MDD teams. Full use of the SDTT system allowed complete coverage of the
block area in a series of mechanical applications identifying the presence or absence
of mines and preparing the terrain for further investigation.
After repeated trials to maximise area reduction capacity, a simple system was
developed to provide maximum assurance that all the ground had been covered. It
combined mine clearance (the physical destruction of the mines as opposed to their
detection) and area reduction operations.
The SDTT tractor chassis, with seven tool attachments, began by making a series of
16 passes to ensure that any landmines present were initiated or identified. The
attachments included a tree extractor, a vegetation slasher, a vegetation mower, a
light and heavy cultivator, a grabber, a segmented roller and a tow-behind magnet.
The process of applying these tools is described in detail below.
Difficult terrain conditions with heavy vegetation cover, high-metal-content
contamination and hard ground matched with the SDTT system capacity, resulted
in a process where 20 working days of operations by the combined team produced
the first area-reduced block. In reality, machines do not work a full eight-hour day,
rather three to four hours each day.
During the dry season, five to 10 working days were needed for the mechanical
operation due to vegetation thickness and soil hardness. A further 10 days are
necessary for the MDD teams and manual deminers to follow up with 100 per cent
coverage of the block area, when evidence of mines or UXO was confirmed by the
machines.
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If a block area had no evidence of mines then the block was 10 per cent checked by
MDD teams and manual deminers using standard clearance methods. This took only
two or three days. During a 10 per cent check, areas are selected where machines
or attachments did not perform well or other areas where mines are likely to be
found.
Once the process started, moving in sequence an average of 20 working days was
required to area-reduce one block. The workforce for these operations was
considerably smaller, totalling 23 personnel as follows:
Table 2.
Integrated mechanical/mine dog/manual team
Team commander
Team deputy
Mechanical assistance section:
Mechanical unit commander
2 SDTT x 2
2 SDTT operators
MDD section:
4 MDD teams
2 MDD supervisors
8 mine dogs
8 dog handlers
Manual demining team
Supervisor
6 deminers
Medical
One medic

Total: 23 people

The emphasis of this operation was “horsepower” over “manpower”, capitalising
on the advantage of mechanised systems for removing obstacles and preparing the
way for MDD teams and manual deminers.
Summary of performance8
Manual mine clearance operations and operations supported by MDD teams
Manual demining was conducted at a base rate of 1,600 square metres in a 20day period or a slow clearance rate of 80 square metres per day in very high
metal contamination and heavy vegetation conditions. These operations are
clearance tasks, which only manual deminers can perform due to inherent limited
technical performance of metal detectors and hand-tools used to locate mines or
UXO.
Adding MDD teams to the procedure increases performance. However the process
is still basic clearance operations. Area reduction is enhanced by the mine dog
capability to focus on explosive vapours instead of non-hazardous metal scrap as
located by metal detectors.
MDD teams supporting manual clearance where deminers remove vegetation
manually allows limited deployment of the MDD team. However, clearance capacity
increased to 3,000 square metres per 20-day period. This represents an 87.5 per cent
increase in productivity over standard manual methods.
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Area reduction with mechanical assistance followed by mine clearance operations
During 20-day periods the SDTT system was deployed to remove vegetation, break
up ground to activate landmines and conduct multi-level investigation. These
activities prepare terrain for MDD and manual deminer team deployment to maximum
effectiveness, reducing threat and encumbrance from tripwires, vegetation, metal
contamination and hard soil.
Mechanical assistance supporting MDD and manual demining teams can reduce as
much as 22,400 square metres in 20 days, equalling a 1,400 per cent increase over
manual or a 746.6 per cent increase over MDD teams with manual deminers in support.
In addition, another 22,400 square metre area was mechanically reduced during the
same period, although a MDD team was not available to complete the 10 per cent
check during the same timeframe.
This totalled a 2,100 per cent increase in productivity over manual methods or a
1,120 per cent increase over MDD with manual deminer teams. These results are
summarised in Figure 10 below.

Fig. 10. The increasing productivity of integrated area reduction operations

Methods of area reduction (dry and wet season)
Dry season operations
Step 1. Establish area boundaries
Arbitrary boundaries defining the area where operations will be conducted are based
on the capability of the mechanical system and the terrain features. The SDTT
mounted on steel wheels is driven into the area outlining the perimeter and marking
the four corners with flags to guide operations. The SDTT is equipped with the
heavy slasher mounted on the front and grabber mounted on the rear of the tractor
chassis.
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The commander directs the operator by radio on a bearing and distance using the
heavy slasher to cut lanes forming a block. Yellow flags are erected at each corner of
the inner box visually identifying the boundaries to both the operator and
commander. The lane established by the first pass of the SDTT around the box is
now considered a turn-around area and overlap zone for subsequent blocks. During
these operations the 14-rai block (80 x 280 metres) is used, corresponding with the
needs of the beneficiaries and the technical capabilities of the systems and operators.
Fig. 11. Oblique view of suspected
mined area.

Fig. 12. Block area showing lane cut by
SDTT and slasher with flags marking
boundaries.

Step 2. Remove heavy vegetation (one pass)
The SDTT is now directed by the commander in a series of passes to cut down all
heavy vegetation of up to 10 centimetres in diameter within the block area. Both the
operator and commander observe the progress of the operations.
Fig. 13. Slasher is capable of cutting down large trees and vegetation.

Fig. 14. All heavy vegetation is cut down using both the slasher
and hydraulic tree pullers.
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Step 3. Investigate the threat and remove surface metal with a magnet (one pass)
The heavy magnet is mounted on the rear of the SDTT and pulled in overlapping
sweeps along the length of the block. In the turnaround areas at the end of the
block, the magnet plate is released dropping collected metal fragments onto a
tarpaulin. Deminers are employed to observe, identify and dispose of hazardous
material, which also identifies further potential threats in the lane and other areas of
the block.
Fig. 17. Passing the magnet in overlapping sweeps and checking the results at
the end of each lane is an efficient method to remove metal and identify threats
in the block or lane.

Step 4. Investigate the threat with segmented roller (four passes)
The segmented articulating roller is mounted on the front of the vehicle. Systematic
rolling in overlapping passes at 50 per cent of roller width is conducted over the full
area of the block. Three additional passes are made over the area until all four
cardinal directions are completed by rolling vertically, horizontally and both diagonals.
Theoretically, each area of ground will be impacted by the mechanical pressure from
a 50 kilogram roller up to eight times.
Fig. 18. Complete coverage of the block is achieved by overlapping passes.
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Step 5. Investigate the threat at depth with light cultivator (one pass)
Light cultivator is adjusted to 10 centimetre digging depth and mounted on the rear
of the SDTT. The light cultivator is pulled in overlapping sweeps over the entire
block. This action disrupts hard soil creating access for additional applications of the
magnet and roller at greater depths.
Fig. 19. Light cultivator is the first step in sub-surface investigation
for evidence of mines.

Step 6. Investigate the threat at depth with magnet (one pass)
In line with cultivated furrows the heavy magnet is pulled in overlapping sweeps
along the length of the block, picking up sub-surface exposed metal or mines and
components.
Fig. 20. The magnet is pulled in the same direction as cultivated furrows.

Step 7. Conduct deeper threat investigation with heavy cultivator (one pass)
The heavy cultivator is adjusted to 20 centimetre digging depth and pulled over the
block area in a different direction to the light cultivator. Again, overlapping passes
are used to ensure total coverage. The direction is determined by terrain features
on the ground.
Fig. 21. The heavy cultivator is pulled in a different direction
to the light cultivator.
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Step 8. Conduct deeper threat investigation with magnet (one pass)
The heavy magnet is mounted on the rear of the SDTT again and pulled in overlapping
sweeps along the full length of the block.
Fig. 22. The magnet follows the same pattern as the heavy cultivator collecting
metal fragments or mines.

Step 9. Conduct deeper threat investigation with segmented roller (four passes)
Four additional passes are made over the area until all four cardinal directions are
completed, attempting to detonate mines that may have been brought to the surface
by the light and heavy cultivator.
Fig. 23. Final passage of the roller is intended to ensure no further evidence
of threat is present.

Total passes – 16: This repetitive system starting at the surface and processing the
ground to find evidence of mines is an area reduction process and is not considered
mine clearance by TMAC.9 After conducting this process without finding evidence
of mines, the reduced area is then released.
Wet season operations
Increased moisture content in the soil reduces the effectiveness and mobility of
mechanical systems. The process must therefore be modified during the wet season.
The same activities are conducted with fewer passes based on how the soil responds
to the machine and its attachments. The passes used are as follows:
¾ establish area boundaries,
¾ heavy vegetation removal (one pass),
¾ grabber (one pass),
¾ light vegetation removal (one pass),
¾ magnet (one pass),
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¾ articulating roller (four passes).
Total Passes: 8.
Depending on the soil moisture and how the soil reacts to the machine and its
attachments, additional passes are attempted increasingly until the full 16 passes can
be implemented without turning the field into a morass.
Action taken on evidence of hazardous threat
Carefully controlling all activities through visual observation and gathering
information is obtained by the following three methods:
¾ visual identification of mines/UXO,
¾ detonation of mines/UXO through activation by roller or cultivator, or
¾ magnetic collection of mines/UXO or components.
Visual identification
Equipment operators, commanders and deminers can observe the presence of exposed
mines or components throughout the process. Once a suspected mine is identified it
will be located through triangulation and recorded for further clearance action.
Detonation of mines/UXO through mechanical activation
Multiple passes of the mechanical equipment and tools provide the opportunity for
mines to detonate as designed. Observing detonations and recording the location
through triangulation identifies primary threat areas for clearance action.
Fig. 24. Mine strike using mechanical equipment immediately
identifies the threat area.

If a detonation is consistent with a landmine the entire box is considered mined.
Depending on the nature of the detonation (for example an explosion consistent
with an anti-personnel mine) mechanical operations may continue in the block, further
identifying other areas or reducing risk and ultimately preparing the terrain for
manual and MDD teams.
Magnetic collection
Passing the magnet over the ground after vegetation clearance offers the opportunity
to collect surface-laid or exposed mines and their components. Magnet strength does
not allow mines to be “sucked”out of the ground although considerable metal debris
can be collected. The debris tell a story, showing contamination levels and types of
munitions expected.
The magnet’s removal of metal fragmentation increases the effectiveness of manual
deminers, and removal of explosive-encrusted metal amplifies the efficiency of MDD
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teams. Positive identification of hazardous material narrows the search to the lane
where the hazard was picked up.
No evidence of mines or other hazard
If, after repeated passes of the SDTT tractor and mechanical application of a full
range of attachments no evidence of mines is produced or witnessed, the assumption
is that mines are unlikely to be present. Knowing that no system is infallible,
confirmatory checks are necessary.
Checking areas where mechanical application is weak or ineffective (such as steep
slopes) is therefore obligatory. Areas where mines are known to be frequently located
(e.g. around water sources and field fortifications) are also checked using alternative
methods. Following up with MDD teams and manual deminers ensures the mechanical
process is reinforced. Using dogs and metal detectors brings two separate sensory
methods of checking or quality assurance to the mechanical area and risk reduction
process.
Confirmatory checks with alternate sensory method
Follow up of systematic mechanical area and risk reduction operations should employ
a different methodology than the primary methods employed. MDD and manual
teams are ideal to confirm the effectiveness of mechanical systems.
Fig. 25. Following thorough mechanical application, MDD teams and
manual deminers perform quality assurance checks and investigate areas
where mechanical systems perform poorly.
MDD

Manual

Once the mechanical system has moved to another block, MDD and manual teams
can check the block. Arbitrarily, 10 per cent of the block is the recommended level of
checking until quantifiable tests can be conducted on the mechanical system. Should
the teams find any evidence of mines the entire block must be cleared by both MDD
and manual teams, or just manually. However, if no mines are found during this
confirmatory check then the area is declared released.
Evidence of mines
At any stage in the TMAC process the first indication of mines initiates a “100 per
cent clearance of area” response. The block becomes the arbitrary area where the
full measure of MDD and manual clearance effort will be deployed in standard
clearance operations.
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Systematic area reduction operations
These procedures are repeated over the entire suspected mined area, block by block,
until all mined areas are identified or shown to contain no evidence of mines.
Understanding the difference between blocks that are “reduced” and blocks that
are “mine cleared” is important. Considerable time was invested educating farmers
and other beneficiaries receiving the cleared or area reduced land. The local
perspective is quite practical in that, following the repeated processes of the
mechanical equipment, farmers are satisfied to take over the land.
Additional checks with MDD and manual teams provide marginal increases in farmer
confidence after witnessing the effects of mechanical methods that produce no mine
evidence. Greatest confidence is achieved when MDD and manual teams deploy to
fully clear areas identified containing mines.
During these operations two types of mines were located: Chinese Type 72A pressureactivated anti-personnel mine and the Chinese Type 69 bounding fragmentation mine.
Type 69 mines were found by visual observation, magnet and MDD teams with
manual deminers. In all cases these mines were missing the plastic fuse, which had
deteriorated as a result of the forces of nature, and the tripwires had long since
disappeared.
During clearance operations, in the vicinity of the Type 69 mines, additional Type
72A mines were located by MDD teams and uncovered by manual deminers. The
mines appeared to be in generally good condition although weathered with possible
water intrusion into the mechanism and firing chain. No mines were detonated during
area reduction operations, indicating either the depth of the mines did not allow
them to detonate as intended or their firing mechanisms had deteriorated.
Figure 26. Top view showing reduced
areas in a block system.

Fig. 27. Typical ground after area reduction
process

Quality control process
Defining adequate quality control (QC) procedures to follow up repetitive mechanical
processes with a 10 per cent MDD and manual check requires either new technologies
or a sensor system that adds value to the described area reduction methodology.
However, during these operations in Thailand a final QC process was implemented,
witnessed and directed by third party stakeholders, e.g. members of nongovernmental organisations and military engineering technical staff. The roller system
was directed at random by QC participants in blocks. Also, MDD and manual teams
were directed to conduct random checks of areas until the QC monitors were satisfied
with the results. During these random checks and QC operations, no mines were
either detonated or discovered.
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Conclusions, findings and recommendations
Conclusion 1.

In patterned mined areas machines are used to identify the exact presence of
mines. In non-patterned mined areas machines are used to identify the areas
containing mines. The potential for machines to reduce the amount of land deemed
contaminated with mines and UXO is significant.

Findings
In a patterned mined area, demining organisations work with available information,
which is often comprehensive. Mines are generally found in a deliberate formation.
A machine can identify patterned minefield perimeters so that clearance assets can
deploy to the affected area quickly.
In patterned minefields, information is often extensive but its reliability may require
confirmation. Machines can be used to effectively verify this. If the information proves
reliable, it may impact on future clearance techniques used in the area. If the
information proves unreliable then greater caution is required in its use.
In non-patterned mined areas, a process to obtain greater information is required.
Typically, available information is vague. A machine process is a good way to provide
information to a level that suspect areas can be cancelled out. Various threat
possibilities can be categorised, with each being targeted successively. For example,
the presence of metal-cased mines, UXO and metal mine components can be identified
by the use of a magnet whereas pressure-activated plastic anti-personnel mines might
be identified with the use of a roller. Other technologies could assist with other
mine threats. The basic requirement would be to identify the likely threat types
using the most appropriate technology to identify a presence.
In non-patterned mined areas, land can be divided into workable sections. The size of
each section might depend on the mine history of the area as well as terrain.
Sectioning allows for areas to be separated into two categories; those which have
been shown to contain a mine threat, and those which have not.
Recommendation 1.
Demining organisations need to invest in technology that will deliver more information
about a minefield prior to clearance operations. This information can save both time and
money and, as a result, more minefields can be cleared in a given time. Machines can
apply a series of confirmation tools including those designed to detonate mines,
electronically indicate and map the location of mines and UXO, pick up or retrieve metalcased mines and UXO, and collect explosive vapour.

Conclusion 2.

Technical survey involving area reduction with machines has the potential to rapidly
release large suspected hazardous areas.

Findings
Applying the world’s limited mine clearance resources to actually clearing all suspected
land, rather than identifying areas that do not contain mines is wasteful. Changing
focus to “area reduction operations” followed up by “mine clearance operations” of
identified threats will have a greater and quicker impact on the mine and UXO
threat.
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Eliminating suspected hazardous areas where no evidence of a threat is found through
a systematic mechanical area reduction process has clear advantages. This process
allows mine clearance resources to be deployed where real threats are located, as
opposed to huge suspect areas subsequently shown not to contain mines.
Areas deemed as requiring clearance are typically identified in a general mine action
assessment. Information is gained via a variety of means — e.g. verbal interaction
or mined area documentation such as sketch maps. Information gained in the general
assessment should be proven and confirmed by physically “doing something”, i.e.
conduct a technical survey. The use of machines to provide on-the-ground
confirmation in technical survey is not a standard approach among most demining
organisations.
If most of the work in demining is searching for mines rather than clearing them,
more effort is required during the technical survey phase of an operation. Immediately
switching to clearance operations after the conduct of a verbally based technical
survey is arguably not the best use of clearance resources.
In both case studies in this chapter, productivity results show that investment in an
area reduction machine results in a high return when compared to the other technical
survey or clearance methods used (MDD and manual). Moreover, there are probably
more efficient methods of conducting full clearance than those used in the case studies
and therefore the results are only an indication of potential productivity increases.
In any case, using a method that more accurately locates mines and thereby reduces
the size of the area to be cleared will almost always produce a positive cost-effective
result.
Recommendation 2.
Machines can be effective tools to hasten the technical survey process, quickly revealing
the true areas containing mines and requiring full clearance. The use of mechanical systems
during technical survey should be standard where physical conditions allow.

Conclusion 3.

The effect of mechanical action upon mines is not 100 per cent predictable.
Machines vary in their ability to destroy ordnance and the physical conditions in
which they work will have a bearing on the outcome. However, machines are
effective enough that they can be expected to at least indicate the presence of
mines and can therefore be used for area reduction. This is borne out by tests and
empirical clearance data.

Findings
The reliability of the machine tool is more of a general concern, as reliability will
differ from machine to machine, and will depend on how each machine is applied
and the mine type it is up against. In addition, a machine’s reliability should be
compared to the ability of other methods to do the same job (e.g. REST and MDD
techniques or manual survey lanes). Despite certain grey areas as to a machine’s
effectiveness against ordnance, consideration should be given to how much slower
area reduction will be if means other than mechanical must be relied upon.
Recommendation 3.
Since an objective comparison between clearance methods is unlikely to be available in
the short term, demining organisations should be encouraged to exchange machine
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reliability data and knowledge while continuing to work with the degree of confidence
each has in the respective methods deployed.
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Endnotes
1. A risk assessment is a key ingredient in a mechanical area reduction operation. It involves a
closer look at the information obtained about a minefield with the aim of cancelling out areas
requiring clearance in an informed and transparent way.
2. See GICHD (2003:100-105).
3. In other trials HALO has conducted, the roller has proved less effective against PMA-2 antipersonnel mines (50-60 per cent success rate) as the fuses tend to be broken off from the initial sideforces of the roller effect. Also the PMD-6 mine is not easily initiated (40-50 per cent effective) as
the wooden construction of the mine crumbles at the joints thereby not applying sufficient downward
force on the fuse.
4. The HALO Trust (1999b) and (2000a).
5. The platoon configuration was one commander, one second-in-command, three section
commanders, 24 deminers and one medic.
6. MDD teams only work four hours a day due to temperatures and the ability of manual deminers
to clear enough vegetation allowing the MDD teams to deploy.
7. See GICHD (2003:100-105).
8. Neither the manual nor the MDD procedures were fully optimised. For example, machines were
not used to prepare the ground for manual clearance or MDDs to increase their productivity.
Clearance performance is therefore an extreme comparison and only indicative of the options
used.
9. Since this case study was written the dry season procedure has been refined and the total number
of passes has been reduced.
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Chapter 4.

The application of
machines to ground
preparation
Summary
Ground preparation machines are typically underused in mine clearance
operations. They can contribute significantly to the performance of a
manual or MDD clearance programme, especially if machine use is
tailored to the area. In order to quantify the productivity improvements
that result, more demining organisations need to separate the recording
of land cleared manually behind a machine from the land cleared manually
without machine assistance.
Machines conducting surface ground preparation are limited by the
degree of preparation they provide for follow-up clearance teams. The
maximum productivity increase is restricted to areas with low levels of
metal contamination. Machines conducting sub-surface ground
preparation are also limited by the degree of preparation they perform
for follow-up clearance teams, but do hasten the excavation process
perfomed by manual deminers and have the potential to extend dog
working-day periods into the cooler months of the year. Machines
conducting sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation offer
the most advantages as they remove all common obstacles for follow-up
clearance. Such machines remove the threat of tripwires, so that the deminer
is no longer required to perform a tripwire-detection drill. They remove
vegetation so that the deminer no longer spends time cutting away
vegetation down to ground level, and they remove the majority of metal
contamination.

Introduction
Background
In Chapter 3, we looked at the potential for mechanical systems to be employed for
area reduction to enable land to be returned to the civilian population more quickly
and efficiently. In this chapter, we look at the topic of ground preparation.
Many different types of machines were deployed in demining operations with the
intent of completely clearing minefields. In the early days, the machines used then
generally demonstrated that complete clearance could not be achieved with a high
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degree of confidence. However, demining organisations quickly saw the potential
for machines to be used to prepare ground for subsequent clearance methods.
Currently, clearance after the use of machines is conducted by both manual and
MDD techniques.
In general, machines such as flails and tillers are used in a ground-preparation role
and focus on removing tripwires (used to initiate some mine types) and vegetation.
Tripwires are difficult, hazardous and time consuming to deal with. If the machine
removes the tripwire and vegetation, both manual deminers and MDD teams can
then concentrate on searching for mines.
A large variety of machines are used in other forms of ground preparation. Examples
include excavators used to scoop up and lay out debris in built-up areas. Without a
machine to do this, a deminer would have to laboriously excavate through piles of
debris by hand, making the task very slow. Rollers or steel wheels have also been
used to prepare minefields to reduce the workload of follow-up clearance. This
detonates a large percentage of the mines so less time is spent excavating for mines
and destroying every one uncovered.
There are three general deployment methods for ground preparation machines:
machines that are driven by an operator into a minefield, machines that are controlled
remotely and used inside the minefield (both types known as intrusive machines),
and machines that are only operated from established safe or previously cleared
land (known as non-intrusive machines).
When machines are used in a ground-preparation role, it is now assumed that some
mines might be missed. The emphasis today is on improving the productivity of
follow-up clearance.

Study aims
The aims of this sub-study were to:
¾ identify the advantages of mechanically preparing the ground;
¾ document the results of ground-preparation experiences;
¾ recommend an optimised ground-preparation methodology; and
¾ discuss issues related to optimising machine use

Categories of ground preparation
The following are the three different categories of ground preparation:
Surface ground preparation: the removal of vegetation and the tripwire threat. This
category generally involves two types of machines. One operates and travels along
cleared areas with commercial cutters attached to hydraulic arms that reach out and
cut in the un-cleared areas. The other involves small remotely-controlled specialised
vegetation cutters.
Sub-surface ground preparation: the removal of vegetation and the tripwire threat
with the tool penetrating the ground to a certain depth. This method usually involves
flails or tiller-type tools attached to armoured machines that operate in un-cleared
areas.
Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation: the removal of vegetation,
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the tripwire threat, penetration of the ground and the removal of metal
contamination. This currently involves the same type of machine as for sub-surface
ground preparation with the addition of a magnet towed behind or on board the
machine, collecting metal.

Surface ground preparation: case study HALO
Cambodia
Introduction
Vegetation cutting was one of the first mechanical ground-preparation methods
applied in humanitarian demining. The HALO Trust in Cambodia, for instance, has
been using specialised machines to cut vegetation since 1995.
The main type of vegetation cutter used by The HALO Trust is a non-intrusive
commercial agricultural tractor, which has been armoured and fitted with a
commercial vegetation cutter. The initial concept was to attach a commercial vegetation
cutter to a standard piece of agricultural machinery that could be purchased and
maintained locally.
The machine first chosen was a Belarus MTZ 82R tractor, which was purchased in
Phnom Penh. While this machine could do the job, it proved too light to carry both
the cutter and armour and to be reasonably manoeuvrable. The best choice of tractor
is now considered to be the Ford New Holland 8340. At around eight tonnes in
weight and with more than
160hp it is big enough to
take the extra weight and be
reasonably manoeuvrable
(crucial with this type of
machine). It is, however,
still restricted to working
on reasonably flat ground.
The vegetation cutter
chosen was a B80XM from
Bomford Turner. The
extendable cutting arm
has an 8 metre reach from
the centre of the tractor.
The cutting head is 1.25
metres wide and rotates at
1. The armouring consists of a simple three-sided eightabout 2,300rpm. The only Fig.
millimetre-thick armoured cab. The far side or the left-hand
modification to this cutting side is left open for ventilation as cutting can only be
arm is that two wooden performed on the right-hand side.
skids are fitted to each side Additionally, an armoured plate covers both the right-hand
side of the engine and the fuel tank.
of the cutting head. These
act as the main contact
between the cutting head and the ground. If they initiate a pressure anti-personnel
mine, they are “sacrificed”, leaving the cutting head damage-free.
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Methods
Productivity in 190 individual manual demining lanes was estimated over a 12-month
period by the HALO Mechanical Supervisor. The data was taken in 43 minefields
with vegetation cutting by 11 different machines. Productivity was compared to
that achieved by a manual deminer in the absence of a cutting machine (the deminer
was required to cut the vegetation).

Results
Productivity improved in all 191 instances in which the deminer followed a cutting
machine (Fig. 2). The average increase was 73.8 per cent (+s.e. 3.3, range 7-200 per
cent) with more than 100 per cent achieved in 26 instances; the median increase was
50 per cent. In general terms, productivity increased by about 50 per cent when
manual deminers followed a machine, but considerably greater increases were
possible under some circumstances.
Fig. 2. Increase rate (IR) as a result of surface ground preparation
with HALO Tractor. a)

a. The report is a yearly summary of all monthly mechanical results
for 2001.

Figure 2 shows that the productivity increase is difficult to predict as the range is
quite large. The lowest productivity increase of 20 per cent was recorded six times
and the highest productivity increase was recorded 13 times.
What influences the IR and the range of results?
The productivity of a manual deminer working on areas cut by the HALO tractor is
influenced by two main factors: the amount of metal contamination in the ground
and the type of vegetation being cut.
a) After vegetation is removed, the subsequent progress made by the deminer
depends primarily on the amount of metal contamination. Areas where the
machines recorded a 100 per cent IR or less were considered to contain a high
level of metal contamination and areas where the machine recorded an IR
higher than 100 per cent were areas considered to have relatively low metal
contamination .1
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b) Improvements in efficiency of manual demining were smaller in areas containing
high elephant-type grass than in areas containing thick underbrush. Although
the latter is often categorised as thicker vegetation, bushes are often easier for
the deminer to remove because a much larger area of vegetation is removed
when one main base trunk or stem is cut. The time costs of removing high
grass are more substantial because of the small net clearance gained on each
cut.
How the machine affects overall productivity
The HALO tractor is a non-intrusive machine. It therefore works concurrently with
the follow-up clearance teams. Coordinating this cooperation to optimise the machine’s
effect includes the following considerations:
Reliance on demining follow-up
The machine is capable of cutting up to 3,400 square metres of land per day, depending
on the vegetation and terrain type.2 The average area cut daily by 11 machines over
a 12-month period was 560 square metres with an average working time of three
hours per day.3 Deployment of the machine is limited by the progress made by the
deminers and the availability of breaching lanes. Therefore the cutting rate of 500600 square metres per day reflects the rate of manual demining in the minefield, a
limitation likely to apply to all types of non-intrusive vegetation cutters.
Over use of breaching lanes
The manual teams have to prepare four-metre wide breaching lanes before the machine
is used in the minefield. When the aim is to provide enough breaching lanes to
enable the machine to cut all day, a dilemma is created: breaching lanes can represent
a significant portion of the minefield area, thereby reducing the increase in
productivity which is the main benefit of using the machine. For example, if the
breaching lanes represented 25 per cent of the total area being demined and the
effect of mechanically cutting vegetation was a 50 per cent productivity increase,
then the net effect would be a 37.5 per cent increase in productivity. Requirements
for breaching lanes need to be calculated for each individual site, as the size of the
minefield and the ease of access for the machine will differ for each task.
Using breaching lanes has an obvious advantage: they can be used to target obstacles
(tree stumps, ditches, etc.) which could limit deployment of the machine. These
obstacles can be removed or otherwise negated during the demining of the breaching
lane.
Informative reporting
The machine needs to be used to target as many demining lanes as possible. However,
simply recording the area cut per day by the machine and the area cleared manually
by the deminers gives a false representation of what is happening. One could be
fooled into thinking there is a balance between what is being cut and what is being
subsequently cleared. For example if 500 square metres per day were cut by the
machine and 500 square metres per day were cleared by follow-up clearance, this
could mean that half of the deminers are working on cut land and clearing at twice
the rate. Different sites can more easily support different percentages of demining
lanes (not all lanes can be supported). It is very difficult to template or pre-plan the
work of the machine. It is again a case of making day-to-day decisions as the demining
operation progresses.
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Summary/conclusions
The large range for the individual-lane productivity increase is explained by the
varying degrees of metal contamination in the ground and the types of vegetation
being cut. Best use of the machine to maximise overall productivity increase is
achieved by minimising breaching lanes which should be ideally as far apart as
practical so as to support as many demining lanes as possible. Additionally, deploying
the machine a few days before follow-up clearance is more productive, provided
initial breaching lanes have first been established.
It seems apparent that because this type of machine cannot support all demining
lanes (breaching lanes are a necessity) an intrusive machine could prove more
beneficial if deployed to cut all the vegetation before clearance began.

Small intrusive vegetation cutters
The HALO Trust in Cambodia also operates a small vegetation cutter known as the
Tempest.4 The Tempest is a low cost unit that is simple to operate and is constructed
using materials and manufacturing techniques that are available in mine-affected
countries. The Tempest is remotely controlled, therefore forward vision of the unit
is compromised. As a result its vegetation-clearance capacity is slowed by time spent
manoeuvring the machine away from and around obstacles (tree stumps, dead-fall,
etc.).

Fig. 3. Tempest operating in
Thailand.

Intrusive vegetation-cutting machines were designed because of their potential to
clear vegetation in areas which larger non-intrusive machines could not access (e.g.
between closely-located large trees and over undulating ground). An original
objective for this machine was for it to work with non-intrusive machines, so that a
greater percentage of vegetation could be cut. This, however, seldom happened.
Methods
Clearance data was taken over a 12-month period. Twelve different minefield results
were recorded in total as the monthly average productivity increase taken from an
analysis of the daily reports. Figure 4 shows that the average recorded increased
rate (IR) was 60 per cent. The range was from a 20 per cent IR to a 120 per cent IR.
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Fig. 4. IR as a result of surface ground preparation with Tempest

Source: HALO Trust (2001b).

Results
All monthly measures of adjusted productivity were positive, indicating that using
vegetation cutters always improved productivity. Productivity increased by
60%+s.e.9.4 (range 20-120%, N=12). The median was 50 per cent.
What influences the IR and the range of results?
Similar productivity increases would be expected from any type of vegetation cutter
as the productivity increase of the deminer is a result of the areas to which they are
deployed and not the type of vegetation cutter. However, different machine types
have a different effect on the overall minefield productivity. The main factor
influencing the Tempest’s ability to maximise overall minefield productivity is its
daily productivity.
The Tempest weighs 2.7 tonnes and is driven by a single 70hp diesel engine. The fact
that it is remotely controlled means forward vision is non-existent. This combination
of a small, lightweight machine with limited horsepower and no forward vision
results in a very low rate of productivity. The average clearance rate to be expected
from the Tempest in both Bosnia and Cambodia was 800m2 per six hour working
day.5
Low productivity can occur when the machine is working concurrently with manual
deminers because of safety distance requirements. The minefield size decreases over
time, further increasing the machine-deminer space restriction. This often limits the
amount of vegetation that is cut each day as the work of the deminer takes priority.
Sometimes the amount of area cut by the unit in a day is less than that cleared by the
deminers, who then catch up to the machine.6
Catch-up is most likely to occur when the minefield is small and the metal
contamination level is low. These two circumstances represent an ideal deployment
situation for a vegetation-cutting machine as the conditions can potentially optimise
the overall productivity increase.
Deminers tend not to catch up to machines deployed on large minefields where the
metal contamination is high. This circumstance is not an ideal deployment situation
for a vegetation-cutting machine, as the productivity increase of the deminer is

109

110

A Study of Mechanical Application in Demining

restricted by the level of metal contamination. With high levels of metal
contamination, the presence of vegetation does not slow the progress of manual
demining.
If the unit is used to cut the entire minefield in front of follow-up teams, there is a
limit as to what size the minefield can be. Deploying more than four weeks in advance
in places like Cambodia (high vegetation growth rate) could mean having to contend
with vegetation re-growth and therefore time spent re-cutting some areas. Deploying
four weeks in advance (20 working days as a maximum) would mean deploying the
Tempest in minefields no larger than 20,000 square metres to ensure the entire area
is prepared.
In a situation where the unit is not deployed to clear the entire minefield, the pattern
the unit cuts can determine the minefield IR (see Figs. 5 and 6).
Fig. 5. Cutting at right angles to baseline

Fig. 6. Cutting along baseline

The distance between each manual lane influences the minefield IR. The farther away
the deminers are from each other, the more vegetation the unit has to cut per day to
support a given number of lanes (cutting in front of each lane is not viewed as
practical). For example, when lanes are 25 metres apart and each demining team
clears 50 metres per day, the required length of the baseline is 500 metres and contains
20 lanes. However, when demining lanes are 15 metres apart, the 500-metre baseline
will contain 33 lanes. The distance between working lanes is a risk management
issue, which depends on the severity of the mine threat. Organisations tend to increase
the distance between deminers when the severity of the mine threat increases, but
the reverse is rare.
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Summary
The advantage of small remote machines is their ability to get into smaller and more
difficult places than larger machines. Small vegetation cutters are inexpensive but
productivity is low. The remote-control nature of this type of machine is necessary
because of its size but contributes to its low productivity rate.
Small, remote machines are optimised when they are cutting along the front of
demining lanes, ensuring as many lanes as possible are supported. When not operating
concurrently with manual teams, best use could be expected in small minefields
(< 20,000 square metres). To be fully independent (no area size restriction) this type
of machine would probably need a daily productivity rate of about 2,000 square
metres per day.
In small minefields with low metal contamination, a normal-sized demining team
working about 20 lanes is likely to clear more land than can be cut by a small
vegetation cutter.

Sub-surface ground preparation
Introduction
Sub-surface ground preparation machines are generally intrusive machines (able to
enter a mined area to operate). Machines that can break up the surface of the ground
are usually more powerful than machines that only remove vegetation. They therefore
generally have higher daily productivity rates than vegetation cutters, as they are
able to work independently of subsequent clearance methods.

Advantages of sub-surface ground preparation
Sub-surface ground preparation combines the advantages of surface ground
preparation with the additional ability to break up the ground. This gives at least
two potential advantages over surface ground preparation:
1. facilitating the use of MDDs; and
2. reducing the time spent investigating signals registered by the metal detector.
In temperate climates, the layer of soil between the mine and the ground surface is
normally quite moist for most of the year, influencing the ability of explosive molecules
to reach the surface.7 Dogs may find it easier to locate scent of explosive behind
machines that break up the earth’s surface. A greater explosive plume is produced
by exposing the sub-soil to the atmosphere. The advantage is short-term only and
depends on the amount of rain after sub-surface ground preparation and air
temperatures at the time dogs are searching.
However, there is potential to extend the working-day period of dogs into the cooler
months if the machines were used to churn up the moist soil thereby exposing it to
the sun to dry which, in turn, releases explosive molecules.
In September 2002, the GICHD study team conducted an experiment in Croatia. The
area chosen was flat grass land (no vegetation) and the soil was soft as it had been
raining for about eight days prior to the experiment. Two deminers were each given
10 metal pieces to investigate (nails at 10 centimetres) along separate 20-metre paths.
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One path had been flailed by a machine to a depth of 10cm; the other had not. The
time taken to excavate each signal was recorded. The times recorded for each of the
excavations do not represent excavation times in a real minefield as the deminers
were excavating for nails not mines. Instead, the experiment was concerned with
the relative efficiency of each type of excavation (flailed ground vs. un-flailed ground).
It took significantly longer to locate each target in unflailed ground than in flailed
ground (t (18) = 4.24, p = .0005, Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Time costs of excavating for metal pieces in flailed and unflailed ground
(blue represents average, “T” represents standard deviation)

Experiment observations
Excavating in ground that had been broken up was more efficient because a sharp
tool (bayonet) was not necessary to penetrate the ground and remove or cut through
the root systems present. The tool was necessary in un-flailed ground. A small hand
spade was used in flailed ground and therefore digging was more efficient for
removing loose soil surrounding the item being investigated.
Assistance to manual excavation techniques
Some organisations use manual excavation techniques as a full clearance method
when the metal contamination in an area is too high for the use of a metal detectors.
NPA has conducted two tests to gauge the effect of breaking up the ground prior to
manual excavation.8
In the first test, one 10 x 10 metre box was flailed and one 10 x 10 metre box was left
un-flailed. Ten deminers took 130 minutes to excavate the flailed box, and 190 minutes
to excavate the un-flailed box, representing a productivity increase of 46 per cent in
the flailed box.
In the second test, two groups of five deminers excavated for four hours each, one
group in flailed ground and one group in un-flailed ground. In flailed ground, 47.2
metres were completed. In un-flailed ground, 36 metres were completed. This
represents a productivity increase of 31 per cent in the flailed ground.

Effects of metal contamination in sub-surface ground preparation
In the surface ground preparation section it was argued that higher productivity
increases occur after vegetation cutting in areas where there is less metal
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contamination, because the vegetation represents the major obstacle to manual
demining. However, breaking up the soil provides added value after sub-surface
ground preparation in high metal-contaminated areas because the excavation process
is hastened. This advantage is not obtained after surface ground preparation.

Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation
Introduction
Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation incorporates all aspects of surface
and sub-surface ground preparation with the additional benefit of removing metal
contamination. This technique is seldom used and is a relatively new approach to
mechanical ground preparation.
Mine clearance organisations often disapprove of the use of machines which cause
mines to detonate and spread numerous metal fragments into the area to be cleared,
because it exacerbates clearance productivity. The use of magnets could remove the
added contamination thereby expanding the potential use of machines to detonate
mines in more situations.
There are two general types of magnets: the permanent (or earth magnet) and the
electro-magnet. Magnets are used in industry to clear away ferrous debris at airport
runways, driveways, parking lots, etc.; to reduce vehicle and aircraft maintenance
and reduce occurrence of flat tyres. In these roles, permanent magnets seem to be
preferred over electromagnets as there is no need to provide an electrical power
source. Fragments are removed from the magnet by either collecting them on a nonferrous separator plate or by inverting the magnets. Suitable commercial tow-behind
magnet systems sell for about US$6,000 and weigh approximately 400kg. Magnet
strength is categorised in grades, with Grade 8 being the strongest available.
Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation was observed only in Thailand.
TMAC uses a Pearson magnet as part of the ground preparation process to remove
the majority of metal pieces found at
sites along the Thai/Cambodian border
(see case study Area reduction of nonpatterned minefields in Thailand). The
magnet is fitted to a prime mover with
a hydraulic lift and external service. In
use, the magnet is either pushed or
pulled over the minefield with the depth
wheels set to position the magnet 50 to
100millimetres clear of the ground.

Advantages of sub-surface with
metal removal ground
preparation

Fig. 8. Pearson magnet as used by TMAC.

The obstacle which most hampers the progress of the manual deminer is metal
contamination. Some areas can be so highly contaminated that the metal detector
will continually signal the presence of metal and consequently require full manual
excavation. This can result in daily clearance figures lower than five square metres
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per six-hour working day. Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation
incorporates the advantages of both surface and sub-surface methods with the added
advantage of removing a significant portion of the metal contamination.
This section focuses on the metal-removal effects of sub-surface with metal removal
ground preparation and is based on the results of a trial conducted by the HALO
Trust in Cambodia, and The Japanese Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support
(JAHDS) in Thailand, using the Pearson magnet.9
Methods
The trial was conducted between 25 March and 10 April 2001 in Thmar Pouk district,
Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia (internal trial report dated March 2001).
Six closely-located 200 square metre boxes were marked out. Box 1 was cleared
using normal manual techniques to gauge the amount of metal contamination in the
area. A Pearson magnet was passed over the surface of Box 2 and the number of
metal pieces counted.
In Boxes 3 and 4, a cultivator working to a depth of five-six centimetres was used to
expose the metal contamination below the surface. The magnet was then passed
over the area and the number of metal items collected was counted.
In Boxes 5 and 6, the magnet was passed over the box and the items counted before
cultivation to assess the surface metal contamination. After cultivation, the magnet
was passed over the boxes again and the items counted.
After processing, all boxes were cleared by a manual deminer, and the number of
metal items found recorded. The daily clearance rate by the manual deminer was
recorded.
Results
Similar amounts of metal were found in all of the boxes (see Table 1 overleaf). The
magnet reduced the amount of metal to be found by the deminer under both removal
conditions. Passing the magnet over the ground both before and after cultivation
removed more metal than passing it only after cultivation, as the amount of metal
found by the manual deminer in Boxes 3 and 4 (52 of 149 pieces) was significantly
higher than in Boxes 5 and 6 (27 of 160 pieces) (X2 = 13.2, P=0.003).
Removing surface metal contamination resulted in an IR of 21 per cent (Box 2).
Removing sub-surface metal contamination resulted in an IR of between 93 per cent
(Box 3) and 101 per cent (Box 4). Removing surface then sub-surface metal
contamination resulted in an IR of between 127 per cent (Box 5) and 200 per cent
(Box 6).
Box 1 was cleared completely by one deminer who found 76 metal pieces in total
with a clearance rate of 66 square metres per six-hour working day.
In Box 6, the magnet was passed over the area to collect surface metal. The area was
then cultivated to expose sub-surface metal and the magnet passed over the box.
The number of metal pieces in Box 6, coincidently, was the same as the number in
Box 1 but the clearance rate increased to 200 square metres per six-hour workday.
This represents a 200 per cent increase in the manual demining rate.
An indication of metal contamination levels was obtained at the Nong Yakeao
minefield (ref No. 005) in Thailand, which was cleared by JAHDS. At this site the
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Table 1. Number of metal items collected by magnet and deminer
after different cultivation treatments (cultiv.=cultivation)
Metal items
collected before
cultivation

Metal items
collected after
cultivation

Metal items
found by
deminer

Total items
found

Percentage of
items removed
by magnet

Box 1

No collection

No cultivation

76

76

Box 2

28

No cultivation

56

84

33

Box 3

No collection

41

Surface:
2
Sub-surface: 28

71

58

Box 4

No collection

56

Surface:
2
Sub-surface: 20

78

72

Box 5

29

37

Surface:
2
Sub-surface: 16

84

35 before cultiv.
45 after cultiv.
Total: 80

Box 6

27

40

Surface:
1
Sub-surface: 8

76

36 before cultiv.
53 after cultiv.
Total: 89

The different treatment conditions influenced the subsequent rate of manual demining,
with Boxes 5 and 6 (magnet, followed by cultivation, followed by magnet) giving
the most productive return (Table 2).
Table 2. Manual demining rates for clearance of boxes under different treatment
conditions after magnet and cultivator (cultiv.=cultivation)
Manual demining rate per 6-hour day

Area cleared

Total metal items found

Box 1

No metal removal

66 m2

76

Box 2

Metal removal without cultivation

80 m2

84

Box 3

Metal removal after cultivation

122 m2

71

Box 4

Metal removal after cultivation

133 m2

78

Box 5

Metal removal before and after cultiv.

150 m2

84

Box 6

Metal removal before and after cultiv.

200 m2

76

Fig. 9. Effects of magnet of use on deminer productivity

m2
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number of metal pieces of different size and configuration within a 11,241 square
metre block was 36,119 (averaging 3.2 pieces per square metre).10
If deminers were spending, on average, 15 minutes to excavate each and every metal
signal and the magnet removed 70 per cent of the metal contamination, and this was
being done in a six-hour working day, 1,053.5 working days would be saved by
using a magnet in this block. If 30 demining lanes were deployed on site then the
saving would be 35 operational days (1,053.5/30).
Use of magnets in operations
It is necessary to remove any vegetation prior to deployment of the magnet.
Additionally, in this example, rollers were used on land before the magnet was
towed behind to limit the chance of mine damage. Future magnet use may involve a
flail with a commercially-available tow-behind magnet. In this way, vegetation is
removed, the chance of mine damage to the magnet is limited, and the ground is
broken up to make metal fragments more accessible to the magnet.
Summary
Removing the vegetation and breaking up the ground significantly improves the
productivity of manual demining. However, the result of these techniques depends
on the amount of metal contamination in the ground. Therefore, removing metal
contamination prior to the deployment of manual deminers potentially offers the
most effective time saving method of ground preparation.
There are two categories of metal contamination — surface and sub-surface. Removing
sub-surface metal contamination would have a greater effect than removing surface
contamination as the deminer will spend more time investigating the former than
the latter.
Removing surface then sub-surface metal
contamination is the most effective use of a
magnet in the metal-removing process.
Neglecting the surface metal contamination and
immediately breaking up the ground to expose
the sub-surface metal contamination will result
in some of the surface-metal items being buried
and therefore becoming less accessible to the
magnet.
Removing metal contamination has major
potential benefits in terms of clearance efficiency.
The HALO Trust test results showed that as
much as 89 per cent of metal contamination can
be removed under some conditions leading to a
200 per cent increase in the manual-demining
rate.
Evidence of the operational effectiveness of a
magnet was seen in operations conducted by
TMAC which initially conducted mine clearance
along the Cambodian border manually. Each
deminer was averaging four to five false metal
investigations for each square metre cleared.

Fig. 10. Metal collected by the
Pearson Magnet on TMAC operations.
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After the deployment of the Pearson Magnet, manual deminers were averaging one
false metal investigation every four to five metres.11

Conclusions, findings and recommendations
Conclusion 1.

Ground preparation machines are generally underused.

Findings
Within some mine action programmes, machines still play only a small role in the
mine clearance process. For example, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre’s manual
demining platoons cleared a total of 6,921,372 square metres in the first six months
of 2002 but only 640,252 square metres (10.3 per cent) were prepared by machine.12
In Angola, NPA mechanically prepared 23 per cent of the total area they cleared in
2001.13 Manual teams in the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan cleared a total
of 15,645,634 square metres in 2001 but only 288,998 square metres (1.8 per cent) was
prepared mechanically.14
However, in Thailand, the Humanitarian Mine Action Unit One mechanically prepares
100 per cent of all the land it clears.15 In Croatia, of the 13,640,000 square metres
demined in 2001, approximately 75 per cent (10,230,000 square metres) were prepared
mechanically and followed up with either manual demining or MDD techniques.16
The GICHD Study of Global Operational Needs found that “In the great majority of demining
scenarios, mined areas contain very few mines, and time spent dealing with these individual
mines is insignificant in relation to the time spent carrying out other activities such as vegetation
clearance and the detection or removal of scrap metal.”
Also, the risk assessment sub-study report (see Chapter 2, Table 1) explained that, on
average, mines occupy a very small part of a suspect area. This indicates the need
for ground preparation machines to contribute more, particularly if such large
percentages of suspect areas do not contain mines. Moreover, ground preparation
machines can contribute significantly to a manual or MDD clearance programme’s
performance if machine use is tailored to the area.
The lack of detailed comparative data collected by demining organisations may be
the reason that ground preparation machines are not being used to a greater degree.
Most organisations do not have effective recording procedures and therefore do
not know what quantitative benefits their machines are producing. We should assume
that if organisations knew the quantitative benefits, they would then capitalise on
them by maximising their mechanical ground preparation capacity.
The normal demining organisation’s operational reporting format is seldom detailed
beyond the amount of land processed by machine. However, measures of productivity
alone do not lead to improvements in productivity, or a greater understanding of
the usefulness of a machine.
Recommendation 1.
Mine clearance operations should make significantly greater use of machines for ground
preparation. In order to quantify the productivity improvements that result, more demining
organisations need to separate the recording of land cleared manually behind a machine
from the land cleared manually without machine assistance as a basic requirement.
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Conclusion 2.

Machines conducting sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation offer the
best quality of ground preparation as they remove all practical obstacles for followup clearance.

Findings
Machines capable only of surface ground preparation are limited in the assistance
they can provide to manual deminers and MDD teams. They merely remove
vegetation and, on occasion, tripwires. Productivity is increased when they are
deployed to areas with minimal metal contamination, where vegetation is the main
obstacle facing subsequent deminers. Optimising the productivity of intrusive and
non-intrusive vegetation cutters involves considering:
¾ how the greatest number of demining lanes can be supported;
¾ the most effective use of breaching lanes for non-intrusive machines; and
¾ the metal contamination levels in each minefield.
Machines conducting sub-surface ground preparation are limited by the degree of
preparation they perform for follow-up clearance teams, but offer a higher degree
than surface ground preparation as benefits are cumulative. Additional advantages
include:
¾ speeding up the excavation process the manual deminers perform;
¾ enabling dog working-day periods to extend into the cooler months of the
year; and
¾ speeding up the excavation process undertaken by a deminer investigating
each metal signal from a metal detector.
Ground preparation machines are probably more productive if they are driven into
the minefield containing invisible obstacles (dead-fall, tree stumps, wire fencing
and ditches, etc.) as opposed to being remotely controlled.
Productivity would be maximised by the increased ability of the driver to see and
avoid obstacles. By including a driver, the cost of a machine will increase because of
the operator protection needed. However, this extra expense would probably be
more than compensated for by the extra productivity.
Machines conducting sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation offer the
best quality of ground preparation as they remove all common obstacles for followup clearance. These obstacles can be grouped in a hierarchal order as described in
Figure 11.
As the machine or mechanical process removes each level of obstacle, follow-up
clearance productivity is increased depending on the degree that each obstacle poses
to the subsequent clearance technique.
Sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation machines remove the threat of
tripwires, so that the deminer is no longer required to perform a tripwire-detection
drill. They remove vegetation so that the deminer no longer spends time cutting
away all vegetation down to ground level and they remove a high degree of metal
contamination. A magnet is best used to remove metal contamination on the surface
then reused after exposing the sub-surface. This technique requires multiple passes
and the use of several tools, and as such, may negate the advantage of using a
magnet twice. The better ground preparation machine is, therefore, one which
performs these tasks in as few passes as possible.
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Recommendation 2.
Demining organisations and mine action centres should give particular consideration to
the use of machines that perform sub-surface with metal removal ground preparation,
especially where a machine can achieve all three categories of preparation in as few
passes as possible.

Fig. 11. Hierarchical order of obstacles (bottom to top)
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Endnotes
1. The HALO Trust (2001b).
2. Ibid. 3,400 square metres was the highest recorded area cut by the machine in 2001.
3. The machines actually cut intermittently throughout the day, this is the average aggregate time.
4. See the GICHD Mechanical Demining Equipment Catalogue 2004.
5. This average is consistent with MAG Cambodia, NPA Bosnia as well as HALO in Cambodia.
6. Records in 2001 show that more land was being cleared manually than was being cut by the
machine in all the sites it operated.
7. Phelan and Webb, in press.
8. Information provided by Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Programme Manager, NPA Angola.
9. Saratha (2001). This report is just one section of a larger trial report on the range of Pearson tools
which were attached to a Volvo 4400 front-end loader.
10. Information provided by J Van Zyl, JAHDS, Thailand.
11. Information provided by D. McCracken, Technical Advisor to TMAC.
12. CMAC (2002). CMAC annual reports can be downloaded from their website www.camnet.com.kh/
cmac.
13. Internal report provided to GICHD, summarising operational results of 2001.
14. Results of all operational activities for 2001, provided to the GICHD by the MAPA operations
office.
15. This is limited to Humanitarian Mine Action Unit 1 working on the Thai/Cambodian border.
16. Results for 2001 provided by Nicola Pavkovic, Assistant Director, Centre for Testing
Development and Training, CROMAC.
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Chapter 5.

The protection of vehicles
and plant equipment
against mines and UXO
Summary
Three principles can be incorporated into the design of vehicles and
equipment to render protection against the blast effect of mines: absorption
of energy, deflection of blast effect away from the hull and the distance
from detonation point.
A simple and cost-effective manner to absorb energy is to fill the tyres of
wheeled vehicles with water. This increases considerably the protection
of light and medium vehicles against the threat of blast anti-tank mine
detonating underneath a wheel.
The effect of blast against the hull of a vehicle can be reduced considerably
by incorporating steel plates at an angle to the direction of blast. Reflected
pressures are generated when the blast direction is at a 90° angle to the
plate. This approach has lead to the introduction of V-hulls, which have
been successfully used in the protection of light- and medium-sized
vehicles against mines.
The protection level of all vehicles can be further increased by use of fourpoint safety belts, good seating design and footrests (not attached to the
floor), and “good housekeeping” (not having loose items in the car).

Introduction
This chapter discusses the threat posed by landmines and UXO to vehicles and
plant equipment operating in the field and offers guidance on appropriate ways
to minimise the damage to vehicles and injuries to their occupants in the event of
an explosion.
The design, construction and testing of mine-protected vehicles and systems are
conducted within a framework of military standards and specifications. Most of the
design and testing detail is considered confidential information. Some military
standards and specifications have, however, been de-classified for use by commercial
and humanitarian deminers; where this has occurred, they have been included.
Similarly, construction methods are regarded as intellectual property by the various
companies and entities involved within the industry. It has therefore not been possible
to include exact detailed mechanical design and manufacturing criteria as well as
test data.
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This chapter does not provide the last word in the protection of vehicles in demining.
It represents sensible principles, distilled over years of practical field experience.
The information provided is especially useful for organisations intending to adapt
commercial vehicles for demining purposes.

Assessing the mine and UXO threat
Classification of mines and UXO
It is assumed that the majority of humanitarian and commercial demining operations
are conducted in a stable or semi-stable political environment. Hostilities have ceased
and deminers, vehicles and equipment are not exposed to direct or indirect fire or the
threat of command detonations. The threat of hostile fire (direct or indirect) as well as
that of command-detonated mines or devices are therefore excluded from the study
underpinning this chapter.
It is common to classify mines according to their intended use and purpose. This
classification is used throughout the demining world today and will be used here to
provide a framework for further discussion. While clearing mines dominates the
overall demining effort, items of UXO also need to be located and rendered safe.
UXO poses a threat to operators, vehicles and plant equipment during clearance
operations and items of UXO are therefore included in this classification.
Fig. 1. Classification of mines and UXO

Anti-personnel mines
Anti-personnel mines are designed to incapacitate or kill personnel on foot through
blast or fragmentation effect.
Blast mines
As their name suggests, anti-personnel blast mines rely primarily on the blast
effect from the explosive charge to incapacitate personnel. Such mines are usually
initiated by direct pressure on top of the device, i.e. by stepping on them.
Detonation results in a combination of shock and blast effects that destroy human
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tissue with severe localised maiming of flesh and limbs in the lower body region.
If the victim is not killed outright, amputation of the lower limbs — feet or legs
— is usually required.
Secondary blast effects can also include severe damage to the lungs in the upper
torso, depending on the size of the explosive charge and the position of the victim’s
body relative to the mine. The detonation and resulting blast effect also creates
secondary fragmentation in the form of soil particles, stones and mine debris that
can cause wounds and lacerations to the lower limb region as well as the upper
torso and arms. Eyes are particularly vulnerable to the secondary fragmentation
effect. Hearing is normally impaired as a result of the blast.
Smaller blast mines contain less than 100 grams of high explosive as their main
charge. Their primary objective is to incapacitate the victim by causing severe
localised damage to the feet and lower limbs. Secondary effects, aside from the
threat of fragmentation to eyesight, are usually less severe than those encountered
with larger blast mines.
Larger blast mines contain between 100 and 250 grams of high explosive. These
mines not only cause severe damage to lower limbs and tissue, they also have greater
and more severe secondary effects on the upper torso, which include severe lung
damage and secondary fragmentation effects. The loss of upper torso limbs, such as
fingers and hands, is not uncommon when victims encounter these larger antipersonnel blast mines.
Fragmentation mines
Omni-directional mines
These mines rely on the fragmentation effect to incapacitate personnel. This type of
mine usually consists of a cylindrical metal sleeve that surrounds an explosive charge.
The metal sleeve produces fragmentation with velocities up to 1,500 metres per second
when the explosive charge is detonated and is lethal to people up to 50 metres.
Two types are encountered: the first is stake-mounted on the surface and activated
by pull-switch and tripwire; the other is referred to as the “bounding mine”. Bounding
mines are buried underneath the surface and activated by either pressure or tripwire.
Activation of the fuse initiates a black powder charge that expels the mine from the
ground to detonate at a height of approximately 1.5 metres to optimise the
fragmentation effect against personnel.
Directional mines
These mines restrict the projection of fragmentation within a 40º to 60º arc in front
of the mine. They are commonly used to initiate ambushes where they are command
detonated (usually electrically) or for perimeter protection and early warning. In
the last instance they are initiated by tripwire.

Anti-tank mines
These mines rely on blast effect to incapacitate vehicles. Self forming fragment (SFF)
and hollow charge (HC) mines (discussed below) use the “platter charge” effect or
the “Munroe” or “hollow charge” effect to penetrate steel in order to incapacitate
vehicles, especially heavy armour.
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Blast mines
These mines rely on the blast effect from the main explosive charge (normally 5-7
kilograms) to incapacitate vehicles. The charge is usually initiated by a pressure
mechanism that activates the mine. While the blast effect is devastating to light,
soft-skinned vehicles, damage to medium-size armoured vehicles is usually contained
to the wheel stations or tracks. The
shock effect transferred to the hull
can cause injury to occupants,
especially if the hull is penetrated.
Anti-tank blast mines can either be
boosted with additional explosives
placed underneath the mine or by
more than one mine being stacked
on top of the other, as depicted in
Figure 2. This results in a main
explosive charge of 15-20 kilograms
that enhances the blast effect. (Socalled triple mines are not
uncommon in certain regions). This
configuration is usually used against
armoured personnel-carriers, mineprotected vehicles and medium to
heavy tanks.
Another tactic is to position the mine
to allow for a centre blast
underneath the vehicle’s hull. The
blast is contained underneath the hull
and causes greater damage to the
vehicle. The mine is positioned in the
middle of the road with a second
mine located in the wheel track.
These mines are linked with
detonating cord as depicted in
Figure 3. This configuration is
known as the “goggle mine”.

Fig. 2. Double mine located in Angola. The bottom
mine is a metallic TM46 anti-tank mine with a lowmetal-content Type 72 anti-tank mine on top.

Fig. 3. Two linked mines located in Angola. The
TM57 anti-tank mine in the centre is linked by a
detonating cord to a low-metal-content PTMI
BA3 anti-tank mine in the track on the right of
the picture.

Hollow charge mines
These mines use the “Munroe” or “hollow charge” effect to penetrate armour and
allow the blast and shock effect of the accompanying explosion to incapacitate the
vehicle and occupants. The explosive charge is cone-shaped and provided with a
metallic liner (usually copper) with the open end of the cone pointed upwards towards
the target. Upon detonation, the Munroe effect causes a focused blast effect that
turns the metallic liner into a high-speed copper slug capable of penetrating the steel
due to its very high kinetic energy. Once the steel has been penetrated, the blast
effect enters the vehicle interior and incapacitates the occupants. These mines are
used against armoured and mine-protected vehicles.
A number of mines are included in this category because they create more damage
to vehicles than the conventional anti-tank mine relying on blast alone, even though
they are not, strictly speaking, HC mines. For example, although the South African
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No. 8 anti-tank mine does not use the Munroe effect optimally (as it does not have a
metallic liner), the focusing effect of the explosive charge causes the resultant blast
effect to be more effective than some other conventional blast anti-tank mines.
Similarly, the British MK 7 anti-tank mine is fitted with a heavy metal fuse array on
top of it. This fuse forms a high-speed metal slug that penetrates steel up to a certain
thickness. This mine is also more effective than some other conventional blast antitank mines.
Self forming fragment (SFF) mines
SFF-type mines rely on the “Miznay Shardin” or “platter” effect to incapacitate vehicles
and its occupants. The mine contains a hollow dish-shaped metal liner facing towards
the target. Upon detonation, this dish (with a mass of 0.73 kilograms) forms a highspeed metal slug that is projected towards the target at velocities up to 2,500 metres
per second. This slug is capable of penetrating armoured steel, allowing the ensuing
blast effect to enter the target vehicle and incapacitate the occupants and cause
damage to the vehicle.
The Miznay Shardin effect causes greater damage to vehicles than the Munroe effect.
The formed slug is bigger and thus causes greater damage to the vehicle’s hull. The
ensuing hole in the hull is larger, with the result that the blast effect that enters the
hull is considerably larger, causing more damage to occupants and the interior of
the vehicle. These mines are usually used against medium and heavy armour and
mine-protected vehicles.
Less effective SFF mines can be improvised by positioning a circular metal plate (1020 millimetres in thickness) on top of a conventional blast anti-tank mine. While
detection of the mine is easier, the resulting effect is far more devastating than that
of a conventional blast mine alone.

Unexploded ordnance
UXO can be classified as small, medium and heavy according to their explosive
content. While most items of UXO rely on a combination of blast and fragmentation
effect to incapacitate personnel and vehicles, more sophisticated devices include HC
effects, thereby posing a greater threat.
Small-size UXO
Small-size items of UXO contain an explosive charge of less than 500 grams and rely
on a combination of blast and fragmentation effect to incapacitate personnel and
vehicles. Examples include the following:
¾ hand grenades,
¾ rifle grenades,
¾ 40-millimetre aircraft rounds, and
¾ submunitions.
Medium-size UXO
So-called “medium-size” items of UXO contain an explosive charge of between one
and 20 kilograms and rely on a combination of fragmentation and blast effect to
incapacitate vehicles and personnel.
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Large UXO
These items of UXO consist mostly of aircraft bombs with explosive charges of up to
500 kilograms. They rely mostly on their blast effect to incapacitate vehicles, equipment
and personnel.

Definition of mine threat levels
The threat that mines and UXO pose to vehicles, plant equipment and their occupants
is defined according to severity in Table 1 below. These levels will be used to
determine required protection levels to counter this threat.
Table 1. Definition of mine threat levels (MTL)
MTL

Description

Typical examples

MTL-01

anti-personnel mine blast type

PMN, PMD-6, Type 72

MTL-02

anti-personnel mine fragmentation type
small-size UXO

POM-Z, OZM-4, OZM-72, PROM-1
Hand grenades, rifle grenades,
submunitions

MTL-03

anti-tank blast type

TM46, TM57, TMA-3

MTL-03A

anti-tank blast under wheel

TM46, TM57, TMA-3

MTL-03B

anti-tank blast under hull

TM46, TM57, TMA-3

MTL-04

medium-size UXO (mortars and artillery
rounds)

60-120 millimetre mortars. Artillery rounds
up to 155 millimetres

MTL-05

anti-tank HC

AT-4

MTL-06

anti-tank SFF

TMRP-6, TMRP-7, TMK-2

MTL-07

heavy-size UXO

250-500 kilogram aircraft bombs

Effect of mines and UXO on unprotected vehicles,
plant equipment and occupants
While the protection of personnel working in mine-affected areas is of paramount
importance, the effects of mines and UXO on personnel “in the open” fall outside
the scope of this study. This section concentrates on the effects on unprotected vehicles
and plant equipment, with particular emphasis on the safety of the occupants and
crew inside.
The mass of the vehicle or equipment plays an important role in determining the
effects of mines and UXO on them. The heavier a vehicle, the less damage is caused
by the mine or UXO. Vehicles and equipment are therefore classified by mass in
order to facilitate this discussion, although hull shape and materials used are also of
importance.
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Table 2. Classification of vehicles and plant equipment
Classification

Mass (metric tonnes)

Examples (unprotected non-military vehicles)

Light

<3

Sedan vehicle, light pick-up, lorry, light backactor

Medium

3-15

Medium lorry, bus, D-4 bulldozer, excavator

Heavy

15-30

Heavy lorry, D-8 bulldozer, heavy excavator

Extra heavy

> 30

Low-bed with freight

Anti-personnel blast type (MTL-01)
Light vehicles
The blast effect associated with the detonation of high explosive manifests itself in
the form of a high-speed shock wave with very high overpressure being emitted
from the charge. This overpressure decays very rapidly with distance due to expansion
into the surrounding air as depicted graphically in Figure 4 below. The graph depicts
the decay of reflected overpressure with distance for the detonation of 250 grams of
trinitrotoluene (TNT) on the surface. The overpressures were calculated from the
Rankine-Hugoniot equation, which enables the overpressure to be calculated at given
distances for a TNT charge detonated on the surface. The overpressure can be
calculated and presented in two ways, either as reflected pressure or “side-on”
pressure. The difference is the way in which the blast wave is viewed.
Fig. 4. Blast overpressures against distance in metres for 250 grams
of TNT charge

Reflected pressures are obtained when the blast wave is viewed directly from the
front, i.e. the measuring probe is positioned directly in front of the approaching
wave. The wave hits the surface of the probe directly and reflects back towards the
point of its origin. The direction of measurement is in the same direction as that of
the blast wave.
“Side-on” pressures are obtained when the blast wave is viewed from the side, thus
the direction of measurement is 90º perpendicular to the direction in which the blast
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wave is travelling. “Side-on” pressures are much lower than reflected pressures,
depending on conditions. Reflected pressures are more useful in engineering
applications because they give an approximation of what pressure and associated
impulses are exerted on materials and structures when subjected to explosives blast
waves. Care should be taken when using quoted or calculated pressures to always
establish how the blast wave was viewed when pressures are quoted or calculated.
While the Rankine-Hugoniot equation is useful to estimate the resulting overpressure
for a given explosive charge size, it is only valid for ideal conditions for the explosive
charge suspended in free air. It further assumes that the shock front and blast wave
develop and expand evenly away from the point of detonation. It does not take soil
effects into account. When explosive charges are detonated under the surface of the
soil, factors such as soil type, moisture content and depth have a profound effect on
the development of the blast wave. The wave will develop in the direction of least
resistance and will project the soil on top of the charge in these directions, causing
zones of pressures much higher than calculated. In spite of this, the Rankine-Hugoniot
equation is handy to establish the order of magnitude of overpressures expected at
certain distances from a given explosive charge size.
From Figure 4 above it is evident that the blast effect is limited to less than one
metre from the detonation point. Thus, the effect of anti-personnel blast type mines
on light vehicles is restricted to local damage in the wheel area. The tyre is punctured
and the tyre rim and wheel studs may be damaged by the bigger type anti-personnel
mines, such as the PMN or PMD-6. Hydraulic brake lines may also be damaged.
The threat to occupants caused by the blast effect is minimal. The biggest threat to
occupants is the ensuing accident resulting from the sudden puncture of the tyre,
similar to a tyre blow-out in normal vehicle accidents. Occupants are shielded from
the blast effect by the vehicle body and are usually more than two metres removed
from the detonation point. The resulting blast from the detonation of this class of
mines is insufficient to rupture body panels and thus prevents the blast and associated
shock wave from entering the vehicle compartment.
Medium, heavy and extra heavy vehicles
The effects are similar to those on light vehicles, but with less damage to the wheel
station. There is no damage to tracked vehicles, especially with heavier vehicles and
plant equipment.

Anti-personnel fragmentation mine and small UXO (MTL-02)
All vehicle classes
The detonation velocity in cast explosives such as TNT is approximately 7,600 metres
per second. When a column of explosives is encased in steel, the velocity of the
ensuing shock wave (approx. 7,600 metres per second upon detonation) exceeds the
velocity of sound in steel (approx. 6,000 metres per second). Energy is pumped into
the steel at rates higher than those with which the steel can conduct this energy.
This leads to the build-up of very high, localised stresses within the material along
the molecular grain boundaries. This results in the fracture of the material along the
grain boundaries. These fractured pieces are referred to as fragments and are
propelled away from the detonating explosive charge at velocities in the order of
1,000 to 1,800 metres per second. The size and shape of these irregular fragments
depend very much on the material properties of the steel.
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The fragmentation emitted by this class of mine and small UXO is capable of
penetrating the body, windshield and windows of the vehicle at distances of up to
30 metres causing a serious threat to occupants or operators. Shrapnel can also cause
severe localised damage to vehicle systems such as brakes, cooling, hydraulic and
fuel lines.
Tripwire-operated mines pose a serious threat to plant equipment working in mineinfested areas. The equipment can activate the mine by disturbing the tripwire up to
10 metres in front of the machine, but the mine may be positioned right next to the
machine, resulting in a detonation very close to it. Shrapnel velocities in such close
proximity average between 800 to 1,000 metres per second that can easily penetrate 10
millimetres of mild steel.
Bounding mines pose an additional danger. They are expelled from the ground with
considerable force when activated. The mine itself can easily penetrate the soft belly
of an unprotected vehicle. In one instance, a Casspir MPV was hit by an OZM-72
bounding mine which detonated just behind the rear door. The mine hit the side of
the three-millimetre-thick “checker plate” step with sufficient force to bend the plate
out of the way before detonating.

Blast of anti-tank mines under a wheel (MTL-03A)
General considerations
When anti-tank blast mines are initiated, the blast and shock front is formed exactly
in the same manner as that for the initiation of anti-personnel blast mines. The
difference is that the ensuing blast wave generates overpressures much higher than
that of anti-personnel mines. Anti-tank blast mines are thus capable of causing damage
at much further distances from the detonation point. The relation between blast
overpressures and distance for a seven kilogram TNT charge is depicted in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Blast overpressure v. distance in metres for 7 kilograms of TNT

The high-pressure zone associated with the extremely high associated reflected
pressure (3,300 kiloPascals) is now extended to three metres.
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The initial shape of the blast wave as it emerges from the ground depends on the
depth of the charge as well as soil conditions (moisture, soil type and hardness),
but is generally cone-shaped with an angle between 45 and 60 degrees. This
wave flattens out to an inclusive angle of 100 to 120 degrees in the final
development of the blast wave due to the sideways expansion parallel to the soil
surface as indicated in Figure 6. This picture was captured on film approximately
five milliseconds after initiation.
Fig. 6. Final development of explosive shock wave approximately
5 milliseconds after initiation of a 7 kilogram TNT test charge
buried 100 millimetres under the surface.

The position of the shock wave edge is clearly visible along the surface by the dust
kicked up as the shock wave passes over the ground. The dotted red line depicts the
theoretical position of the shock wave at this stage, had the shock wave formed
symmetrically upon emerging from the soil. This edge is further away from the
detonation point than the following plume that contains smoke (detonation products),
sand and dust particles. These particles, and thus the plume, travel at the so-called
particle velocity which is less than the shock wave velocity. The black objects emerging
above the plume are solid debris (e.g. stones), which were initially projected upwards
through the impulse caused by the blast wave.
At this point their velocity is greater than that of the shock wave and they are in
front of the shock wave. The velocity decay of the shock wave in air is greater that
that of solid objects with a certain level of kinetic energy. This is due to the expansion
in air.
While the reflective pressures generated by the horizontal development of the blast
wave is of the same magnitude as the vertical development, the reflected pressures
associated with the vertical development are of greater importance where the blast
effect on vehicles is concerned. This is the area included within the 100º cone above
the detonation point (depicted in Figure 6), also referred to as the “cone of
destruction”. Local overpressures within this cone are normally of such a magnitude
that they lead to the complete destruction of vehicle chassis parts, panels and even
the engines of unprotected vehicles.
The size of this cone of destruction as well as associated reflected pressures, particle
velocity (plume velocity) and time of arrival of the shock wave against the vertical
distance from the detonation point are given in Table 3. The values were calculated
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from the Rankine-Huguniot equation and can therefore only be regarded as indicative
of the order of magnitude. The calculations to establish the cone diameter are
contained in Annex 1 to this chapter.
Table 3. Shock wave characteristics v. distance for a 7kg TNT test charge
Distance above
detonation
point (metres)

Cone
diameter
(metres)

Reflected
pressure
(kPa)

Shock
velocity
(m/s)

Particle
velocity
(m/s)

Arrival time
of
shock wave
(millisecs)

0.5

1.2

131,000

3,610

3,290

0.08

1.0

2.4

43,500

2,440

2,020

0.24

1.5

3.6

19,800

1,840

1,430

0.49

2.0

4.8

10,400

1,440

1,060

0.81

2.5

6.0

5,720

1,160

815

1.22

3.0

7.2

3,300

936

637

1.72

3.5

8.4

1,950

812

507

2.33

4.0

9.6

1,250

714

412

3.01

4.5

10.8

838

642

340

3.79

5.0

12.0

583

588

284

4.65

Blast effect on light unprotected vehicles
Based on an “average” light vehicle five metres long and two metres wide and with
a ground clearance of 50 centimetres, the cone of destruction will encompass roughly
one quarter of the vehicle when an anti-tank blast mine is detonated under a wheel.
Three quarters of the blast effect is dissipated into the surrounding air, but the blast
wave generates extremely high reflected pressures on the chassis and hull of the vehicle
close to the ground. These high reflected pressures simply destroy and remove
everything in its path. The vehicle itself is flung into the air, and pending on its
initial velocity, normally lands five to 10 metres away from the detonation point.
The effect of the cone of destruction resulting from a wheel blast underneath a light
unprotected vehicle is depicted schematically in Figure 7. The part of the vehicle
coloured in red is usually completely destroyed and the likelihood of occupants
within this area surviving is slim.
Fig. 7. Illustration of the “cone of destruction” in wheel blasts on light
unprotected vehicles
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Figure 8 depicts a light unprotected pick-up that detonated a single TM 46 anti-tank
blast mine under the left front wheel. The entire cab and engine compartment have
been destroyed (the areas within the cone of destruction). Note that no damage
occurred to the left rear wheel and wheel-base as well as the rear area outside the
cone of destruction.
Fig. 8. Light unprotected pick-up destroyed by the blast from a single
TM 46 anti-tank mine under the left front wheel

The effect on the occupants depends on their position relative to the detonation
point. If an occupant is positioned within the cone of destruction, death is almost
certain.
Statistics of the effect on the occupants of the explosion of single anti-tank mines
under the wheels of light unprotected vehicles in the former Rhodesia (1972-1978) are
summarised in Table 4. They indicate that in recorded incidents 28 per cent of the
occupants were killed outright and a further 36 per cent sustained severe injuries.
Injuries included severe tissue damage and lacerations (some leading to amputation
of limbs) sustained by secondary fragmentation generated by the blast wave. Further
injuries included impaired hearing, damage to eyesight and, though to a lesser extent,
lung damage.
Table 4. Mine incidents recorded in Rhodesia (1970-1978)
Blast effect on medium and heavy unprotected vehicles
Vehicle

Detonations

Unprotected Land Rovers

People
involved

Deaths

Injuries

22

88

81 (20%)

52 (59%)

7

24

2 (8%)

15 (60%)

Protected Land Rovers, steel plates next
to wheels

118

397

25 (6%)

185 (47%)

Protected Land Rovers, front wheel only

81

249

3 (1.2%)

120 (48%)

Unprotected Land Rovers, front wheel only

Leopard

37

139

0

18 (13%)

Rhino

12

45

1 (2%)

15 (33%)

Hyena (SA)

99

407

1 (0.2%)

82 (20%)

Kudu

14

70

7 (10%)

39 (56%)

Puma (heavy vehicle)

82

715

2 (0.2%)

106 (15%)

95

498

139 (28%)

181 (36%)

173

1949

103 (5%)

397 (20%)

Unprotected light vehicles (cars, etc.)
Unprotected heavy vehicles
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The blast effect and associated damage caused by single anti-tank mines exploding
underneath medium or heavy unprotected vehicles tend to be more localised. This
is due to the bigger size and mass of the vehicle as well as the higher ground clearance.
The cone of destruction associated with the blast effect covers a proportionally smaller
area of the vehicle than that for light vehicles. In spite of this, local damage is just as
severe as in light vehicles and leads to the complete destruction of a segment of the
vehicle as depicted in Figure 9. This 10-tonne truck detonated a single anti-tank
mine under the right front wheel.
Fig. 9. Unprotected medium-sized vehicle that detonated
a single anti-tank mine under the right front wheel

The cab was destroyed with little or no damage towards the rear of the vehicle or
the lower left hand side in front. The driver of the truck was killed instantly.
Statistics in Table 4 indicate that five per cent of occupants were killed and 20 per
cent injured during incidents involving the detonation of single anti-tank blast type
mines underneath medium to heavy unprotected vehicles. These figures are much
less than those for light unprotected vehicles due to the fact that occupants are further
removed from the detonation point in these bigger and heavier vehicles than in the
smaller light vehicles.
Fig. 10. Bulldozer after detonating a single TMA 3 mine in Mozambique

After some of the roads were cleared by manual teams in
Mozambique this was the fate of road-building equipment
following them up. Hand-held metal detectors and
prodding sticks were cleaning to a depth of some 100mm.
The TMA-2 mine detonated after the blade had removed
enough cover. The mine was too deep for other vehicle traffic
to detonate it.
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Figure 10 depicts a bulldozer that detonated a single TMA-3 anti-tank blast mine
underneath the right hand track. The blast effect shattered the track and damage
was limited to the right hand side alone. The blast effect was insufficient to throw
the vehicle out of the crater created by the blast. The driver survived and sustained
severe lacerations due to the secondary fragmentation effects.
Blast effect on extra heavy size unprotected vehicles
The blast effect of anti-tank blast type mines detonating under the wheels of extra
heavy unprotected vehicles is similar to the effect on heavy vehicles. The difference is
that the effect is more localised due to the bigger size and mass of the vehicle. However,
the localised effect when detonating an anti-tank blast mine under a front wheel is
sufficient to cause extensive damage to the cab of the vehicle and can cause death or
serious injuries to the occupants.

Detonation of anti-tank blast mine underneath hull (MTL-03B)
General considerations
Double anti-tank blast mines became common during the middle of 1978 in the former
South West Africa with the advent of the first generation mine-protected vehicles
(MPVs). These mines appeared in both the linked or “goggle” configuration causing
blast effect directly under the vehicle hull or, in the stacked configuration (triple mines
were not uncommon), detonating underneath the wheel.
The number of mines involved in incidents in South West Africa (now Namibia)
during July/August 1978 is reflected in Table 5.
Table 5. Number of mines detected and involved in incidents
in South West Africa in July-August 1978
Type
Visual

Mines located
Detected

Detonations

Total

Single mines
TMA-3

0

1

0

1

Total

0

1

0

1

Stacked TMA-3

0

2

3

5

Linked TMA-3/
TM 46/57

0

3

1

4

Linked others

0

2

0

2

Total

0

7

4

11

Double mines

The blast effect of these multiple mines was much more devastating on unprotected
vehicles than when single mines were detonated underneath the wheels: more
occupants were killed and injured. This is depicted in Table 6.
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Table 6. Number of people killed and injured in vehicle mine incidents
in South West Africa: January-July 1978
Vehicles

Incidents

People involved

Killed

Injured

Unprotected

22

117

43 (37%)

61 (52%)

Protected

48

356

5 (1.4%)

32 (9%)

Total

70

473

48 (10%)

93 (20%)

Blast effect on light and medium unprotected vehicles
The blast effect of multiple mines on
unprotected light- and mediumsized vehicles is much more severe
than that of single mines. If multiple
mines are detonated in the linked
configuration, the mine initiates
underneath the hull of the vehicle.
Blast damage is not localised to the
wheel area, as in the case of single
mines detonating under the wheel.
The full force of the mine causes
much more damage to the vehicle as
depicted schematically in Figure 11.

Fig. 11. The effect of the cone of destruction
on a light, unprotected vehicle from a
centre blast underneath the hull

The effect of a centre blast
underneath the hull of a light unprotected pick-up is depicted in Figure 12. While
the front of the vehicle, engine compartment and cab have been destroyed and
removed, the rear area suffered relatively little damage. Note that the one rear
hubcap remained fixed to the wheel: this area was obviously outside the cone of
destruction.
Fig. 12. The effect of a single TM-46 anti-tank blast mine detonated underneath
the centre of an unprotected light vehicle
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When multiple mines are stacked (either
double or triple), the ensuing blast effect
on the vehicle, even for a detonation
under a wheel, is much bigger due to the
increase of explosive charge. Figure 13
depicts a light unprotected vehicle almost
completely destroyed by a double mine.
The mine detonated underneath the right
front wheel. All five occupants were
killed instantly.

Fig. 13. Damage to a light unprotected
vehicle from a double mine detonating
under the right front wheel

Blast effect on heavy and extra heavy
unprotected vehicles.
The blast effect of multiple mines on
heavy and extra heavy vehicles is just as
severe as that on light and medium
vehicles, especially for detonations
underneath the hull. Overall damage,
though, tends to be less severe due to
the bigger size and mass of these vehicles.

Medium-size UXO (MTL-04)
The biggest danger from medium-size UXO is when they are used as booster charges
in conjunction with anti-personnel or anti-tank blast mines. The effect is similar to
that of multiple anti-tank blast mines, but with an added fragmentation effect.
When used as booby-traps and initiated above the surface with the aid of tripwires,
the fragmentation from this class of UXO poses a threat to unprotected vehicles up
to 100 metres away. It also poses a threat to plant equipment engaged in excavation
or bush clearing activities. Figure 14 shows artillery shells and 122 millimetre rocket
warheads (BM-21) used as booster charges in the road. These warheads were
connected to anti-personnel blast mines in the road with detonating cord.
Fig. 14. Rocket warheads shells used as booster charges
located in a road in Angola
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Anti-tank HC Mines (MTL-05)
Although anti-tank HC mines are mostly “scatterable mines”, which lie on the surface
after being deployed against armoured vehicles from the air, the hollow charge
effect can penetrate armoured steel up to 40 millimetres in thickness at five metres.
This allows the blast effect to enter into the vehicle and cause extensive damage.
These types of mines will cause severe localised damage to all classes of unprotected
vehicles and occupants will similarly be exposed to the blast effects, resulting in
deaths and injuries. The effect of a Soviet TMK-2 HC mine on a Casspir MPV is
depicted in Figure 15.
Fig. 15. The effect of a TMK-2 HC mine on a Casspir MPV

However, when these mines are detonated under the wheel, the hollow charge
effect is neutralised if the hull of the vehicle does not extend over the wheel and the
effect is similar to that of a single anti-tank blast mine detonating under the vehicle’s
wheel.

Anti-tank SFF Mines (MTL-06)
The SFF type of anti-tank mines is designed to incapacitate heavy armoured vehicles
so they have a devastating effect when detonated under unprotected vehicles. Such
SFF mines will completely destroy light unprotected vehicles and cause severe localised
damage to the heavier classes of vehicles. The chances of occupants surviving the
blast are slim.
A black powder charge explodes and dispels soil from the top of the mine upon
initiation. This is required to allow for the optimal formation of the “platter slug” in
air during the detonation of the main charge. This molten slug (approximately 0.74
grams of steel) is projected towards the target with a high velocity. Velocities of up
to 2,500 metres per second have been measured and the associated kinetic energy is
sufficient for the slug to penetrate up to 80 millimetres of armour plate at distances
of four metres.
The most damaging effects are obtained when the mine is detonated under the hull
of a vehicle, which is why tilt rods are the preferred way of initiating these mines,
allowing for the full width of the vehicle as the attack area. The penetration of the
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armour plate allows the blast effect to enter the vehicle
and cause further damage.
When these mines are detonated underneath the wheel of
a vehicle, the “platter slug” is not formed optimally,
however the resultant blast effect on the vehicle is similar
to that of a double mine. Figure 16 depicts the effects of a
TMRP-6 SFF mine detonated underneath the wheel of a
Casspir MPV during a test. The wheel was filled with a
liquid rubber compound that solidifies after a short period
to minimise the effect of smaller anti-personnel type mines
as well as to reduce punctures.

Fig. 16. Effects of a
TMRP-6 SFF mine
exploding under the
wheel of a Casspir
MPV

UXO Heavy (MTL-07)
The use of 250-500 kilogram aircraft bombs as mines or
booby-traps is not uncommon in certain regions. These
bombs are buried in the road and linked with detonating
cord to either anti-tank or anti-personnel mines, which are
used to trigger the devices. The resulting blast effect from these devices will destroy
all types of vehicle classes (from light to heavy) with virtually no chance of survival
for the occupants. Figure 17 depicts a 500 kilogram aircraft bomb connected with
detonating cord to several anti-personnel mines.
Fig. 17. A 500kg aircraft bomb rigged as a mine

This type of UXO also poses a serious threat on its own to unprotected plant
equipment used for bush clearing or excavation.

Mine/UXO protection levels
The mine or UXO protection levels for vehicles are generally defined in terms of the
likelihood of the occupants surviving the effects of the explosion as well as the
possibility of the vehicle being able to be repaired.
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The likelihood of occupant survival
It is difficult to categorise the survivability of occupants of vehicles involved in mine
blasts. This is because the position of a particular occupant relative to the detonation
point as well as the cone of destruction created by the blast effect will be determinant
factors.
Nonetheless, statistics recorded during the Rhodesian War (1972-1978) indicate that
the size and mass of the unprotected vehicle plays an important role in determining
whether the occupants survive a blast or not. The analysis of these statistics, which
are related to the detonation of a single blast mine underneath one of the wheels
(MTL-03A), is depicted graphically in Figure 18.
Fig. 18. Percentage of occupants killed and injured against vehicle size

The percentage of occupants killed in light vehicles differed slightly when compared
with those injured (30 per cent killed and 38 per cent injured). For medium and
heavy vehicles the difference increased considerably (less than 10 per cent killed
and 25 per cent injured). Occupant survivability and associated medical care required
are defined in Table 7.
Table 7. Definition of survivability levels for vehicle occupants
Survivability
level (OSL)

Immediate condition

Medical care required

Estimated time to
full recovery

OSL-04

No incapacitation

Nil

N/A

OSL-03

Temporary loss of hearing
Light lacerations
Minor fractures of limbs
Not life threatening

First aid

Hours

OSL-02

Temporary loss of hearing
Severe multiple lacerations
Severe multiple fractures
Not life threatening

First aid and stabilisation
Casualty evacuation to clinic

Days

OSL-01

Partial/complete loss of hearing
permanent
Temporary/permanent loss of sight
Severe multiple lacerations
Blast lung
Limbs completely torn off
Multiple fractures
Life threatening

Stabilisation and immediate
casualty evacuation
Trauma surgery and
amputations

Months

OSL-00

Instant death

N/A

N/A
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Vehicle repairability
Vehicle repairability levels are defined in terms of the skills levels, required capabilities
and time required to carry out repairs after a mine or UXO explosion. The vehicle
repairability levels are defined in Table 8.
Table 8. Definition of vehicle repairability levels (VRL)
VRL

Immediate condition

Repair capability and action

Duration

VRL-04

No incapacitation

Nil

NA

VRL-03

Temporary incapacitated

Effect repairs on site

Hours

VRL-02

Temporary incapacitation
No structural damage

Recovery to field workshop
Requires general components

Days

VRL-01

Semi permanent incapacitation
Recovery to field workshop
Weeks
Light to medium structural damage Requires factory supplied subsystems

VRL-00

Destroyed beyond economic repair Recover to workshop
Salvage usable parts and systems

NA

Principles for the protection of vehicles and plant
equipment against the threat of mines and UXO
General considerations
Steel plating (usually armour plate) is used to neutralise the blast and fragmentation
effect of mines and UXO in order to render protection to vehicles, plant equipment
and their occupants. However, any design incorporating the use of steel plating adds
considerable mass to the vehicle.
Automotive engineers usually accept a power-to-mass ratio of 27kw per metric tonne
to ensure vehicle mobility that also caters for off-route conditions. Another aspect
that needs to be considered is axle loadings. In general, it is more difficult to protect
the light to medium range of vehicles than the heavier classes, as depicted in Fig. 19.
Fig. 19. Difficulty of protecting vehicles against mine threat
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Principles for the protection against blast effect
The following principles can be incorporated into the design of vehicles and equipment
to render protection against the blast effect of mines:
¾ absorption of energy,
¾ deflection of blast effect away from the hull, and
¾ distance from detonation point.
Absorption of energy
A simple and cost-effective manner to
incorporate this principle has been found
to fill the tyres of wheeled vehicles with
water. This concept increases the
protection level of light and medium
vehicles considerably against the threat
of single blast anti-tank type mines
detonating underneath a wheel. Figure
20 depicts a three-ton Bedford truck
that detonated a single TM46 anti-tank
mine under the left front wheel.

Fig. 20. Bedford truck with water in the
wheels that detonated TM 46
anti-tank mine

It was previously thought that the water
absorbed energy by being converted into spray and vapour, but recent studies suggest
that the water, being much heavier than the air in the tyre, deflects the shock wave
sideways thereby flattening the cone of destruction.
This concept can be enhanced by adding protection plates to shield the vehicle
occupants from the blast effect. However, these plates must be able to withstand the
blast effect (although considerably less) within the cone of destruction. Otherwise,
they could form deadly secondary fragmentation when shattering or shearing off
during the blast. The general positions for inserting protection plates on a light
vehicle are indicated in green in Figure 21. The windscreen and side windows should
be replaced by reinforced, laminated glass to withstand the blast effect of the mine
and render protection against fragmentation.
Fig. 21. Schematic layout for insertion of protection plates in light vehicles
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Figure 22 depicts a Unimog vehicle fitted
with protection plates in the wheel area
and tyres filled with water. This vehicle
detonated a TM 57 anti-tank mine under
the right wheel. Damage is considerably
less than it would otherwise be, and is
limited to the wheel area.

Fig. 22. Unimog vehicle fitted with
protection plates in wheel area and
wheels filled with water

However, it should be noted that the use
of water in the wheels and the
installation of deflection plates will only
render protection against single anti-tank
mines detonating underneath the wheel
(MTL-03A).
Deflection of blast away from the hull
The effect of blast against the hull of a vehicle can be reduced considerably by
incorporating steel plates at an angle to the direction of blast. Reflected pressures
are generated when the blast direction is at a 90º angle to the plate. Side-on pressures
are approached if the blast direction corresponds to a 0º angle to the plate angle. It
can thus be expected that the resultant pressure will be reduced to a value between
the reflected pressure and the side-on pressure, should the plate be angled between
0 and 90º. In classical gas dynamics this is referred to as an oblique reflected shock
wave. This approach has lead to the introduction of V-hulls, which have been
successfully used in the mine protection of light- and medium-sized vehicles.
Protection can be rendered to lightweight vehicles against single anti-tank blast mine
detonations underneath the hull (MTL-03B) by incorporating the design of a Vshaped capsule onto the chassis of a standard light commercial vehicle. The additional
mass of the armour plating involved and the engine power limit the size of the
capsule, therefore maximum use must be made of the deflection principle in the
design. Design options are further limited by the vehicle configuration itself. Figure
23 depicts one of the successful designs issued to farmers in mine-affected areas in
South Africa during the mid-1980s.
Fig. 23. An example of a V-shaped capsule mounted on the chassis
of a light commercial vehicle
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It is also important to prevent the “entrapment” of the blast wave. Lightweight,
“blow away” panels should be used in areas within the cone of destruction, such as
in the wheel wells.
Distance from the detonation point
The blast effect diminishes drastically
with the distance from the detonation
point. Thus, by increasing the ground
clearance height and by spacing the
wheels further apart, maximum distance
can be obtained from the detonation
point. Practical considerations such as
mobility, turning circle and ease of
driving limit the extent to which this
principle can be applied.

Fig. 24. Rear view of South African
Casspir MPV

These principles were incorporated in the
design of the South African Casspir MPV
as depicted in Figure 24. Note the
maximum use of wheel spacing (the
wheels run on the outside of the body),
the V-shaped hull to incorporate
maximum deflection of the blast wave
and optimal use of ground clearance.

Principles for the protection against the fragmentation effect of
mines and UXO
Protection against fragmentation is achieved by using steel plating and armoured
glass of sufficient thickness. Normal ballistic protection levels as required for military
combat and armoured vehicles are used effectively for the protection against the
fragmentation effect of mines and smaller UXO (MTL-02). The plate thickness required
to render protection against blast usually renders protection against the fragmentation
effect of mines and smaller UXO (MTL-02).
A commonly used standard is to protect against the penetration of North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) 7.62 x 51mm anti-personnel rounds. These protection
levels are defined in Military Standards such as STANAG 4569.
Armoured plating is currently being
used instead of mild steel to create
vehicles with lower weight. A rule of
thumb is that an armoured plate of a
given thickness renders the same
ballistic protection as a mild steel plate
of twice the thickness (thus half the
mass).
The principle of deflection can also be
used in designs to render protection
against the fragmentation effect.
Figure 25 illustrates the effect of
incident angle on the thickness of a

Fig. 25. Effect of incident angle on plate
thickness required to stop 7.62 x 51mm
NATO anti-personnel rounds
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typical armour plate required to stop penetration from a NATO 7.62 x 51mm antipersonnel round.

Principles for the protection against hollow charge (HC) and selfforming fragment (SFF) mines
The amount of steel (armoured plate) required to neutralise the effect of various HC
and SFF mines is depicted graphically in Figure 26. From this graph it is evident that
the Soviet TMK-2 HC mine poses the biggest threat. Fortunately this mine is rarely
encountered in current humanitarian and commercial demining operations.
Fig. 26. Amount of steel required to neutralise the effect
of various HC and SFF mines

Protection against HC mines
The Munroe effect associated with HC mines requires a stand-off distance in free air
to form the high-speed jet. This stand-off distance is usually determined by the cone
diameter and length of the charge. The optimal formation of this high-speed jet can be
prevented by positioning a “capture plate” between the vehicle hull and the ground
surface. This capture plate can cause the break-up of the jet. This will reduce the
penetration capability of the jet against the vehicle hull.
This concept will reduce ground clearance of the vehicle considerably and thus impairs
vehicle mobility, especially in wet conditions.
Protection against SFF mines
The high-speed slug formed in SFF anti-tank mines requires less distance to optimally
form. The effect of this mine can be reduced by introducing a thick “capture plate”
between the vehicle hull and the soil surface. This plate must be thick enough to stop
the slug completely. Current designs incorporate the use of armour plate and
composite materials to reduce mass. The vehicle hull above the “capture plate” must
be able to withstand the associated blast and shock effect of the mine as well. A
typical “capture plate” underneath a V-shaped hull is depicted in Figure 27, as well
as the after-effects of the SFF test mine.
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The capture plate neutralises the effect of the V-shaped hull when fitted underneath
a vehicle. If the vehicle detonates a conventional blast mine, either under the wheel
or directly underneath the capture plate, the blast effect is trapped underneath the
capture plate. The vehicle is then subjected to higher impulse and momentum transfer
than in the case where the V-shape deflects most of the blast effect.
Fig. 27. Effect of a SFF test mine on a capture plate fitted underneath
the hull of a MPV capsule

Application of other principles to render protection against the
effect of mines and UXO
Consideration should be given to the application of the following general principles
to further increase the protection level of vehicles:
¾ use of safety belts,
¾ seating design and footrests, and
¾ “good housekeeping” (no loose items).
Use of safety belts
Although the measures described above can all reduce the blast effect on a vehicle,
significant impulse and momentum transfer to the vehicle may still occur. This causes
a sudden vertical acceleration of the vehicle, i.e. the vehicle is thrown into the air.
The lighter the vehicle, the more pronounced is this effect.
This sudden vertical acceleration, coupled with the original forward movement of
the vehicle, can cause serious injuries to the occupants if they are not properly strapped
into their seats. Conventional safety belts as used in the automotive industry do not
render sufficient protection. Double straps with at least four adhesion points to the
hull should therefore be used.
Seating design and footrests
The shock associated with the blast wave is transmitted through the steel hull of the
vehicle when subjected to the blast effect of a detonating mine. If the seats are
attached to the floor of the vehicle, the shock wave can be transmitted through the
steel directly to the seat and subsequently into the body of the person occupying the
seat. This additional shock, in conjunction with the sudden vertical movement of the
vehicle, can increase the extent of injuries sustained. As a result, it is far better to
suspend seats from the side, or even better from the roof of the vehicle, to reduce
shock transmission.
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The same effect is encountered when occupants rest their feet directly onto the floor
of the vehicle during a detonation incident. The shock wave is transmitted through
the floor directly into the feet and lower limbs of the occupants, causing injury to
those body parts. This effect can be minimised by producing footrests attached to
the side of the vehicle or forming part of the seat arrangement. Footrests should not
be attached directly to the floor section.
“Good housekeeping”
Good housekeeping implies that the interior of the vehicle should be kept clean and
free from foreign objects lying on the floor. Nuts, bolts, spare parts, tools and other
foreign objects lying around on the floor of the cabin can be accelerated due to the
blast effect and associated vertical movement into the air. These objects can cause
injury to personnel inside the cabin.
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Annex 1.

Trigonometry regarding the cone
of destruction

Xi

Hi

α
β
Xi / Hi = tan α

Table 1. Trigonometry relations for the cone of destruction
Angle a

Tan a

Height Hi(metres)

Cone radius Xi
(metres) Hitan a

Cone diameter
(metres) 2Xi

50

1.19

0.5

0.595

1.19

50

1.19

1.0

1.190

2.38

50

1.19

1.5

1.785

3.57

50

1.19

2.0

2.380

4.76

50

1.19

2.5

2.975

5.95

50

1.19

3.0

3.570

7.14

50

1.19

3.5

4.165

8.33

50

1.19

4.0

4.760

9.52

50

1.19

4.5

5.355

10.71

50

1.19

5.0

5.95

11.90
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Annex 2.

Guidelines to estimate the survivability of
vehicles, plant equipment and their
occupants in the field

The following guidelines have been established in order to allow technical advisors
assigned to a mine action centre or other entity involved with the coordination or
regulation of mine action, to make decisions regarding the suitability of vehicles, plant
equipment and their occupants faced with specific mine threats.

The assessment process
There are very few defined “yes-no” situations in assessing the survivability of mine
protected vehicles (MPVs), plant equipment or their occupants against a mine threat.
However, the following process should eliminate a number of uncertainties and
thereby reduce risk:
¾ establish the mine threat level;
¾ establish the required protection level in terms of the survivability of the
occupants and the repairability of the vehicle;
¾ establish the stated protection level claimed by the designer or manufacturer;
¾ verify the protection level achieved in the final product;
¾ design process,
¾ materials used,
¾ construction processes,
¾ design features,
¾ test and evaluation; and
¾ ask for assistance.
Mine threat level (MTL)
Ensure that the assessment is conducted against the primary threat level. This will
normally be a combination of MTL-01 (anti-personnel blast) and MTL-02 (anti-tank
fragmentation) and MTL-03 A and B (anti-tank blast) in the humanitarian demining
scenario. MTL-06 (anti-tank SFF) is currently restricted to the Balkans.
Protection levels
Establish the protection levels required by donors, the regulating authorities, as well
as insurance requirements and operators. This is in fact a statement of acceptable
risk and should be determined by taking into account aspects such as availability of
medical facilities, casevac SOPs and availability of repairing facilities.
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Stated protection level
Establish the stated protection level of the system or product. This is easily done by
extracting data from the manufacturer’s product data sheet or brochure. If the
manufacturer does not have the data available in this format, simply ask him.
Establish if this stated protection level meets the requirements of the actual mine
threat and required protection level. A sound understanding of the actual threat and
required protection level is required to achieve this.
For instance, a manufacturer may claim ballistic protection for a particular vegetationcutting machine or flail, based on a commercial tracked excavator, against the
fragmentation of a PROM-1 mine 10 metres away from the cab. This assumption
would not represent the real threat. The PROM mine can be activated by tripwire.
The machine may activate a tripwire with its working part 10 metres of the machine,
but it could initiate a PROM mine within one metre away from the machine. If the
design allowed for protection at 10 metres away, the possibility exists that no
protection will be rendered at one metre, thus resulting in the death or injury of the
operator.
Verification of the protection levels achieved in the product
Design process
Request the manufacturer to submit design detail such as drawings and calculations
to verify the claimed protection level. Ask questions such as “Why is this plate this
thickness, or why did you use this angle of deflection?” If the manufacturer is not
capable of answering these basic questions, the design of the product becomes
questionable. Establish the total mass of the vehicle or machine.
Materials
Establish what materials are used and in what position. Ductile steel with sufficient
toughness should be used in the lower regions close to the blast and the more brittle
armour plates used higher up along the hull. Request material certificates from the
suppliers of the steel to verify what material was used in the design.
Construction methods
Establish what construction methods were used in the design. Bolted sections
securing the lower part of the hull immediately identifies a questionable design.
Capped welding in the lower areas would be better with bending of the plates as
the best solution.
Design features
Evaluate the product’s design features through visual inspection.
Assess the free height of the hull above ground level. This height will determine the
intensity of the impulse and area size of the shock wave. Visualise the size of the
cone of destruction at this height and look out for the following:
¾ any bolted sections within this area?
¾ are all welded sections capped in this area?
¾ did they use a ductile material in this area?
¾ is the design smooth and clean to deflect the blast sufficiently?
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¾ Are there any pockets to trap gas underneath the hull?
¾ Will the fuel tank be subjected to direct shock?
¾ Can water be used in the wheels to effect blast reduction?
Assess the ballistic protection of the product. If armour plate thinner than eight
millimetres (or, in the event of mild steel, 16 millimetres) has been used, ballistic
protection is deemed to be insufficient. Bullet resistant glass with a thickness less
than 53 millimetres should not be used for windows. Pay attention to the screening
off of hydraulic piping, electrical cables and other systems to reduce secondary
damage caused by fragmentation.
Inspect quality of the welding and check for undercuts.
Test and evaluation
Ask the manufacturer if the design of the product had been verified through blast
testing. If so, request test data and results. If the machine or vehicle had been involved
in previous mine incidents, request incident and investigation reports for further
analysis and study.
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Chapter 6.

Mechanical
cost-effectiveness
Summary
This chapter establishes a methodology for the calculation of the costeffectiveness of mechanical demining equipment, in particular through
the Cost-Effectiveness Model (CEMOD) software programme. This
software can be used to assess past or projected costs or to evaluate past or
projected plans.

Introduction
Mechanical clearance equipment has been used by demining organisations almost
since the beginning of mine action in the late 1980s. Initial mechanical clearance
often relied on equipment whose design was influenced by the military objective of
clearing a navigable path through a minefield rather than on the humanitarian
objective of removing all mines in an area. More recently, special-purpose clearance
machines have been developed, but to date, with the exception of mechanical
excavation methods, none of these are perceived as capable to conduct full clearance
without follow-up by either manual demining or MDD teams.
The apparently limited success in the use of mechanical clearance methods means
that most demining organisations continue to rely heavily on manual clearance
techniques. While manual techniques may be a reliable way of ensuring that acceptable
clearance standards are met, they can be slow, expensive and dangerous.
The growing number of purpose-built mechanical mine clearance machines in use
and under development and the increasing variety of ways in which machines are
used to support mine clearance makes it an opportune time to assess the costeffectiveness of mechanical mine clearance. This information can help to serve at
least two purposes. First, a greater awareness of the cost-effectiveness of various
methods of mine clearance may help demining agencies to use their existing resources
more effectively. Second, more widely available and standardised data on the costeffectiveness of mechanical equipment relative to other clearance methods could
help planners and developers allocate support to the machines and techniques that
offer the greatest promise.
The aim of this chapter then, is to establish a methodology as to how an organisation
calculates the cost and the productivity of a machine working in a minefield, and
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how its cost-effectiveness should be established, in comparison with equivalent
clearance carried out by manual or MDD teams. The CEMOD cost-effectiveness
software model is available from the GICHD on CD-ROM upon request. It allows a
manager to decide whether machines or manual methods are more economically
viable for certain clearance tasks.
For both mechanical and manual mine clearance methods, annual data is likely to
provide a more accurate picture than weekly and monthly costs. A shorter reference
period can be more easily distorted by atypical costs, so annual data on items like
spare parts is likely to provide a more accurate picture. Similarly, a longer reference
period may give a more accurate reflection of labour costs and productivity, because
these can be affected if a significant component of the time period is devoted to
training.
Moreover, in monsoonal environments, costs are likely to differ between wet and
dry seasons. For example, in the wet season, soils may break up more easily, aiding
the detection or disablement of mines. Offsetting this, some clearance methods may
not be possible in the wet season due to the bogging of machines and the inundation
of land preventing the use of mine detectors. Hence, both costs and productivity
may differ across seasons and this can distort comparisons if data for different
methods relates to different seasons. The use of an annual reference period can be
thought of as averaging across the various seasons, and so allows greater consistency
of comparisons.
In cost-benefit analysis the term “economic” is generally taken to include shadow
pricing with the objective of assessing social1 benefits and costs from a national
perspective. The objective of this study is to improve the cost-effectiveness of
mechanical demining by implementing agencies. As such, the emphasis should be on
the actual costs they face (whether distorted or not). For this reason our analysis
will be based on estimates of financial costs and benefits.
This report describes how the Cost-Effectiveness Model (CEMOD) should be used
to analyse the effect of, for example, donated equipment on financial2 viability — i.e.
is it ultimately more cost-effective to purchase the desired machine rather than to
“make do” with one donated. It allows calculation of performance indicators (e.g.
cost per square metre) based on alternative assumptions to establish viability:
¾ actual costs faced by project managers, e.g. donated equipment at zero cost;
and
¾ “real cost” to funders of demining activity.

The Cost-Effectiveness Model (CEMOD)
Model purpose and overview
Economics is the study of how society manages scarce resources. Each year resources
available for mine action are sufficient to tackle only a small proportion of mineaffected areas worldwide. Mine action is an expensive activity that can often be
undertaken using a number of different methods. Data already available suggests
that there is a wide range in the unit cost of these methods, even after adjusting for
quality and variation in other key variables. Clearly it is essential that scarce mine
action resources be deployed in such a way as to achieve the best possible outcomes.
Cost-effectiveness analysis has a key role to play in achieving this goal.

Mechanical cost-effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness analysis can be approached in two ways: a) to determine the
least- cost method of achieving a known goal, or b) to find the policy alternative
that will provide the largest benefits for a given level of expenditure (the fixed
budget approach). This report is concerned with the fixed effectiveness approach.
There is an important distinction between cost-effectiveness analysis and costbenefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis can assess both a) whether any of the
alternatives are worth doing (whether benefits to society exceed costs), and b)
how alternatives should be ranked if more than one has benefits that exceed
costs. On the other hand, cost-effectiveness analysis cannot tell the analyst whether
a given alternative is worth doing (this requires a cost-benefit analysis), but if a
decision is made to achieve a particular goal, it can help in deciding which policy
alternative will do so most efficiently.3
The design of the CEMOD is based on the concept of the “mine clearance method”
i.e. any method used to achieve the IMAS standard. There is little point in comparing
different machines in isolation if they make different contributions to mine clearance.
The only useful comparison is between alternative methods that achieve the same
goal.4 For example a given piece of land might be cleared to the same standard by
four alternative methods:
1. manual mine clearance only;
2. flail followed by manual mine clearance;
3. vegetation cutter followed by manual mine clearance; or
4. flail followed by dog teams, supported by manual mine clearance
A vegetation cutter might have a lower cost per square metre than a flail, however
the overall cost of method 2 might be lower than method 3 because manual mine
clearance is faster after a flail.
The following sections of the report describe how the CEMOD can be used to estimate
the cost-effectiveness of alternative mine action methods.

Analysis functions
The CEMOD may be used for four main types of analysis (see Table 1).
1. Past costs: Implementing organisations can analyse the past cost-effectiveness
of alternative methods of mine clearance, given the particular conditions
faced by their organisation. The “real” cost of donated equipment is not
included.
2. Projected costs: Implementing organisations may use CEMOD to project future
expenditure using existing or new mine clearance methods.
3. Planning (Past): Planning organisations can compare the past performance of
different implementing agencies, including adjustments to create a “level
playing field”. The “full market cost” of donated equipment is included.
4. Planning (Projected): Planning organisations can project the future cost
effectiveness of alternative methods of mine clearance, including adjustments
to create a “level playing field”.
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Table 1. Types of analysis performed using CEMOD
Implementation function
Past expenditure

Analyse the cost-effectiveness of
alternative methods of mine
clearance.
Based on “actuals”.

Projected expenditure Project the future costeffectiveness of alternative
methods of mine clearance
Based on expected costs faced
by the implementation agency.

Planning function
Analyse the cost-effectiveness of
alternative methods of mine
clearance.
Based on “actuals”.

Adjust to create “level playing field”.
Project the future cost-effectiveness
of alternative methods of mine
clearance
Based on “expected costs”.
Adjust to create “level playing field”.

How to determine costs
Allocation to cost categories and cost centres
All costs should be broken down into staff salaries, staff allowances, consumables
and capital equipment and allocated to the available cost centres (management and
administration, mine survey, medical, dog teams, manual mine clearance and
mechanical mine clearance; separately for each machine type).
If the organisation operates more than one of a particular type of machine it will
usually be appropriate to allocate costs to these machines as a group. However costs
can be allocated to each machine separately where a separate analysis is desirable.
In this case each machine should be given a separate name (e.g. Flail A, Flail B, etc.).
Machines that use a variety of attachments can be analysed separately or as a group.
If analysed separately then a proportion of the cost of the “base unit” must be
allocated to each of the attachments.
Salaries and allowances
Staff salaries cover the employment costs of all personnel including senior
management. Both local and expatriate staff should be included (except that
implementing agencies should not include those expatriate staff costs which are
donated). The staff allowances category should be used for items such as field
allowance, travel allowance, etc. However agencies can choose, if they wish, to
combine all such costs under the staff salaries subheading.
Consumables
This covers all items that are generally consumed within a year, e.g. petrol, stationery,
machinery repair costs, dog food, rent for buildings, etc.
CEMOD is not designed to take account of changes in stock levels, so consumables
cost data should reflect use during the reporting period rather than change in stock
levels.
Capital equipment
This covers all items that usually have a working life of more than one year. It
includes major items such as mine clearance machinery and vehicles. Also included
are smaller items such as mine detectors and dog kennels. Buildings constructed (or
purchased) by the project should also be included.
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In each case effective working life should be estimated. This is used to estimate the
annual cost of capital equipment (based on capital cost divided by working life). In
some cases judgement may be required; some examples may prove useful:
Table 2.
Example

Working Life

Based on past experience the average working life of a manual mine
detector is estimated to be three years. Value of discarded equipment
is negligible

3 years

Vehicles are kept for four years then sold. They usually realise around
33 per cent of their cost new. Add 33 per cent to working life to account
for salvage value.

4 years

Project will last more than five years. Equipment is expected to last for
5 years
five years and will then be donated to local mine clearance organisation.

Management and administration costs: defining the unit of analysis
The unit of analysis should usually be the whole implementing agency that carries
out mine clearance activities. In some cases it may be appropriate to include a particular
part of an agency, e.g. in cases where separate divisions have quite separate activities
that may be unrelated to mine clearance. In this situation management and
administration costs should be entered for the whole organisation, and an estimate
made of the percentage attributable to mine clearance activities. Management and
administration costs for separate headquarters organisations should not be included.
This should increase the comparability of data between organisations. So, for example,
the home country or regional5 headquarters cost of an NGO involved in mine clearance
activities would not be included.
Types of analysis: Appropriate treatment of capital equipment, donations and overhead
expenditure varies according the type of analysis performed. This is summarised in
Table 3 and covered in more detail below:
Table 3. Treatment of capital equipment, donations and overhead expenditure
Existing capital
equipment

Possible new
equipment

Donated
equipment

Remarks

Only include
costs to the
implementation
organisation

Market cost of
donated items
NOT included

Only include
actual/expected
costs to the
implementation
organisation

Purchase price of
existing
equipment is
treated as a sunk
cost

Implementation function
Past costs

Depreciate over
effective working
life

Projected costs

Depreciate
current salvage
value of existing
equipment over
remaining working
life

Depreciate
expected cost
of new
equipment
over expected
working life

Planning function
Past costs

Depreciate over
effective working
life

Projected costs

Depreciate over
effective working
life

Include full cost
Market cost of
(net of any
donated items
donated element) INCLUDED
Depreciate over
effective working
life

Include full cost
(net of any
donated element)
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Past costs
This analysis function should be used to analyse the past cost-effectiveness of methods
of mine clearance used by an implementation agency.
¾ Enter all costs faced by the implementing agency over a given reporting period
(usually one year).
¾ All management and administration costs are entered, but only a percentage
of these are allocated to mine clearance (this percentage is entered by the
user).
¾ Enter all capital items used by the agency.6
¾ Only enter the cost of donated equipment that is actually paid by the
implementing agency e.g. do not enter the capital cost of donated equipment,
but enter “actual costs” e.g. running costs, cost of repairs, etc.
Projected costs
This analysis function should be used to analyse the projected (future) costeffectiveness of methods of mine clearance that may be used by an implementation
agency.
In most respects the method of determining costs is the same as for past costs.
Projected costs should be based on past data (where available) or in the case of new
equipment or new methods, on data from other agencies working under similar
conditions.
When deciding whether or not to replace existing equipment, we need to compare
the projected cost of existing equipment (treated as a sunk cost) against the projected
cost of the new equipment (depreciated over its expected working life). In this case,
enter the salvage value7 of the existing equipment and the full expected cost of the
possible new equipment. In this case enter remaining8 working life for existing
equipment.
If the new equipment will be used to expand mine clearance activities (not to replace
existing equipment) enter the actual cost of existing equipment and the full expected
cost of possible new equipment.
Planning (past and projected)
This analysis function is used to analyse the past/projected cost effectiveness of
alternative methods of mine clearance. In order to increase comparability, donated
cost items should be included at their real/market price.
All capital items should be entered at their actual or projected cost.

Allocation of costs
Cost-effectiveness analysis requires the development of an appropriate system to
allocate all direct and indirect costs to each cost centre. The cost allocation system
needs to be reasonably accurate, without being too onerous in its data requirements.
CEMOD includes the following cost centres:
¾ management and administration costs,
¾ mine survey,
¾ medical support, and
¾ mine clearance “procedures” (e.g. manual, dog teams, machines).

Mechanical cost-effectiveness

The following notes summarise the way in which costs are allocated in the CEMOD
software.
Management and administration costs (including mine survey)
¾ Calculate the total cost of management and administration for the implementing
agency (excluding international and regional headquarters costs).
¾ Estimate the percentage of management and administration costs attributable
to mine clearance activities.
¾ Estimate mine clearance management and administration cost (based on above).
¾ Add the cost of mine survey activities.
¾ Divide by total area cleared in last reporting period to arrive at management,
administration and survey cost per square metre.
Medical support
¾ Calculate total medical costs (avoid double counting, e.g. inclusion of any of
the management and administration costs included above).
¾ Estimate the percentage of medical costs attributable to:
¾ manual mine clearance and clearance by dogs,
¾ mechanical mine action.
¾ Estimate medical costs per deminer or dog handler day for manual mine
clearance and clearance by dogs (it would not be appropriate to use a per
square metre measure in this case since a deminer clearing a larger area/day
should have a lower per square metre medical cost).
¾ Estimate medical cost per square metre for mechanical mine clearance (this
should be a reasonable approximation, although medical cost per square metre
will also vary with machine speed and crew size).
Manual demining
¾ Calculate total cost of manual demining operations (e.g. salaries/pay, staff
allowances, equipment, transport, etc.).
¾ Estimate deminer days (no. of deminers x no. of demining days) by activity.
This should be available from standard log books used by most demining
organisations e.g.:
¾ manual only,
¾ manual after flail,
¾ manual in support of dog teams,
¾ others,
¾ total deminer days.
¾ Assign cost of manual demining operations to each activity based on average
cost per deminer day x no of days engaged in each activity.
¾ Estimate per square metre costs based on logbook records of area demined
using each method.
¾ In the case of manual in support of dog teams the actual area manually demined
should be recorded (e.g. the clear lanes required by the dog teams), not the
total area cleared using dog teams and manual combined.
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Dog teams
¾ Calculate total cost of dog team operations (e.g. salaries/pay, staff allowances,
equipment, transport, dog training, international technical assistance, kennels
etc.).
¾ Estimate dog handler days (no. of dog handlers x no. of operating days) by
activity (this should be available from standard log books used by most
demining organisations):
¾ dog teams only,
¾ dog teams after flail,
¾ dog teams after vegetation cutter,
¾ total dog team days.
¾ Assign cost of dog team operations to each activity based on average cost per
dog handler day x no of days engaged in each activity.
¾ Estimate per square metre costs based on log book records of area demined
using each method (the net area cleared by dogs excluding the lanes cleared
using manual mine clearance).
In some contexts (e.g. Bosnia) each unit of land is cleared by two independent dog/
handler teams. In this case the actual daily output per dog handler/day is double
that entered in the spreadsheet. An example may make this clearer:
The demining organisation enters:
¾ Area cleared by dog teams
320,000 square metres
¾ Dog handler days to clear this area
1,600 days
¾ This implies area cleared per DH day
200 square metres
However to clear 200 square metres requires coverage by two separate dog teams
e.g. 400 square metres per day.
Mechanical mine clearance
¾ Calculate total cost of mechanical operations for each machine (e.g. capital
equipment, salaries/pay, staff allowances, equipment, running costs, transport,
international TA, etc.).
¾ Capital costs have been annualised using straight line depreciation, assuming
no salvage value.
¾ Calculate machine costs per square metre.

Model output and interpretation
Model output includes cost-effectiveness, cost saving and machine costs per year.
Key indicators include:
¾ Annual cost and cost per square metre for each mine clearance method;
¾ Annual cost saving from use of mechanical support;
¾ Cost saving from use of mechanical support per square metre;
¾ Cost ratio mechanical support: manual mine clearance; and
¾ Time for machine to pay for itself.
Model output is demonstrated in Table 4.
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Table 4. Model output
Variable

Item in ToR

Remarks

Cost per m2 (actual and
“real”)
Cost per unit

Cost effectiveness

Cost effectiveness is estimated
by comparing cost per unit
cleared with base case
(manual clearance or another
chosen method). In the Past
Cost and Projected Cost
functions, cost effectiveness is
based on costs “actually”
faced by project managers. In
the Planning function, cost
effectiveness takes account of
the “real” cost of donated
demining equipment.

Total cost saved compared
to manual (or other method)

Cost saving9

Cost saving is be calculated
relative to manual clearance
or another selected method.

Cost per time period

Define weekly or monthly
manual and machine costs

Annual data on running costs,
spare parts, etc. provides a
more accurate picture. Some
staff may be salaried but
cannot work in some months
of the year.

Sensitivity Analysis or
Switching Values

Highlight variables relating to
cost effectiveness

Effect of change in
assumptions on cost per m2,
total cost saved, etc. –
highlighting variables with
greatest effect on cost
effectiveness (see above).

How to calculate cost per square metre
The CEMOD system calculates mine clearance costs per square metre for each method
of mine clearance. CEMOD allocates management, administration, survey and medical
costs in a standard way that will facilitate comparison between different mechanical
clearance systems, and between mechanical and manual or manual/dog systems.
This report includes guidelines for the treatment of donated items and headquarters
administration/supervision costs. Four analysis functions are described, since the
“real” cost of mine action depends on the perspective of the decision maker — whether
they are an implementing or planning agency and whether the analysis covers past
or projected costs.
Cost per square metre should only be compared “where all other factors are equal”,
i.e. for clearance of mined land of similar characteristics. Differences in cost per
square metre between minefields may be a reflection of changes in mine field
characteristics — rather than the cost-effectiveness of alternative mine clearance
procedures.
How to determine the cost-effectiveness of alternative methods of mine
clearance
Analysis of the cost-effectiveness or productive value of mine action machines is
integrated into the comparison of alternative methods of achieving the same goal
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(mine clearance to a given standard). This allows direct comparison of alternative
combinations of procedures including area reduction, area preparation and
combination machines with multiple tool attachments.
CEMOD also produces data on annual machine costs and cost per operating day.
Comparisons based on machine cost per square metre will be valuable where
different machines perform similar tasks. Data on cost per operating day highlight
the importance of maximising the effective operating hours of expensive pieces
of capital equipment.
Manual mine clearance provides a useful benchmark (base case); against which
alternative mine clearance procedures can be assessed. Alternatively, a mechanical
method may be entered as the base case. CEMOD compares the cost of alternative
methods of mine clearance with the base case (it provides cost per square metre and
the cost per square metre of each method as a percentage of the base case). Data is
also provided on potential annual cost savings relative to the base case if each method
had been used over the entire area cleared. Some judgement is required in using
these figures appropriately, since in many cases use of a single method over the
entire area would not be feasible.
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis tests how changes in key assumptions affect the key output from
the model (e.g. cost per square metre). The analyst concentrates on the changes
which, based on past experience, are most likely to occur. For example how would
the key indicators change if:
1. area cleared per machine per year was 30 per cent less or more?
2. area cleared manually per day was 30 per cent more or less?
3. area cleared manually (or by dogs) after a machine was 30 per cent more or
less?
4. management and administration costs per square metre were 30 per cent more
or less?
To carry out sensitivity analysis using CEMOD:
¾ Enter data into CEMOD using actual past data (or your best estimate of what
will happen in the future). Print Standard Reports. Save to an appropriate
name e.g. CEMOD Base Case;
¾ Change a key assumption e.g. decrease are cleared per machine per year. Print
Standard Reports. Save to an appropriate name e.g. CEMOD Scenario 1;
¾ Continue for as many alternative scenarios as appropriate; and
¾ Review results.
Discussion of CEMOD results should be backed up by a discussion of the how
sensitive key indicators are to changes in key assumptions. For example:
“Mine clearance using method 1 (Mine Shredder followed by manual clearance) had
the lowest overall cost per m2. However achievement of this cost level requires annual
clearance by Mine Shredder of 500ha. Based on past experience of … there is a
significant risk that this will not be possible, in which case method 2 would have the
lowest cost per square metre.”
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Factors affecting cost-effectiveness
The cost-effectiveness model is designed to provide standardised calculations of
the cost of mine clearance using actual or projected data. Many factors are likely
to influence the cost-effectiveness of particular methods of mine clearance in
particular settings (see Table 4). Foremost among these will be labour and machine
costs, and the comparative productivity levels of manual clearance teams, dog
teams and mechanical clearance machines (whether in a support or leading role).
However, other idiosyncratic factors are also likely to be important and these
are not incorporated into CEMOD even though they are likely to be relevant to
the decisions that agencies make about the most effective way to clear a given
area.
For example, an agency may use different machines to do a similar task (say,
vegetation clearance), but on land with different characteristics. While it would be
possible to have a model that considers factors such as slope v. flat, dry v. wet, such
a model would be quite complicated and it would be more difficult to use the model
for planning purposes. Instead, it is expected that when the current model gives
costs for each machine, the user can work out if the higher cost for one machine is
justified by the more difficult terrain it is working on.
Table 5. Key variables affecting cost-effectiveness
Variable

Remarks

Administration & support costs
Medical costs

Substantial variation between countries and organisations,
etc.

Labour costs

Vary with country, skill levels, employing organisation, etc.

Machine costs

Should (in theory) be similar for equipment procured
internationally, but transport costs, tariffs/duties, availability
of supply, etc., may cause considerable variation.

Labour productivity

Key variables include:
i. work practices, training and labour turnover,
ii. weather and seasonal conditions,
iii. degree of metal contamination (including laterite soils),
iv. terrain and amount of vegetation, rubble, etc.,
v. number and type of mines present, and
vi. rate before and after machine use.

Machine productivity

Key variables include those detailed above, and:
i. area suitable for demining by that machine,
ii. work practices, training and labour turnover,
iii. type of role undertaken by machine,
iv. result of machine action (degree of contribution to the
entire clearance method),
v. feasibility/difficulty of moving machine to site,
vi. reliability (amount of down time due to mechanical
problems),
vii. clearance depth (see below), and
viii. number and type of mines present.

A similar complication comes from the type of mine that is expected in a given field.
Mechanical procedures that are feasible when working with anti-personnel mines
may not be feasible when working on anti-tank mines and the use of suitably
armoured machinery is likely to affect the cost comparisons. Hence, the information
provided by CEMOD cannot replace the detailed knowledge of project managers,
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instead it is designed to provide additional information so that they can make better
informed decisions about mine clearance.
There are at least two additional factors that must be considered so that the cost
effectiveness calculations can be put in their correct context. First, as noted above,
there is no explicit premium for timeliness in the calculations carried out by CEMOD.
However, while the reports allow methods to be compared on an area unit basis,
they also indicate clearance rates and cost per day, so information on the timeliness
of particular methods can be extracted. It is unlikely that a standardised model
could provide more detail because local factors (such as the pressure on land) will
dictate what value is placed on timeliness. Second, although square metre seems to
be an accepted metric for recording output, there is some argument for considering
the depth of clearance. A hidden (dis)advantage of some machines may be that they
clear to a (lesser) greater depth than is possible with other techniques. A comparison
solely on the basis of costs per square metre will miss this point and may unfairly
indicate an advantage for one machine or method in the comparisons.

Mechanical cost-effectiveness

Endnotes

1. i.e. from the point of view of, for example, Bosnian society as a whole. Such economic calculations
might for example be adjusted for taxes, tariffs and other price distortions. They might include a
shadow cost of labour lower than actual rates paid to those working on demining — to reflecting
the high local rate of unemployment.
2. See note 1.
3. This paragraph is summarised from D.L. Weimer and A.R. Vining (1999), Policy Analysis: Concepts
and Practice.
4. Subject to differences in conditions and other variables (discussed below). There is no explicit
consideration of the time taken to achieve the goal because the value of timeliness may differ
greatly between projects. However, timeliness is one of many factors that users of the model must
bear in mind when interpreting the results.
5. Regional in the sense of covering a group of countries.
6. The present model does not account for inflation. This should not normally significantly affect
results since most capital items have a fairly short life and many agencies will enter costs in US$
terms (and the U.S. inflation rate is at low levels). This could be a problem if cost data is entered
based on a currency with a high inflation rate.
7. The money that could realistically be obtained if the equipment was sold.
8. Number of years you expect existing equipment to remain in service from the analysis date.
9. It is assumed that the term productive value in the TOR (item 1) is the same as cost saving.
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Main study conclusions
and recommendations

Conclusion 1.

Under certain circumstances, machines are capable of achieving full clearance.
Even when employed only in the ground preparation role, some machines have shown,
through the testing and empirical performance data available, and when operating in a
suitable environment no live mines are left in a condition that could pose a further threat.
Where mechanical excavation is concerned, clearance is achieved down to the depth at
which operators remove suspect soil.
Recommendation 1.
Machines used for primary clearance can achieve the IMAS specification of mine clearance
quality in suitable environments against certain mine types. The residual threat — ordnance
that is unlikely to be fully destroyed by a particular machine in a particular environment —
should be understood by the operator and the relevant demining authority. Any postmechanical clearance by manual or mine detection dogs (MDDs) should be tailored to
meet the identified residual threat in order to make clearance operations more rapid.
Conclusion 2.

With regard to flails and tillers, the physical interaction between the destructive
tool, the ground and the mine/UXO, is not completely understood.
Some of the negative effects — such as throw-outs or burying — have been identified but
their exact causes can not yet be fully explained.
Recommendation 2.
The demining and the scientific communities need to conduct further research into the
following areas:
¾ To determine how the following issues:
· impact stress and soil movement;
· limits imposed by soil/terrain/vegetation;
· flail hammer geometry;
· engine power;
· flail shaft height above the ground;
· forward speed, and;
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· mine type
are responsible for the negative results of:
· soil bulking/overburden;
· throw-outs;
· skipped zones;
· slipstreaming (tillers only), and;
· burying and bow wave (tillers only).
Better understanding of the causes will lead to suppression/control of the effects;
mechanical clearance results should be predictable.
¾ Where mines/UXO are not detonated but are broken up by machine use, the
remaining fragments may or may not constitute a further threat. Relating to different
mine types, guidelines should establish the level of damage to a mine such that it no
longer poses a threat to subsequent clearance personnel or users of the land. Where
ordnance fails to detonate, a definition of what level of destruction constitutes a nonhazardous mine/UXO, when broken up, is required.
¾ Some mechanical tools penetrate the ground, often resulting in removal of top soil,
leaving pulverised earth and destroying shallow root systems. The short- or longterm ecological damage that might be caused to soil and the implications this has
for agriculture should be established.
Conclusion 3.

The clearance capability of some mechanical demining systems is not always
predictable.
In part this is due to a lack of testing with a sufficient number of ordnance targets. Due to the
efforts of the European Committee for Standardization, Workshop 12 (CEN WS 12), more and
better testing data is likely to be available in the coming years. Another reason for the lack
of understanding of machine effectiveness is the limited availability of machine clearance
data from field operations which could be used to assess mechanical systems empirically.
With such information, a greater understanding of mechanical clearance capability would
emerge.
Recommendation 3.
The demining community should record mechanical clearance data in a standard,
internationally recognised format. This would provide a clear, comparative format for
assessing the true capabilities of various mechanical systems involved in demining.
Empirical data could then be used to argue the case for further employment of machines in
mine clearance. Templates and software for the collection of standardised mechanical
clearance data is under development at the GICHD.
Conclusion 4.

Mine clearance is in reality a risk reduction process. However, the total removal of
risk cannot be guaranteed due to the limitations applicable to all known clearance
methods.
A structured risk assessment with its attendant understanding of local, tolerable risk criteria
will assist deminers in making the most appropriate decision as to where to carry out clearance
(prioritisation), and by what means. Currently, the worst case scenario is generally applied,
resulting in an attempt to clear all suspected hazardous areas — often not the most efficient
use of scarce resources.
Recommendation 4.
¾ Demining agencies should consider using a structured risk assessment process to
get the best out of their clearance. General survey information should be assessed
by physical action, i.e. technical survey, in order to make the decision whether or not
to commit deminers to an area.

Main study conclusions and recommendations

¾ In the right physical environment, machines are often the most effective means of
acquiring accurate information about the ordnance hazards in a suspect area.
¾ Machines should be used for technical survey as part of a risk assessment process.
Currently, this use for machines is not practised widely. Increased use of machines in
this role will allow deminers to confidently rule out the necessity for further clearance
in some areas. In areas where subsequent demining is required, the risk to deminers
is reduced as quantities of existing ordnance may be destroyed and ground will be
prepared making subsequent post-mechanical clearance faster. The attempt to clear
all suspect areas all the time is not required and will only slow down the worldwide
effort to remove landmines and UXO.
¾ Manufacturers should consider the information gathering abilities afforded by
clearance and detection tools attached to mechanical systems, and attempt to
incorporate such assets in their designs. Further research on machine attachments
other than the primary working tools, such as vapour detectors, magnets, ground
penetrating radar, global positioning systems (GPS) and thermal imaging is
encouraged.
Conclusion 5.

Today, the great majority of suspect land cleared is subsequently revealed not to
contain mines.
Much time is spent in the search for ordnance, particularly where general survey information
is poor. Data analysed by the GICHD from 15 separate national demining authorities indicated
that of all land cleared, it is possible that an average of less than less than three per cent of
suspect land ever contained mines or UXO. Knowing where landmines are located and
therefore where to clear, is possibly the best way to increase demining efficiency.
Recommendation 5.
Where no clear evidence of a threat is confirmed, suspect areas can be eliminated through
a systematic mechanical area reduction process. The same would apply to areas where
hard evidence of the presence of mines exists but quick confirmation as to true disposition
is required.
Conclusion 6.

Preparing ground by machine for subsequent demining methods — manual or
mine dog detection — significantly increases the speed at which clearance can
be conducted as many common obstacles will be removed.
The greatest benefits brought to manual or MDD clearance teams are the cutting of vegetation
and the removal of tripwires, the breaking up of soil surfaces, and the removal of metal scrap
contamination. The hierarchy of importance of these obstacles can vary, depending on the
physical environment, threat type and the machine available to prepare the ground. A
machine that can remove all of these obstacles, in as few passes as possible, will contribute
the most to manual and MDD clearance operations.
Recommendation 6.
Manufacturers should develop machines that can remove all main obstacles facing
deminers; cut vegetation and remove tripwires, break up soil, and expose and remove
metal fragments.
Demining organisations should buy and use machines that can defeat as many of the
common obstacles as possible in order to bring the greatest operational and cost-effective
benefits to their programmes.
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Conclusion 7.

The involvement of machines in the mine clearance process can contribute to
significant improvements in productivity.
Evidence of this is found in the case studies included in the chapters of this report covering
area reduction and ground preparation; the productivity increase in the most extreme
example was in excess of 2,000 per cent. Although more moderate figures are typical, in
general, machines will improve the cost-effectiveness of demining operations.
Recommendation 7.
Where conditions are suitable, the wider employment of mechanical systems in demining
programmes, particularly for area reduction and ground preparation, will often significantly
enhance productivity and cost-effectiveness.
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List of acronyms

APC
ARR
BAC
BiH
CEN
CCMAT
CEMOD
CMAC
CROMAC
DRES
ELS
EOD
GICHD
HALO
HC
hp
IMAS
ISO
IR
JAHDS
LAF
LNDO
LMDS
MAG
MDD

armoured personnel carrier
Area Reduction Roller
battle area clearance
Bosnia and Herzegovina
European Committee for Standardization (Comité Européen de
Standardisation)
Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies
Cost-Effectiveness Model
Cambodian Mine Action Centre
Croatian Mine Action Centre
Defence Research Establishment Suffield (now Defence Research and
Development Canada - Suffield)
European Landmine Solutions
explosive ordnance disposal
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organisation
hollow charge
horsepower
International Mine Action Standards
International Organization for Standardization
increase rate
Japanese Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support
Lebanese Armed Forces
Lebanese National Demining Office
Land Mine Disposal System
Mines Advisory Group
mine detection dog
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MgM
MPV
NATO
NPA
NVESD
QA
QC
R&D
REST
rpm
SDTT
SFF
SHA
SOP
STS
SWEDEC
TMAC
TNT
U.K.
UNMAPA
UNMAS
U.S.
UXO

Menschen gegen Minen
mine protected vehicle
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Norwegian People’s Aid
Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate (U.S. Army)
quality assurance
quality control
research and development
Remote Explosive Scent Tracing
revolutions per minute
Survivable Demining Tractor and Tools
self forming fragment
suspected hazardous area
standing operating procedure
Safety Technology System
Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining Centre
Thailand Mine Action Centre
trinitrotoluene
United Kingdom
United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
United Nations Mine Action Service
United States
unexploded ordnance
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The User Focus Group

Armtrac

Steve Brown

Bofors Defence

Allan Carlsson

Canadian Centre for
Mine Action Technology

Geoff Coley

CSIR Defencetek

Theo Van Dyk, Danie Smit

Dok-Ing D.O.O

Vjekoslov Majetic, Josip Tulicic

ELS

Rob Jones

GICHD

Håvard Bach, Mark Buswell, Johannes Dirscherl,
Alexander Griffiths, Leonard Kaminski

The HALO Trust

Gerhard Zank, Simon Conway

Institute for Defense
Analyses

Hal Bertran

ITEP/Qinetiq

Chris Leach, Peter Blatchford

LNDO

Wassim Saleh

MAG

Barry Lower

Mechem

Ashley Williams, Freek Kruger

Minetech Int’l

Lionel Dyk, Hugh Morris

NPA

Erik Tollefsen, Paul Collinson

NVESD

Charlie Chichester, Chris Wanner

Redbus LMDS

Bob French

SWEDEC

Kaj Hörberg, Jan-Ole Robertz, Bo Malmberg

UNMAS

Noel Mulliner

Consultant

Roger Hess
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Appendix 2

Glossary of terms and abbreviations1
anti-personnel mine
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.
anti-tank mine
a landmine other than an anti-personal mine designed to be detonated by the
presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle.
area reduction
the process through which the initial area indicated as contaminated (during
the general mine action assessment process) is reduced to a smaller area.
Note: Area reduction may involve some limited clearance, such as the opening of access
routes and the destruction of mines and UXO which represent an immediate and unacceptable
risk, but it will mainly be as a consequence of collecting more reliable information on the
extent of the hazardous area. Usually it will be appropriate to mark the remaining hazardous
area(s) with permanent or temporary marking systems.

booby-trap
an explosive or non-explosive device, or other material, deliberately placed to
cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally
safe act is performed.
casevac
casualty evacuation.
CEMOD (cost-effectiveness model)
Excel-based software model with visual basic interface design for managers of
mine action programmes to evaluate cost-effective methods of clearance.2
cost-effectiveness
an assessment of the balance between a system’s performance and its operational
costs, relative to other methods of doing the same job.
demining
activities which lead to the removal of mine and UXO hazard including technical
survey, mapping, clearance, marking, post clearance documentation, community
mine action liaison and the hand-over of cleared land. Demining may be carried
out by different organisations, such as NGOs, commercial companies, national
mine action teams or military units. Demining may be emergency based or
developmental.
demining lane
the generic term for any lane, other than a boundary, cleared by a survey or
clearance team to the international standard for cleared lane. This may include
access lanes for machines to enter the minefield.
Note: A breaching lane is also a demining lane.
1. This glossary is for the purposes of this study only. Where an existing IMAS definition exists, this has been
used.
2. CEMOD was developed for the GICHD by Dan Marsh and John Gibson.
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deminer
a person qualified and employed to undertake demining activities or work on
a demining worksite.
demining organisation
refers to any organisation (government, NGO, military, or commercial entity)
responsible for implementing demining projects or tasks.
dummy mine
objects used to represent a mine. Used for testing and demonstration.
follow-up
the process of conducting clearance subsequent to the use of a machine or any
other initial method of clearance.
ground preparation
preparing the ground, usually by mechanical means, by removing or reducing
terrain obstacles.
increase rate
refers to the number of times the clearance rate of a deminer/s has been increased.
intrusive machine
any machine that is capable of operating inside a mined area or minefield as it
is capable of protecting the operator from the effects of blast and fragmentation
from mine and UXO detonations and has a high level of survivability. Intrusive
machines can be operator driven or remotely controlled.
Note. Machines are fitted with tools designed to clear mines e.g. flails.

mechanical application
the generic term to describe the use of machines conducting various roles within
mine clearance operations.
mechanical clearance
the application of mechanical systems as the primary clearance tool.
mine risk education (MRE)
a process that promotes the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups,
and which provides the links between affected communities, other mine action
components and other sectors.
mine threat
Mine and UXO threat. An indication of the potential harm from the number,
nature, disposition and detectability of mines and UXO in a given area.
mined area
an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines
minefield
an area of ground containing mines laid with or without a pattern.
Note. Differs from a mined area as dimensions of the area, the quantity and type of mines
and ordnance are better understood.
Note. A minefield is considered to have a pattern when information about the location of
one or more mines can be used to predict the location of others. A minefield is considered
non-patterned when information about the location of one mine cannot be used to predict
the location of others.

non-intrusive machine
a machine which works from the fringes of minefields (in safe or clear areas) as
it affords the operator limited protection from a effects of mine or UXO blast.
Note: machine is usually fitted with ground preparation tools.
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quality assurance (QA)
quality control (QC)
part of the management focused on providing confidence that quality
requirements will be met. (ISO 9000:2000)
Note: QC relates to the inspection of a finished product.

R&D
research and development
residual risk
in the context of demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the
application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or UXO
hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
residual threat
in the context of demining, the term refers to the mines and UXO remaining in
the ground after a machine has been applied as a single stage in a multiple stage
clearance process.
risk
is the combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of
that harm.
risk assessment
a process of identifying potential areas of harm to enable informed decisions to
be made.
risk reduction
control measures taken to reduce the impact and/or probability of risks.
surrogate mine
a replica of a mine, the same in all aspects less a main charge. Used for testing
and demonstration. In some cases, surrogate mines may contain a live fuze
mechanism, particularly when used in testing machines.
technical survey
the detailed topographical and technical investigation of known or suspected
mined areas identified during the planning phase. Such areas may have been
identified during the general mine action assessment or have been otherwise
reported.
tolerable risk
the degree to which a risk is acceptable.
unexploded ordnance (UXO)
explosive ordnance that has been primed, armed or otherwise prepared for use
or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains
unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other reason.
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